


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Soviet Union

Military Affairs

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Lizichev Explains Reasons for Leaving GlavPUR

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VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 10, May 91
(Signed to press 31 May 91) pp 48-55

[Interview with Army General A. Lizichev, chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "Principles Are Like 10-Ruble Banknotes—You Can't Negotiate Them"]

[Text] The sudden departure of Army General A. Lizichev from his post as chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy generated many rumors, and even gossip. The short, caustic communique that appeared at that time in *KOMMERSANT* and in some other publications didn't clear anything up either. And the article "General Roulette" by A. Golovkov in *OGONEK*, (No 2, 1991), which discussed Army General A. Lizichev's "dacha" and his "unprincipled" position in the investigation of the personal matter involving Marshal of Engineer Troops N. Shestopalov, added to the false rumors. "I would like to dig down to the ultimate truth," Colonel P. Savchuk wrote the editor's office, "and not just out of idle curiosity. What we are talking about, you see, is the honor and merit of an individual who was just recently the top political worker of the armed forces. And all of this gossip and slander and these rumors cast a shadow not only upon him, but also concurrently upon the army and its political organs."

The editor's office received similar letters from Colonel Ye. Kapralov, lieutenant colonels V. Nosov and S. Shulga, majors M. Borovskiy, S. Baranov and N. Karpeshin, Captain O. Nekrylov and others. Readers want to know not only the reasons why the former chief of the GlavPUR resigned his office and what his opinion is of the article in *OGONEK*, but also his attitude toward many problems of the armed forces and country. The editor's office decided to acquaint Army General A. Lizichev with the content of the letters. Our correspondent met with him.

[Correspondent] Aleksey Dmitriyevich, our readers relate different stories about your sudden departure from your post as chief of the GlavPUR. What was it that actually motivated you to do so?

[Lizichev] I resigned my position at my personal request. In the statement I wrote to the CPSU Central Committee prior to my resignation I sincerely named the following reasons. First and foremost was deterioration of my health. I suffered an heart attack back in 1986, and aggravations occurred in late 1989. The attack was compounded by other diseases. Doctors require me to observe a strict regimen. I could no longer work actively, at full effort under such a regimen when my workday was 16-18 hours long. In the best case, even on Sundays I could only get a few hours rest after lunch. And even so, whenever I went for a walk I told the duty officer which way I would walk and when I would return, so that I could be summoned. And summoned I was.

Many things affected my health. There was the constant pressure at work. And the criticism levied against the GlavPUR and political organs. And consider how mercilessly I was queried about discipline, and about social protection of servicemen. And many times at that. Did this have an effect on me? And how! Moreover you can't rectify the situation sitting in an office. I had to visit the troops constantly—in the north, in the south, in the west, in the east, and certain "hot spots" required special attention. I visited Chernobyl on several occasions, and the Baltic four times. On several occasions I visited Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. In those places the discussions were agonizing, serious and sharp, not only in our military environment but also with local authorities. And what about the discussions with refugees? The letters from victims? The tears of mothers? Learning about the life of officers and seagoing and shore-based warrant officers in many regions? And the reproaches. Hundreds of reproaches. Just and undeserved. I was torn by the sad truth that I couldn't help everyone in all places. I began to feel more and more strongly that I was beginning to lose ground. And I could never get used to working at half speed. Nor could I shift the work and the responsibility to someone else's shoulders. I made plans to resign even prior to the party congress. After all, the congress was to hold central committee elections. By tradition, the chief of the GlavPUR—the leader of the armed forces party organization, which is more than a million strong—has always been elected to the central committee. How would it have looked if I had been elected, and then resigned? And the term, as we know, is for five years. Therefore I had to honestly state my position, so that the person who would take over from me would be elected to the central committee, rather than myself.

[Correspondent] What other reasons were there for your resignation?

[Lizichev] In that period of especially angry attacks upon political organs, I unexpectedly discovered that not all leaders understand their role adequately. Obviously the poison pen campaign did its work. As you know, the question of practically eliminating political organs was even raised. I wrote in their defense in *PRAVDA*, in *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* and in other publications. I explained the reasons why they had to be reformed. I proposed specific paths.

We discussed this matter at the Bureau in the GlavPUR as well. The opinions did of course differ. And I naturally had my own as well. For example I was firmly convinced that political organs were the best suited to the unique features of the army's organization, and I emphasized this categorically in my statement. They combine political, party and state functions. That is, they concentrate the entire political branch of influence upon the individual, upon his education, upon his world outlook. This has been verified by all of their glorious history. I felt then, and I feel now, that this life-tested experience has justified itself in many ways. And it did not require fundamental dismantling. Still, I knew that we had to

reckon with the new realities of our life, and take them into account. We had to switch to new methods of leadership, and to abandon functions of power.

I also felt it necessary to conduct universal elections to party organs from bottom up, in accordance with the regulations. At the same time we also had to consider the unique features of army and navy party organizations, and the structure and objectives of the armed forces in today's conditions. We discussed this matter at the Bureau of the GlavPUR. The entire Bureau—15 persons—voted to preserve the existing procedure for forming party organs. These issues were also examined by the Board of the Ministry of Defense. We needed to know the opinion of the minister of defense, his deputies and the commanders-in-chief of the armed services. They supported the GlavPUR's proposal. Then this issue was discussed in the CPSU Central Committee. Significant changes were introduced there. We were forced to discuss a new variant in the GlavPUR. We invited all categories of active political workers to discuss it—from secretaries of primary party organizations to military council members and political directorate chiefs. Many comrades did not support the new variant. They insisted on preserving the old structure.

[Correspondent] We know that you said in that conference that you weren't about to "become the grave digger of political organs."

[Lizichev] Yes, I insisted on preserving the political and party structures that had established themselves in the army, although with regard for the real life of the party and its restructuring, without weakening the role of political organs, and without taking any steps toward removing the party from the military. My arguments did not receive the support of a number of comrades. It was then that I uttered the phrase: "The political organs must be. I will not become the grave digger of the political organs. We cannot allow the party to be removed from the military! Nor is it possible to sit forever in the old saddle." It was then that I proposed, in behalf of the leadership of the GlavPUR, the structure which was then announced at the Central Committee Plenum. It was laid at the basis of the present reorganization of political and party structures in the armed forces. I understood that it was going to take hard work, and that the new policy would have to be implemented by new personnel. Younger ones. More energetic ones. Ones who would not be held back by the anchor of established positions.

[Correspondent] That is, in your statement you also raised the issue of your succession.

[Lizichev] Yes, I also gave thought to who might take my place. I needed to select someone seven or eight years younger than myself. There were many who were worthy. I chose Nikolay Ivanovich Shlyaga.

[Correspondent] Why precisely him?

[Lizichev] First because I feel he is a real professional in party-political work. He underwent a good school of

practical experience at all of its levels, and he worked in the Central Committee. His firmness of position is combined with flexibility in resolving urgent issues, and in his approach to people. Finally, this is a person who knows how to look ahead. It was for this reason that I asked him to leave his position on the Central Committee staff and work for me as my first deputy. I had my eyes on him for a long time.... I consciously assigned the most difficult problems to him, and gave him the right to solve them on his own. I persuaded myself as to his qualities, and I feel that I have not erred in naming my successor.

[Correspondent] Did your statement reach Gorbachev?

[Lizichev] Yes, I was told in the Central Committee that Mikhail Sergeyevich did look at it. But I never spoke with him about it. I talked with secretaries of the Central Committee. And the latter agreed with the opinion of the secretariat "to accept my resignation."

[Correspondent] Were there any attempts "from above" to talk you out of your intention to resign your position as chief of the GlavPUR?

[Lizichev] There were. They said, did I really have to leave at such a difficult time? Would it be prudent perhaps to work on a temporary basis? But I said firmly that my decision was final.

[Correspondent] Aleksey Dmitriyevich, a second group of questions from readers involves the article in OGONEK. What is your assessment of it? The criticism of you was extremely serious.

[Lizichev] First of all I would like to say that neither Comrade Sergeyev nor the correspondent who conducted the interview checked the facts, nor did they meet and talk with me. How does this look from the standpoint of elementary journalistic ethics? To me personally, it's incomprehensible. But this is probably the working style of people who don't care in the least about the objectivity of their printed words.

As we know, two complaints were made against me in that article. The author accused me of being unprincipled in relation to alleged abuses by Comrade Shestopalov. What can I say in this regard? All of the materials that were sent to the Main Political Directorate and which I acquainted myself with were reported simultaneously by me to the minister of defense and sent to the chief military procurator. They looked at them over there, and made administrative decisions in regard to them. That's first, and second, both Sergeyev and Golovkov should know by now that under our organization, it is the primary party organization that deals with the issue of subjecting a person guilty of wrongdoing to party responsibility. This is why the letters were forwarded to the primary political organ, and why the party commission under the GlavPUR was told to monitor the issue's resolution by the primary party organization and the party commission of the primary political organ. And the party commission under the GlavPUR did in fact do

so. On the basis of its findings I asked the party committee secretary to invite Comrade Shestopalov in for a discussion. That's normal. This is usually done when a personal case is under consideration. The chief of the GlavPUR never imposes party punishment personally. This is done by the party committee or the party commission. Therefore there are no grounds for accusing me of being unprincipled.

[Correspondent] But what about the complaints of the authors concerning the dacha business?

[Lizichev] In 45 years of service in the army, of which half were spent in the North and in the Transbaykal, including in positions which allowed me to have a dacha by government decree, I never possessed either a personal or an official dacha. It was only when I was appointed to the position of GlavPUR chief that I was offered the official dacha of the former chief of the armed forces rear services, as a member of the Board of the USSR Ministry of Defense and in accordance with the government decree. Its living space is 160 square meters. But the authors of the article counted 3,501. I have been paying rent on the dacha since July of last year in accordance with the new statute. I have paid over 900 rubles in half a year. There is an official document to that effect. I pay for furniture according to rates established by the government. And I paid the off full value of furniture which I purchased after five years of use. I never bought the television or refrigerator, and I didn't use any other buildings or land. I informed Chairman Bezbakh of the privilege inspection group of the USSR Supreme Soviet, with whom I met at my own initiative, about all of this.

[Correspondent] The article in OGONEK states that the parcel on which your dacha sits has "a modest lodge with a Finnish bath (112.3 square meters), a shower, a tub, a recreation room, and at least another three guest rooms."

[Lizichev] I have nothing to do with this structure, and I never have. Senior warrant officer K. Lyantsevich lives in it. As far as using the sauna in that house is concerned, if the authors of the article had asked me, or the owner of this house, or the doctors, they would have learned that saunas have been categorically contraindicated to me since September 1986, after I suffered my heart attack.

[Correspondent] Why didn't you write a denial in OGONEK, or take the matter to court? What we have here, after all, is not only a distortion of the facts but also an insult to your civic worth.

[Lizichev] When the "chief inspector of the USSR Committee for People's Control," a colonel and a lawyer approaches investigation of such a serious matter in this way, and lies, and when a journal publishes his lies, my dignity does not permit me to enter into combat with people who act dishonorably. I also have my own principles. And to me they're like 10-ruble notes—you can't negotiate them.

[Correspondent] Are you saying, then, that you haven't done anything against the law by living in the dacha?

[Lizichev] Let me put special emphasis on the fact that this is an official dacha. One which was built not for me, and which was used by other people for decades past. My right to live in it was sanctioned by a government decree. What could possibly be illegal here?

[Correspondent] But could you have built your own dacha?

[Lizichev] Certainly. But I always felt, and I still feel now, that because of the position I occupy, I didn't have the right to do so. Even today I still don't have my own dacha. As they say, a reputation is more precious than a dacha. I have always avoided even the slightest causes for ruining it.

[Correspondent] Aleksey Dmitriyevich, let's now go on to the third group of questions from readers who ask for your opinion about various political and social problems in the army and country. Here's one: To what possible consequences could division of the functions of political and party organs lead?

[Lizichev] I think that in the first while, certain confusion may arise, especially in the tactics of action and in the nature of mutual relations. The situation is an entirely new one. That's natural. New wrinkles will also appear in mutual relations between commanders, political organs and party committees. Artificially provoked tensions and ambitions are impermissible here as well. One-man command was, is and should be the fundamental principle. And no matter how they might divide their functions, both political organs and party organizations are obligated to support this principle, though of course they should also react to those who confuse one-man command with all-permissiveness. The leaders must support unity of action with the highest responsibility. The interests of defending the motherland are above everything else.

[Correspondent] Many anti-army officials and publications are making every effort to prove even today that reform of political organs is only a name change, as you are well aware. That political organs will supposedly continue to shuffle papers, divide scarce goods among themselves and create obstacles to the work of others.

[Lizichev] Political organs have never sat around doing nothing, or divided things, or created any sort of obstacles. What we have here is dilettantes, pseudo-democrats and populists trying to impose such an opinion, relying on their own "observations." I'm not surprised by such people. But what are you going to do with them? It's like an amateur musician giving advice to a professional artist, and an ignoramus to a chemist. How can you possibly get angry at them? But let's get back to the question at hand. Doesn't the increase or stability of party membership in armed forces units suggest a certain effectiveness in the work of political organs? And the steady decrease in crime? And the solidarity of army

collectives, their faithfulness to socialism and to protecting the fatherland—don't these things say this as well?

[Correspondent] But Aleksey Dmitriyevich, there are people who have their own logic in this regard. They say that many join the party to further their careers. If you're not a communist, you'll never climb to the top positions.

[Lizichev] This "logic" is absolutely unfounded. If we follow it, wouldn't we have to conclude that the more than 1 million army and navy communists are only in it to further their careers? In my 45 years of service in the armed forces, political organs and party organizations have always promoted growth of party membership. And it has grown not in response to pressure, but by choice, through selection of worthy people. Is this not an indication of growth of the authority of both party and political organs? In the army, defections from the party are isolated cases. The authority of the party, the authority of the communist in the armed forces has persisted and continues to persist because only a few careerists have been able to slip in. The number of persons who joined the CPSU in the last year significantly exceeds the number who left it. As you can see, while people are abandoning the party in some places, here they're joining it. Considering this, can you say that the political organs have been inactive? Only idle gossipers could say such a thing. On the other hand what I say is based on facts and figures; I'm talking about authority that political organs and party organizations have in fact possessed. Together with commanders they have persistently fought to raise the combat readiness of the troops and to strengthen their political morale.

The fact that immature, ambitious and dishonorable people have served as chiefs of some political organs is another matter. Such people are even around today, unfortunately. Every family has a skeleton in its closet. What we should be talking about here is specific individuals, rather than making sweeping generalizations.

[Correspondent] What do you see as the prospects for a multiparty system in the army?

[Lizichev] It's too early to say anything now. No matter how they criticize the CPSU, or how much mud they sling at it, it still holds authority among the people. Yes, almost two million have left the party. But over 16 million still remain. And consider that there are around a thousand other parties, movements, unions and so on today. As far as I know their total membership isn't even 100,000! That's the full scope of their authority! Their social base is thin. The people aren't following them. Neither workers nor kolkhoz farmers. The people can see quite well which party actually expresses their innermost interests, and which is speculating on the crisis. The party which pursues a course toward preserving the USSR, the party which places the interests of the laborers above everything else, the party which openly admits to its serious mistakes and is trying to correct them, the party which appeals to people to work in behalf

of a better life rather than attending rallies and creating obstacles to real progress—such a party will doubtlessly hold the lead in the society. Not the one that soils its own history and tramples it beneath its feet.

More than five years of running down everything have seriously deformed the respect of young people for our history. It is even hard to imagine what effort it will take to reintroduce a feeling of true patriotism into the young, and to educate them in such a way that they would understand that we need to protect our motherland, our history, both glorious and tragic. He who fears the word "socialism" cries out for capitalism, for blanket denunciation of everything that made our people spiritually strong. All of the political, theoretical and economic squabbles, and all of the opposition, ambitions and disputes only aggravate the country's already tragic position. Serious politicians are concerned with how to get the society out of its crisis. Political intriguers will never be sated with their dirty games. Things can't go on like this for long. I'm certain that the working people will speak their decisive words!

[Correspondent] Readers ask what in your opinion could significantly raise the authority of the party in the armed forces?

[Lizichev] My "recipes" are not new. First, every communist must justify his great name by his actions. He must become an ideological warrior, and a practical warrior, an example for all. Second, there are the primary party organizations. The atmosphere in them. It must become such that people would feel themselves to be strong and united in the main thing, that the spirit of party comradeship and democracy is always present. Third, the primary party organizations and political organs must renounce threats and pressure. There have been party committee secretaries and political organ chiefs who sometimes used threats of party expulsion to get people to do what they wanted. But it is in the primary party organization, in the political organ that the party's authority is built. The individual must constantly feel that he is respected as a person, that people are attentive to his opinion, his family and his personal needs. This is the greatest issue of perestroika, one which must be resolved in a new way. Political organs undergoing renewal must work in the closest possible unity with commanders and party organizations.

[Correspondent] The journal's readers also want to know your point of view on whether it was right to dismiss Army General Snetkov, commander-in-chief of the WGF, and Colonel General Kolinichenko, military council member and chief of the group's political directorate, from their positions in connection with the betrayal by Lieutenant Colonel Kolesnikov and one of his subordinates.

[Lizichev] It is difficult for me to say whether they were dismissed "in connection" or not "in connection" with that. But I feel that the commander-in-chief of the group and the chief of the political directorate must bear

responsibility for what happened. Responsibility must be borne for every failure that occurs in subordinated forces. That's simply the way things are done here. But let's try to see what's at the bottom of all this: Why do these defections occur? Because today, many of our mass media portray the West as a paradise. And our country as virtually as a garbage pit. Is it really true that there is nothing left in our fatherland that we can be proud of, that the civilized world still doffs its hat to?

Terrible things are happening in propaganda: We are being taught to be ashamed of our own motherland! Our sacred feeling of patriotism is being leached away. The question I often ask myself is this: What ever happened to the aggressive, substantiated materials revealing the festering sores of capitalism that used to appear in newspaper columns, on television and movie screens, in books, radio broadcasts and lectures? Could it be that there no longer is any discrimination, hunger, unemployment, homelessness, drug addiction or murder, that children are no longer bought and sold in this "paradise"? I think that laborers of the former GDR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and so on have already tasted the joys of the capitalist "paradise." Not only materially but also morally. Many former officers and warrant officers of the armies of these countries, especially communists and Komsomol members, have also had a taste of this "paradise." But our special correspondents write nothing about this. What they do mostly is show fully stocked shelves, but very few are able to afford anything on them. Perhaps we need to send groups of our workers, peasants, officers and warrant officers to Hungary, Germany and Czechoslovakia, and provide them an opportunity to talk openly and without constraint to their former fellow countrymen, and find out what it was they gained, and what they lost. I'm certain that they would see not only "fully stocked" but unreachable shelves, but also corrupted empty souls.

As far as Boris Vasilyevich Snetkov and Aleksey Nikolayevich Kolinichenko are concerned, I feel that they are mature enough not to be angered by the decision.

[Correspondent] But if it is going to be so easy to dismiss commanders-in-chief and political directorate chiefs, soon there will be no one to take their place. Try putting yourself in their place.

[Lizichev] In a situation where dozens of people have deserted to the West, I would probably myself think that it's time for me to be replaced.

[Correspondent] Aleksey Dmitriyevich, you once worked with Colonel General Volkogonov. As you know, he was the deputy chief of the GlavPUR, and chief of the propaganda and agitation directorate. In their letters, readers recall the brilliant, passionate, persuasive speeches by Volkogonov in defense of the CPSU and Marxism-Leninism. Now he holds different views, a different position. What is your explanation for this turn in the philosophy of this scientist, historian, theoretician and politician?

[Lizichev] I think that it would be better for you to ask that of Dmitriy Antonovich himself. It's on his conscience. But there is one thing I can say: I am amazed by the transformation that he recently experienced. And when he says that, for example, we need to change the name of the party from communist to democratic or social-democratic, and he tries to justify this by historical and scientific approaches, I begin to wonder if we can continue to apply the terms teaching and science to the work of Marx and Engels, who named their party the Communist Party. I don't know if we can go on thinking of Lenin as a great teacher, theoretician and politician who felt it necessary to call the Russian party a communist one even in that period. If Volkogonov feels he is right, that's his business. But I don't share his opinion.

[Correspondent] The journal's readers write that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from abroad is more reminiscent of a rout. And when our people return to the motherland, they often find nowhere to go. What is your opinion? Who is to blame for this situation?

[Lizichev] I think that this is the result of not only the new situation in Europe but also certain mistakes made by those who prepared the corresponding agreements with our former allies. Of course, much has changed for the better in international politics owing to the efforts of our diplomats. But it seems that the tumultuous applause has caused some people to lose their sense of reality, their perspective, and now we have to pay the price. We are simply being dumped, and no one wants to hear that the hasty departure would result in thousands of human tragedies. Illusions of stronger friendship have now been supplanted there by anti-Sovietism.

[Correspondent] What, in particular, is your assessment of the discriminatory measures of the Polish government against our soldiers?

[Lizichev] I think that this is a short-sighted and amoral policy. I think that a person who spits on those who freed and saved his land is a person of low morality. I feel nothing but amazement and perplexity. Consider this in the light of the fact that almost 650,000 of our soldier-liberators are now resting in Polish soil.

I have visited Poland on many occasions, and I have talked with hundreds of Poles. My partners in service understood what was what. I don't think that it is the people that are causing the trouble. The politicians are responsible for that. They're doing it to justify the facts that prices are rising, the economy is not improving, workers are striking and so on. They are doing it in order to politically "justify" the tension, and to find a scapegoat. They have now been pursuing their new policy for several years, but somehow there are no visible, convincing changes in the life of the people there. These politicians have gone so far as to abuse friends who liberated them, who died for them, people whose bones now lie in Polish soil—our compatriots. They even require the Soviet soldier to change out of his uniform when he escorts peaceful cargo for the Orthodox Church.

I'm certain that real Poles are noble, and they remember the kindness of other people. They wouldn't stoop to such a low level.

[Correspondent] Here is another question asked of you in letters from readers. Did you fight against protectionism?

[Lizichev] Yes, I waged a struggle with this evil in personnel policy together with the minister of defense and members of the Board of the Ministry of Defense. We fought to see that the scores of people with poor political, working and moral qualities striving to enter the academy, and who are nominated for promotions, would be removed from the lists and from the draft orders. This was not a whim of people in a position of power. We knew that each such deletion from the lists painfully affected an individual's fate. I will not conceal the fact that in my years of service I recommended the deletion of perhaps a hundred candidates. There were also ones among them, of course, in whose behalf others courteously lobbied me by telephone and in personal meetings. And political workers were not the only ones I rejected. I always tried to see that the approach to selecting, placing, advancing and rewarding personnel, especially of a high level, would be stricter and more balanced. I also tried to personally talk with every candidate prior to his appointment.

And of course I sometimes had to say no to a person supported by extremely influential people. But I held firmly to my line. I was asked about this even in the Politburo. By the way, the Politburo did receive a letter carefully listing the sons of currently active military chiefs, the positions they held, and for how long. I replied that many of the facts were true, but that protectionist phenomena were becoming fewer in number. It would probably be extremely improper for me to assert that protectionism in the army has been surmounted. This evil has deep roots. It will take a long time to dig them out, but it is something that we have to keep working at firmly.

[Correspondent] By the way, it is said that you were questioned about your own sons at that Politburo meeting.

[Lizichev] Yes. I replied that so far there was nothing in relation to them that I had to be embarrassed about. Nor do I think I will have to be in the future. Not one of my sons enjoyed easy promotions. The first served in the East for nine years, and the second commanded a deployed regiment for over three years. During this time some of his associates served in two or three jobs. When his name was submitted for a promotion in rank, I personally struck his name from the draft order. I also had something to say about the sons of other chiefs whose names appeared in this draft. I said that the right to make the final decision in regard to them belonged to the minister of defense, but as regards my son, I asked that he not be included. My sons did not receive promotions below the zone.

[Correspondent] Aleksey Dmitriyevich, a number of officers, veterans of the armed forces, wrote with alarm that we are seeing fewer and fewer military dynasties in our forces. The moment the son of a general and even a captain or major joins the military, suspicions are aroused that "Dad is dragging his son on his coattails," or that "there's something underhanded going on here." What do you think about all of this?

[Lizichev] Experience has shown that we must maintain continuity of military generations, of dynasties in our Soviet Army. This is one of its age-old traditions. And, in many ways, one of its strengths. Young boys who roam the garrisons with their father and mother (I for example lived in 21 different garrisons, though I think that's far from a record) are in a sense subjectively prepared for a nomadic life from childhood. They see the army not as it is portrayed in the movies, but as it truly is, and they become accustomed to its deprivations. They come to understand from their early years that life in the military is not a bed of roses. They know what's what. When they enter military school, they already know what to expect. Such people do not fail in military service. It is the uncommitted that fail, it is the weak and luke-warm that fail. Consequently the question is this: If we want to have a strong army, why cut the crown of this mighty tree off from its roots because of some incomprehensible suspicion? And most importantly, we need to judge a person not by whose son he is, but by how he serves.

[Correspondent] Here's another question in letters from readers: Aren't you irritated by the passiveness of many servicemen serving as deputies to the USSR Supreme Soviet? Why do they speak so rarely, and why do they defend the army's interests so weakly?

[Lizichev] You can't judge the work of a serviceman serving as a deputy from what you see on television. Most of the work a deputy does is invisible to the public at large. The work they do is rough, hard and sometimes agonizing, it is intense work in behalf of the future. Activities of the deputies should generally be judged by what they have done in behalf of legislation and in behalf of the common effort, and not by how many times they are able to "seize" the microphone.

[Correspondent] Thank you for your answers. We wish you health and success in your work.

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Law on Alternative Military Service

91UN2614A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA
in Russian 6 Aug 91 p 3

["Law on Alternative Military Service"]

[Text] Chapter I. General Provisions

Article 1. Functions of the Law

The Law of the Republic of Moldova "On Alternative Service," in accordance with the Constitution of the

Republic of Moldova and international legal norms for the purpose of guaranteeing civilian service to the society compatible with the right of citizens to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and convictions, sets forth the system for the substitution of military service with an alternative service and the procedure for the performance of alternative service.

Article 2. Legislation on Alternative Service

The legislation on alternative service includes the present law, other legislative acts of the Republic of Moldova, and the statute on the procedure for the organization and performance of alternative service affirmed by the Government of the Republic of Moldova.

Article 3. Right to Refuse Military Service and the Obligation to Perform Alternative Military Service

The citizens of the Republic of Moldova have the right to refuse military service for religious and pacifistic convictions.

Citizens refusing military service for religious or pacifistic convictions are obligated to perform alternative service.

Article 4. Concept of Alternative Service

Alternative service is state service of citizens that is socially useful and substitutes for military service on the basis of convictions of conscience.

Alternative service is not punitive in nature.

Alternative service is not subject to the control of the Ministry of Defense.

Article 5. Persons Called to Alternative Service

Citizens of the Republic of Moldova called to alternative service are from 18 to 27 years of age. They are on the military register as conscripts and are freed from military service in the manner set forth by the present law.

Not called to alternative service are:

- citizens having gone through active military service;
- citizens with brothers who perished or died during the performance of military or alternative service;
- church officials, monks, and students at religious educational institutions;
- citizens not fit for alternative service for health reasons in accordance with the list of illnesses affirmed by the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Moldova.

Persons having been punished for serious crimes may in specific circumstances be called to alternative service at the decision of rayon (city) commissions for alternative service.

Article 6. Term of Alternative Service

The term of alternative service is 24 months and 12 months for graduates of higher educational institutions.

Article 7. Place of Performance of Alternative Service

Citizens of the Republic of Moldova perform alternative service at enterprises, institutions, and organizations of the republic located in its territory and in formations stationed in the territory of the republic.

The alternative service of the citizens of the Republic of Moldova may be performed beyond its borders only with the consent of the citizens and on the basis of an intergovernmental agreement in which the Republic of Moldova is a participant.

Article 8. Areas for the Performance of Alternative Service

Alternative service provides for the performance by citizens of work that is especially necessary for the society. It is performed in:

- emergency rescue and fire-fighting formations;
- ecological formations;
- institutions for public health and the social sphere;
- construction, repair and construction, road building, and road repair organizations;
- municipal institutions;
- agriculture and organizations and enterprises for the production and processing of agricultural output.

By decree of the Government of the Republic of Moldova, citizens performing alternative service may be involved in work to eliminate the consequences of catastrophes, natural disasters, and other extraordinary events.

The list of work to be performed in alternative service is determined by the Government of the Republic of Moldova.

Chapter II. State Agencies for Alternative Service

Article 9. Republic and Rayon (City) Commissions on Alternative Service

The highest state agency for the administration of alternative service in the Republic of Moldova is the Republic Commission on Alternative Service.

The staff of the commission is affirmed by the Government of the Republic of Moldova.

Rayon (city) commissions on alternative service are established for the organization and implementation of alternative service in rayons (cities).

The staff of the rayon (city) commission on alternative service is affirmed by the executive committee of the rayon (city) soviet of people's deputies.

The procedure for the organization and operation of the republic and rayon (city) commissions on alternative service is defined by the statute on the procedure for the organization and performance of alternative service.

Article 10. Competence of the Republic Commission on Alternative Service

The Republic Commission on Alternative Service:

- develops a republic program for the organization and performance of alternative service;
- manages the agencies for alternative service throughout the territory of the Republic of Moldova and guides, coordinates, and monitors their actions;
- determines the number of citizens subject to being called into alternative service and the number of jobs necessary for its organization;
- establishes training centers for the special vocational training of citizens performing alternative service;
- signs contracts with enterprises, organizations, and training centers on the performance of alternative service by citizens and special vocational training;
- examines the complaints and applications of citizens;
- carries out measures for the protection of the rights and interests of citizens performing alternative service;
- clarifies constitutional and other legislative positions on alternative service;
- makes decisions on the transfer of citizens to another rayon (city) for the continuation of alternative service;
- makes decisions on the early cessation of alternative service by citizens.

Article 11. Competence of the Rayon (City) Commission on Alternative Service

The rayon (city) commission on alternative service:

- accepts and registers the applications of citizens for admission to alternative service and informs the appropriate military commissariat on this;
- organizes the medical examination of citizens applying for admission to alternative service;
- makes decisions on the applications of citizens for admission to alternative service;
- directs citizens to the site of alternative service and to training centers for special vocational training;

—registers citizens performing alternative service and prepares statistical reports in the manner prescribed by state statistical agencies;

—organizes control over the performance of alternative service;

—together with the employment service certifies jobs for the performance of alternative service;

—makes decisions on the transfer of citizens to another place within the confines of the rayon (city) for the continuation of alternative service;

—sends to prosecuting authorities information on citizens shirking alternative service.

Article 12. Funds to Perform the Work of State Agencies for Alternative Service

Funds to perform the work of republic and rayon (city) commissions on alternative service are appropriated from the republic budget.

Citizens involved in the work of the republic and rayon (city) commissions on alternative service retain the average wage for their primary job in accordance with existing legislation.

The procedure for the compensation of the expenditures of enterprises, institutions, and organizations in connection with the participation of their workers in the actions of commissions on alternative service is defined by the Government of the Republic of Moldova.

Chapter III. Call to Alternative Service and Settlement of Disputes

Chapter 13. Time of the Call to Alternative Service

A call to alternative service is made twice a year (in March-April and in September) by decree of the Government of the Republic of Moldova.

Article 14. Application for Admission to Alternative Service

A citizen wishing to be admitted to alternative service presents a well-founded application on this to the rayon (city) commission on alternative service within the four months prior to the beginning of the call to alternative service (November-February and May-August).

The citizen's application registered by the commission stops his call-up to active military duty until the facts of the matter are investigated.

Within three days of the moment of the registration of the application, the rayon (city) commission on alternative service notifies the military commissariat of the stopping of the call-up of the citizen to active military service.

Article 15. Medical Examination

The rayon (city) commission on alternative service organizes the medical examination of citizens applying for admission to alternative service in accordance with the Statute on Medical Examination affirmed by the Government of the Republic of Moldova.

Article 16. Decision of the Rayon (City) Commission on Alternative Service

The rayon (city) commission on alternative service meets to review the application of the citizen and when necessary listens to the testimony of other persons and studies additional materials for the purpose of assessing the validity of the motives behind the application.

The citizen has a right to participate in the meeting of the commission in its review of his application.

The rayon (city) commission in accordance with the results of the review of the application and the medical examination of the citizen makes a decision:

- on calling the citizen to alternative service;
- on deferring the call of the citizen to alternative service;
- on the total lack of fitness of the citizen for alternative service;
- on the rejection of the application of the citizen for admittance to alternative service.

The decision of the rayon (city) commission on alternative service is made by a majority of votes among the total number of members of the commission.

The decision of the rayon (city) commission on the calling of the citizen to alternative service is the basis for his removal from military registration and registering him with the alternative service.

The rayon (city) commission on alternative service informs the appropriate military commissariat of the decision within three days.

Article 17. Deferment of the Call of the Citizen to Alternative Service

The call of the citizen to alternative service may be deferred on account of his state of health, in connection with deputy functions, for the continuation of education, or because of family or other circumstances.

A deferment of the call to alternative service on account of the state of health is granted to citizens recognized by medical commissions as being temporarily unfit for alternative service.

A deferment of the call to alternative service in connection with deputy functions is granted to people's deputies for the period of their mandate.

A deferment of the call to alternative service for the continuation of education is granted:

- to students at general educational, vocational-technical, and intermediate special educational institutions;
- to students in day departments of higher educational institutions;
- to postgraduate students.

Persons dismissed from intermediate special and higher educational institutions lose the right to a deferment of the call for the continuation of education.

A deferment of the call to alternative service for family reasons is granted in cases in which the citizen:

- is the sole breadwinner of the family;
- has two or more children.

A deferment of the call to alternative service because of other circumstances is granted by decision of the Republic Commission on Alternative Service upon presentation by the rayon (city) commission.

Citizens receiving a deferment of the call to alternative service for reasons indicated in the present article may not be called to military service during the term of the deferment.

Article 18. Settlement of Disputes

In the event of disagreement with the decision of the rayon (city) commission on alternative service, the citizen has the right to appeal it to the Republic Commission on Alternative Service within seven days of receipt of a copy of the decision.

The Republic Commission on Alternative Service examines the complaint and within one month from the date of its receipt finds on the decision of the rayon (city) commission.

The decision of the Republic Commission on Alternative Service may be appealed to the courts in the established manner.

The citizen is called to alternative or military service only after final settlement of the dispute.

Chapter IV. Performance of Alternative Service

Article 19. Directing to Alternative Service

On the basis of the decision on the call of the citizen to alternative service, the rayon (city) commission on alternative service issues to him a personal document indicating the time of his arrival at the place of the performance of alternative service.

A citizen called to alternative service may be directed to a training center for special vocational training.

On the basis of an entry in the personal document:

- the administration of an enterprise, institution, or organization enters into a labor contract with the citizen for a set period. In this case, a refusal to accept work is inadmissible;
- the manager of the formation issues an order that the citizen be included in the staff of the formation;
- the administration of the training center issues an order on the registration of the citizen as a student at the training center.

The alternative service begins at the moment of the signing of the labor contract or issue of the corresponding order.

Article 20. Procedure for the Performance of Alternative Service

The procedure for the performance of alternative service is determined by the present law, other legislative acts of the Republic of Moldova, and the statute on the procedure for the organization and performance of alternative service.

Article 21. Obligations of the Administration of the Enterprise, Institution, Organization, or Training Center and Manager of the Formation

The administration of the enterprise, institution, organization, or training center and the manager of the formation:

- within one week notifies the appropriate rayon (city) commission on alternative service of the beginning of alternative service by the citizen;
- familiarizes the citizen with the internal regulations and rules and the conditions of work or training and explains his rights and obligations;
- gives the citizen instruction on the rules for labor protection;
- within one week notifies the rayon (city) commission on alternative service of all violations of labor legislation by the citizen performing alternative service as well as of disciplinary measures taken against him;
- in the event of the liquidation of the enterprise, institution, or organization, reduction of personnel, or dissolution of the formation, informs the rayon (city) commission on alternative service of this two months in advance.

Article 22. Obligations of Citizens Performing Alternative Service

A citizen directed to alternative service or transferred to another place of service is obligated to appear on time at the place of service or training indicated in the personal document.

A citizen performing alternative service is obligated strictly to carry out the requirements set forth in the present law, the statute on the procedure for the organization and performance of alternative service, and the internal regulations and rules in effect at the place of service or training.

Article 23. Rights and Freedoms of Citizens Performing Alternative Service

A citizen performing alternative service enjoys the rights and freedoms provided for by the constitution and other laws of the Republic of Moldova, taking into account the special provisions set forth by legislation on alternative service.

A citizen performing alternative service has the right to appeal to state agencies for alternative service with a request:

- of a transfer to another place of service;
- of the early termination of service;
- on other important matters.

A citizen performing alternative service does not have the right:

- to hold management positions;
- to engage in private entrepreneurial work;
- to take part in strikes;
- to be absent from the place of service or training without the permission of the appropriate official.

A citizen performing alternative service may not be dismissed or transferred to another place of service without the permission of the appropriate commission on alternative service.

Article 24. Social Guarantees and Benefits for Citizens Who Perform Alternative Service

Citizens brought in to perform duties in connection with their registration and call to alternative service are freed from work in accordance with prevailing legislation.

Citizens sent by rayon (city) commissions on alternative service for a dispensary, out-patient, or clinical examination, retain their place of work, position, and average wage during the time they are in the medical institution.

Citizens performing alternative service:

- are provided, when necessary, with special clothing or uniforms, food, and housing;
- have the right to 14 days of annual unpaid leave.

The term of the alternative service is counted in the total and special labor record.

Not counted in the time of alternative service is the time of absence from work without valid reasons.

Citizens performing alternative service retain their housing or place in line for the receipt of housing.

Upon conclusion of the term of alternative service, citizens retain the right to return to the enterprise, institution, or organization where they worked prior to being called.

Citizens losing the capacity to work, families of those perishing in the performance of alternative service, and persons supported by the latter are given state assistance or pensions and one-time compensation set forth by legislation.

Article 25. Remuneration of Labor of Citizens Performing Alternative Service

Citizens performing alternative service are paid 75 percent of the wage subject to taxation on a general basis.

Article 26. Funds Arising as a Result of the Labor of Citizens Performing Alternative Service

Sums withheld from the wages of citizens performing alternative service are transferred to the republic budget and are used for the organization of alternative service in the manner determined by the Government of the Republic of Moldova.

Article 27. Termination of Alternative Service

The basis for the termination of the alternative service is the end of the term of the alternative service.

In accordance with a decree of the Government of the Republic of Moldova, the rayon (city) commission on alternative service makes decisions on the termination of alternative service.

By decree of the Government of the Republic of Moldova in connection with extraordinary circumstances, the time of the conclusion of the alternative service may be moved up but not by more than two months.

Article 28. Early Termination of Alternative Service

Bases for the early termination of alternative service are:

- the conclusion by the medical commission that the citizen is unfit for further alternative service;
- changes in the family situation of the citizen, if in the period of the performance of alternative service circumstances arose that are foreseen by Part 5 of Article 17 of the present law;
- entrance of the citizen into military service;
- criminal prosecution of the citizen.

The decision on the early termination of alternative service is made by the Republic Commission on Alternative Service.

Article 29. Reserve of the Alternative Service

Citizens having served the term of alternative service provided for by the present law are transferred to the reserve.

Citizens in the reserve of the armed forces have the right to be transferred to the reserve of the alternative service for reasons of convictions of conscience.

The Government of the Republic of Moldova has the right to call citizens performing service in special formations to training sessions or to take part in the elimination of the consequences of accidents, natural disasters, and other extreme events as many as three times and for a total time of not more than six months during the entire period in which the citizen is in the reserve of the alternative service.

While in the reserve of the alternative service, citizens undergo periodic medical examination.

The maximum age for the citizen to remain in the reserve of the alternative service is 50.

Chapter V. Final Provisions

Article 30. Registration of Alternative Service

The registration of the alternative service is handled in the manner established by the Government of the Republic of Moldova.

The personal registration of citizens performing alternative service or in the reserve of the alternative service is handled in the rayon (city) commissions on alternative service.

Article 31. Responsibility for the Violation of Legislation on Alternative Service

Members of the republic and rayon (city) commissions on alternative service, physicians participating in the medical examination of citizens, and other persons violating legislation on alternative service are brought to account in accordance with prevailing legislation.

Article 32. Liability for Evading the Performance of Alternative Service

Citizens evading alternative service are criminally liable in accordance with prevailing legislation.

Article 33. Responsibility of Citizens Performing Alternative Service

Citizens committing disciplinary, administrative, and other violations of the law while performing alternative service are liable in accordance with prevailing legislation.

Mircea Snegur, president,
Republic of Moldova
Kishinev, 9 July 1991.

Decree on Alternative Military Service

91UN2614B Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA
in Russian 6 Aug 91 p 3

[Decree: "Decree of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova on the Implementation of the Law of the Republic of Moldova 'On Alternative Service'"]

[Text] The Parliament of the Republic of Moldova decrees:

1. The implementation of the Law of the Republic of Moldova "On Alternative Service" from the day of its passage.

2. That within one month the Government of the Republic of Moldova must:

—present to the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova proposals on the adaptation of the legislative acts of the Republic of Moldova to the Law of the Republic of Moldova "On Alternative Service";

—affirm the Statute on the Procedure for the Organization and Performance of Alternative Service and the Statute on Medical Examination as well as the staff of the Republic Commission on Alternative Service;

—determine the list of work and provide for the establishment of the necessary conditions for the performance of alternative service.

3. The present decree goes into effect on the day of its passage.

Aleksandru Mosanu, chairman,
Republic of Moldova Parliament

Kishinev, 9 July 1991.

Warsaw Pact's Invasion Plan Revealed

91UF1135A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 8 Aug 91 p 1

[Article by Aleksandr Bangerskiy: "Western Europe Shocked by Plans of Warsaw Pact Armies to Attack It; According to AFP Statement, These Plans Were Found in Germany"]

[Text] Paris—Scandal?

Sensational documents were found among the papers of the former army of the former GDR: a plan for a blitzkrieg seizure of Western Europe by Warsaw Pact forces.

Everything in the plan, which is now being studied carefully by NATO experts, is laid out in minutes and kilometers. Hundreds of thousands of soldiers and thousands of tanks cross the border between the two Germany's at "H" hour. A powerful tank offensive of the "fraternal armies" is deployed onto FRG territory. The speed of the advance—50 kilometers in a day. The combat task—to reach the shores of the North Sea.

On the second day, an order is given to deliver a nuclear strike against major groups of NATO troops. Polish tanks attack to the north and capture Denmark. The Soviet Navy moves out into the Atlantic: The way is clear. Dozens of USSR and GDR divisions at this time advance in the direction of Paris, Spain, and Portugal.

As an AFP correspondent reports from Berlin, there is talk of tons of top secret documents. It becomes clear from them that offense was the real military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact and that the Soviet Union was prepared to employ nuclear weapons at the very start of military operations.

It was not old staff elaborations that were found, but documents that no one had rescinded. Maneuvers, in which the technique of the offensive for these plans was developed, continued in the GDR until June of 1990—eight months after the Berlin Wall came down.

"Now we know that they viewed the nuclear weapon as something that was completely normal and acceptable as a conventional weapon in a theater of military operations," a highly placed government official in Bonn told AFP correspondent Richard Ingam. "The threat was real and serious," asserts Walter Reichenmiller, a representative of the FRG ministry of defense.

Each of the Warsaw Pact member countries was supposed to occupy a specific territory. The GDR, for example, was charged after victory to administer the former FRG. "Occupation marks" were already printed, and, right up to the most recent time, special military groups were being prepared to seize specific airports and railroad stations of the FRG. And the Fifth Corps of the GDR People's Army, together with Soviet Army formations, conducted exercises on working out the seizure of Northern Germany, with the employment of chemical weapons and 87 nuclear missiles.

Henry Dodds, editor in chief of the English military journal JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, asserts that, from the documents he was able to familiarize himself with, it follows that the offensive of the allied forces "was supposed to reach Gibraltar in the south and Scotland in the north." However, the discovered documents do not give a complete picture of the Soviet "blitzkrieg," inasmuch as each of the allies received from Moscow only those formulations that concerned that sector of a front that was entrusted to it.

P.S. Viktor Chikin, an employee of the press center of the USSR Ministry of Defense was skeptical of the AFP report. In his personal opinion (except for our telephone call, the press center has no information at the present time), it could be a question not of an offensive, but of a retaliatory strike. As for the mention of "tons of top secret documents," then this is natural: "Since they are military, then they are secret."

Aleksandr Rozanov, acting chief of the information office of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reported

the official reply by telephone to the question of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA: "The ministry does not have any information on this matter." One of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs employees expressed the opinion in a private conversation that the report is probably a "canard," inasmuch as it is difficult to suppose that any significant amount of secret documents could be found.

First Deputy Defense Minister on Coup

91UM0847A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
31 Aug 91 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Colonel General P.S. Grachev, first deputy USSR minister of defense and chairman of the RSFSR State Committee for Defense Issues, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Colonel A. Oliynik; in Grachev's office, date not given: "Airborne Troops Did Not Go Against the People..."]

[Text] In January of this year, our newspaper introduced Major General Pavel Sergeyevich Grachev on the occasion of his appointment to the position of commander of the Airborne Troops. As is now known, Grachev has been appointed USSR first deputy minister of defense—chairman of the RSFSR State Committee for Defense Issues. He has been given the military rank of colonel general.

A brief biography: Pavel Sergeyevich Grachev was born in 1948 in the village of Rvy, Tula Oblast, in a working-class family. In 1969, he graduated from the Ryazan VVDKU [Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School] imeni Lenin Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League], and in 1981, from the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze. He happened to serve two tours of duty with the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. He was distinguished by the title Hero of the Soviet Union. After graduating from the Academy of the General Staff in 1990, he was appointed first deputy commander of the Airborne Troops, and in December of last year, he became commander of the Airborne Troops. Grachev has two sons; the elder son is a cadet at the Ryazan VVDKU.

In the days of the abortive putsch, the paratroopers were the focus of attention because, with the knowledge of the Airborne Troops commander, they did everything in order to frustrate this venture and prevent bloodshed. However, let us give the floor to Colonel General Grachev himself:

[Grachev] On 18 August, the former minister of defense summoned me to his office and announced that the situation in the country remained tense, the dissatisfaction of the people with the existing order was mounting, and the situation was exacerbated by the fact that M.S. Gorbachev was sick and unable to perform his duties at the time. A large government group had left by plane to negotiate with him on further actions. It was not ruled out that an agreement would be reached on taking emergency measures to stabilize the situation existing in the country and even on imposing a state of emergency in the country. In this case, it would apparently be necessary to use the Airborne Troops, along with the

MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] organs, in order to maintain public order and guard facilities of state significance, under the USSR Law on the Legal Regimen of a State of Emergency.

Early on the morning of 19 August, after a state of emergency was announced, Yazov ordered me on HF [high-frequency circuit] to get the Tula Division of the Airborne Troops and march it toward Moscow. As the regiments (without artillery) proceeded at a forced march, Yazov specified that the paratroopers were to take under protection five facilities: the building of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, the Moscow Soviet, the USSR State Bank, the USSR State Depository, and the Ostankino TV Center. At this point, I started having doubts: "Why should we take these facilities under protection if they are well guarded by the militia to begin with?.."

At about 0630, RSFSR President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin got in touch with me and asked me anxiously what was happening. I explained to him that a state of emergency had been imposed, and the State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR headed by Yanayev had been set up. Troops, including Airborne Troops, were being brought to Moscow. Yeltsin told me right away that he knew nothing of that, and that this was a provocation by the Kremlin... He asked me to provide paratroopers for guarding "the White House" to which I responded positively.

Meanwhile, the machine was set in motion. Having massed in the area of Tushino, our regiments took the aforementioned facilities in Moscow under protection in the evening. There were no clashes with the populace. Only in the area of the Garden Ring Road an airborne troops battalion proceeding toward "the White House" was blocked by the populace. I ordered my deputy Major General Lebed to get in touch with the leadership of Russia in any way possible and to agree in what manner it would be more feasible for the paratroopers to guard "the White House." Such a meeting was held, and after certain difficulties, our battalion took the parliament and the leadership of Russia under its protection. The leadership of the Moscow Soviet refused protection and demanded that the battalion be immediately withdrawn, which I did at my own risk.

On the following day, the situation in Moscow grew increasingly tense with every passing hour; barricades went up in the streets. As early as the evening of 19 August, Yazov assigned a mission to me: Due to the fact that Yeltsin had unleashed a hysterical campaign against the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency], paratroopers, in cooperation with the KGB special forces and MVD troops, were to stand ready to seize the RSFSR Supreme Soviet forcibly. Forward movement was scheduled to begin at 2400, and H hour was to be 0300 on 21 August.

I understood that blood would be shed, that this was civil war, and that these actions were anticonstitutional, and

decided on my own to frustrate this criminal plan any which way I could. This is what I announced to my deputies when I arrived at the headquarters of the Airborne Troops. However, the mood was glum. I could not but recall the Afghan tragedy. My distressing reflections were interrupted by an HF call from Air Force Commander in Chief, Air Force Colonel General Yevgeniy Ivanovich Shaposhnikov. He was also strongly alarmed by the forthcoming action. After a lengthy conversation, we decided not to obey any orders which might bring about a tragedy under the threat of death. We planned several variants together in the event that the KGB troops did storm after all, up to capturing the committee... Knowing for sure that my telephones were being monitored, I nonetheless called Yuriy Vladimirovich Skokov at the building of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and notified him of this horrible news, but assured him that the paratroopers would not act.

I will remember this night of 20-21 August for as long as I live. I will remember how the phones of government communications fell ominously silent, and how tormentingly slow the time went on. I knew that my phones were already being monitored. I called Yazov's staff, and they responded that the minister was asleep and had given orders not to be awakened before 0300 hours. His deputies did not respond either. Only at the MVD, where Colonel General Boris Vsevolodovich Gromov said in response that MVD troops were at their location, and were not moving forward anywhere.

Suddenly, sometime around 0100 hours, an HF call came in. Major General Viktor Karpukhin, commander of the KGB special forces, was on the line.¹ He said that "his guys would not go to storm..." I breathed a sigh of relief.

[Oliynik] Why did they fail to storm the building of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet after all? Did the command fail to come, or did the paratroopers stand in the way?

[Grachev] As I have said, H hour was known, but everybody kept waiting to see who would be the first one to move. However, the army, primarily the paratroopers and the air force, did not allow themselves to be led by ranking extremist plotters. After Tbilisi, Baku, and Vilnius, all soldiers and officers came to feel a special responsibility for their actions. In addition, all representatives of armed services understood well that it was impossible to carry out this action without a tremendous loss of life. Everyone certainly thought: In the name of what was the blood of peaceful citizens, our countrymen, to be spilled?

As far as the tragic death of three young men from Moscow is concerned, we may say that they died by chance, when the combat vehicles of the Taman Division were going out on patrol under curfew. However, who could have known where the vehicles were headed...

[Oliynik] As you see it, what measures should be taken to ensure that the army will not be sent into the streets of peaceful cities again, and not used to extinguish interethnic conflicts?

[Grachev] As is known, these issues of tremendous significance are a prerogative of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the USSR president as commander in chief. I am convinced that these measures will be taken very soon. I am also aware of the firm position on this issue of Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Air Force Shaposhnikov, who stated to the president of the country that the Armed Forces will never be used against the Soviet people.

[Oliynik] Please tell us, at least in general terms, what your responsibilities are going to be as first deputy minister of defense-chairman of the RSFSR State Committee for Defense Issues.

[Grachev] They are primarily control and coordination between the Union Ministry of Defense and the government of Russia on an entire array of military policy problems. Incidentally, I have continuous, close contact with the Russian leadership. However, a lot is going to depend on decisions about the future Union with regard to defense issues which will be made in the immediate future, and the final distribution of powers between Russia and the center. It is absolutely clear that fundamental changes will occur in the structure of power itself. Great changes are in store for the army and the navy. However, I must state with the full weight of authority that the Ministry of Defense will do everything so that there will be no "witch hunt," and that the officers will not live in fear of their fate and their future.

[Oliynik] How did you receive the ukase on the depatriation of the Armed Forces?

[Grachev] Calmly. I believed, and I believe, that under a multiparty system, the army should do its main constitutional duty—defend the motherland.

[Oliynik] What is your attitude toward the suicide of Marshal of the Soviet Union Akhromeyev?

[Grachev] Ambiguous. Sergey Fedorovich was a man with firm party convictions, a strong-willed soldier. Apparently, when he learned about the coup d'etat, he could not bear the shame.

[Oliynik] Pavel Sergeyevich, our conversation is proceeding against a background of sorts provided by phone calls. Divulge a secret: What is discussed most frequently?

[Grachev] For the most part, these are routine service issues. They are calling from many districts and congratulating me on my new appointment and new rank of colonel general. I would like to take advantage of this opportunity and express my gratitude to all those who have congratulated me. I will not conceal the fact that other calls, with threats, are also coming in on the phone, including HF. However, they do not scare me...

Footnote

1. Group A (Alpha) of the USSR KGB Seventh Directorate, which consists mainly of officers. The curriculum vitae of Alpha includes seizing the palace of H. Amin in Kabul in December 1978, the liberation of children in Mineralnye Vody... (Note by A. Oliynik)

Military Discipline vs. Conscience in Coup

91UM0852A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Sep 91
Union edition p 2

[Article by Yu. Feofanov: "Is an Order the Law"]

[Text] When the tank column was en route to the barricades set up by defenders of the Russian Parliament a soldier shot and killed a person. People are now trying to determine who moved the tanks into Moscow, and by what right. The accused will no doubt tell the court that they were carrying out an order. They will recite the usual precept: "An order from a superior is the law for a subordinate." We are accustomed to this rule. It has become an integral part of our mentality. Not a legal but a totalitarian, bureaucratic command-oriented mentality.

Now that an investigation of the coup has been initiated, trials are imminent and the president and the parliaments have appointed commissions, it would be a good thing to clarify the legal essence of these rules and the actions which they cover and encourage.

During the war the concept was instilled in the soldier's mind that he had to carry out any order from the commander and that the commander had to force the soldier to carry out his order, even to the point of using force or weapons. The "defectiveness" of the prewar regulations was explained. They were not so definite and gave a subordinate the right to refuse to carry out a blatantly illegal order. Let us concede that in the heat of the war this was essential. The German soldier and all citizens of the Reich underwent the same indoctrination. The Nürnberg Trials, which tried the main Nazi war criminals, encountered the problem of assigning responsibility for carrying out an inhumane order. The main justification of the accused was always the same: We were carrying out orders. We had no choice. Hold the one who issued the order accountable. The following principle was therefore added to the Charter of the International War Tribunal (p. 8): "The fact that a subordinate was acting in accordance with government instructions or an order from a superior does not relieve him of responsibility...."

I have carefully read the findings of the Procuracy of the USSR on the events in Tbilisi, Vilnius and Novochoerkassk (1962). I shall cite just one excerpt from the "Tbilisi Findings": "...airborne troops were subjected to unlawful interference... on the part... of the demonstrators, and in the situation had the right to resort to defense by actively countering the attack. Their chosen means of defense—the infliction of blows with a

small entrenching tool—was consistent with the nature of the attack.... The actions of I.N. Rodionov in bringing in the paratroopers do not constitute a crime." As you can see, neither the soldier nor the general was to blame. The victims were to blame.

The procuracy's finding did not provide the answer to the main question: Did the general have the right to move troops against unarmed, peaceful people, even if there were "government instructions"? And this is what made it certain that there would be victims in all the subsequent events. The generals either do not know or do not want to know the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal. The soldiers all the more. But then the latter are not obligated to know it. And the military regulations do not provide answers. The regulations from the war years have been repeatedly altered, but they still leave the servicemen in a ill-defined situation, which means they make the principle "an order is the law" an absolute.

This is fundamentally incorrect, however. An order is always subject to the law. Furthermore, it impels the taking of some kind of action. The law, on the other hand, never forces anyone to do anything. It merely establish the boundaries of legal behavior and warns that overstepping those boundaries will entail certain consequences or penalties. It is something like the rules of the game. One can do anything one wants, so long as the rules are observed. And if the law bans robbery, rape and murder, no order can rescind this ban.

This is all true. But it is not for the soldier to consider the legal weight of the order and the law before the NCO, the NCO before the major, the major before the general, the general before the marshal. An order is not discussed. This is not only a regulation; it is also the military moral code. All of this creates an intolerable conflict for the man in the uniform, who has taken an oath to obey his superiors. This is due in great part to gaps in the law. Articles 238 and 239 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR ("insubordination" and "failure to obey an order") establishes strict accountability for this, and there are no provisos for "freedom of choice" for the subordinate.

Nor does the recently passed Basic Criminal Law fill this gap. It does not establish the liability of the one actually executing a criminal order; it skirts this issue entirely. What remains are extremely shaky moral criteria and common human values not translated into the language of law. This means that they can be freely interpreted by those who carry an assault rifle, an entrenching tool or a policeman's club.

Discipline, even military discipline, discredits itself if it is interpreted as blind obedience to any word from a superior. Particularly in peacetime. As we can see from recent events, however, it is not all so simple. And to count only on the conscience, on internal moral law or divine commandments is not enough. The standards of the law and their interpretation must provide answers

both for superiors and for subordinates regarding their duty, authority and responsibility.

Coup Leaders' Calculations Regarding Military Industry

91SV0094A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 7 Sep 91 p 2

[Article by S. Razin: "The Military-Industrial Complex: This 'Dinosaur' Will Lay One More Golden Egg"]

[Text] The junta will never return if Yeltsin succeeds in bringing over to his side the former elite of society—representatives of the military-industrial complex. No other country of the socialist camp had such a nightmarish military monster as ours. Let me cite just two figures: More than 80 percent of Soviet machinery manufacturing still works for defense, and the militarists take out of our pockets no less than 300 billion rubles [R]—nearly half of our national income.

It's no accident that of the eight members of the State Committee for the State of Emergency, six had direct ties to the military-industrial complex. Yazov, Kryuchkov, and Pugo require no special commentary. But another troika, in my opinion, has undeservedly been relegated to the background. Former CPSU Central Committee Oleg Baklanov, no doubt, was the real "supreme commander in chief" of the economy: As the Central Committee official in charge of the defense industry, he essentially held those R300 billion in his hands. Real power rested with him, not with Prime Minister Pavlov, who now gives the impression of having been a mischievous teenager who got mixed up with the wrong crowd. Now Pavlov's financial policy no longer seems absurd: He was trying to save the military-industrial complex at the people's expense, at the expense of our pockets. Nor does coup plotter Tizyakov seem so comic against this backdrop: He headed the powerful association of large military plants capable of buying off any number of deputies in kind, not to mention officials.

Now that monster has been decapitated. However, the "dinosaur's body" is still alive, although it now belongs to a different master. During the coup, Boris Yeltsin issued the decree "On Ensuring the Economic Foundation of the RSFSR's Sovereignty." All Union-subordinate enterprises, including the defense branches, were transferred to Russia's jurisdiction. The Russian president then, of his own free will, planted a time bomb under the "White House."

The first counterattack has already been launched. The directors of the military-industrial complex have begun exerting heavy pressure on Arkadiy Volskiy, the member of the "interim government" charged with day-to-day management of heavy industry. The demands are unchanged: more money from the treasury and more resources.

As we have learned, A. Volskiy has taken decisive action to put a stop to any attempts to pressure him. In the past

few months, his views on reforming the military-industrial complex have become markedly more radical and are now virtually indistinguishable from the position of I. Silayev's cabinet. To all appearances, the Russian Council of Ministers' strategy will now be implemented by the new deputy prime minister, Yevgeniy Saburov. In the first stage, plans call for initiating broad-scale privatization in the defense complex, but state financing of military plants will be retained for 12 to 18 months. During this time, they will be obliged to find their niche in the market and to establish themselves in it. In the second stage, the military-industrial complex's "rain of gold" from the treasury will be halted for good. Labor collectives will have the right to decide their own future: either to produce purely civilian goods, or to simultaneously take state orders—but now on a competitive basis!—for the production of military equipment. This is the American military-industrial complex model, which is economical and highly effective—something the whole world saw for itself during the war in Iraq.

I think that the coup was doomed to fail primarily for the reason that the military-industrial complex itself was split roughly "50-50." I am referring not the defense of the "White House," but to that segment of the defense complex that has already begun getting involved in a market economy. You need proof? Go to the Kirov Plant, for example, which is beginning to produce—instead of heavy tanks—motor cars and minitractors on an equal footing with foreign business. I could cite other less striking but nonetheless widespread examples of conversion: Hundreds of military plants have adjusted to taking "side orders" and have put idle capacity to work producing civilian output—including output to be sold for foreign currency.

This semiunderground business has spawned powerful commercial structures that are now capable of quickly mounting a general assault on the military-industrial complex. The experience of an independent conversion trust with branches in dozens of cities from the Caucasus to Kamchatka and from Italy to America merits careful study. It is time to emerge from underground: medicine, biotechnology, electronics, communications, ecology—we have the capacity to bring these and many other branches up to world standards, and without any special hand-outs from the West.

To all appearances, Grigoriy Yavlinskiy now has a serious rival. Of course, it is possible to become gradually integrated into the world economy by relying primarily on a "Marshall Plan for the USSR" and on billions in foreign-currency investments. However, a group under Academician V. Lisichkin is proposing a different model of economic revival and integration into the world community.

The essence of the new model is simple: Thousands and thousands of inventions, discoveries, and expertise are lying about in our country, especially in the caches of the military-industrial complex. If we don't have the brains

to use this wealth, let's open large numbers of joint enterprises: Their executives could quickly convert our expertise into industrial prototypes, and with their help we could set up series production of supergoods—at these very same defense plants. Such "technology villages," in Academician V. Lisichkin's view, would kill two birds at once: First, they would ensure a mutually advantageous influx of nearly \$100 billion into our economy; second, they would transform the Soviet military-industrial complex from a monster into a blessing—and do so very quickly and without losses.

It is gratifying to see that this model is being put into effect with the same speed with which the plot of the State Committee for the State of Emergency was foiled. Contracts for the establishment of "technology villages" have already been signed with Italian, German, and Swiss firms, and negotiations are under way with Japanese and South Korean businessmen. The engineering academy has prepared early 100 packages of Soviet expertise that will doubtless induce Western entrepreneurs to come up with the needed funds without any goading from the leaders of the "Big Seven."

Far East Air Defense Chief's Role in Coup

91SV0087B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Sep 91 Union Edition p 6

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent B. Reznik under the rubric "The Three Days of the Putsch. IZVESTIYA Investigation": "The Generals Became Heroes by Accident"]

[Text] Khabarovsk—In the report "Such Different Generals" (IZVESTIYA No. 203), I wrote that the commanders of the Far Eastern Air Defense Forces ignored the order from the commander in chief, General of the Army I. Tretyak, to give active support to the leaders of the putsch. The memorandum stated that they read the documents coming from the conspirators but left them in the folders of the code clerks without signing off on them and did not send them to the troops.

I want to say right away that I was told about all of this by Major General A. Yefimov, chief of staff of the Army. He took from a safe and showed me encrypted messages from Moscow, only one of which—for distribution to the military council of the Air Defense Forces—was signed by Major General V. Yepifanov, chief of the political section of the Army: "Publish in the Army newspaper NA STRAZHE RODINY."

A. Yefimov strongly reproached the political workers for excessive zeal and stressed that the "combat" generals did not act this way.

As soon as the newspaper with the article "Such Different Generals" reached Khabarovsk, the IZVESTIYA correspondents' center received a spate of calls. It turned

out that General Yefimov...simply deceived the newspaper. He did not keep the documents from the leaders of the putsch in a red folder in his safe but correctly sent them to the troops.

In addition, as has now become clear, the texts of the encrypted message were in two copies. Yefimov showed me the ones that were not signed by the Army command and chief of staff. From the very beginning, he "set up" only the chief of the political section....

Air defense officers from several units and the Army staff brought to the correspondents' center encrypted orders from the participants in the conspiracy that they had received, including three documents signed by Lt. Gen. A. Kornukov, commander of the Far Eastern Air Defense Forces.

On the encrypted message of Col. Gen. I. Maltsev, chief of staff for the country's air defense, for example, there is the following demand: "For the purpose of shutting down channels of information and agitation aimed against the measures undertaken by the emergency committee, take into account and if necessary guard all facilities with the technical means of transmitting information regardless of the department to which they belong (television, radio, sound-broadcasting stations, communications systems of the Ministry of Railways, and the hydrometeorological service). The commander of the army outlined:

"Organize explanatory work, execution, and control."

Thus, today the newspaper is again forced to return to this story to tell its readers how everything really was....

Closing Political Organs in Military Viewed

91SV0063A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Sep 91 First Edition p 2

[Report by TASS correspondent S. Ostanin on interview with Col V. Bogatyrev, a military expert with a working group of the USSR Ministry of Defense: "Political Organs: Retirement Has Taken Place"]

[Text] Military-political organs in the armed forces of the USSR, troops of the Committee for State Security, the internal-service troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the railroad troops have been abolished in accordance with the decree of the President of the USSR of August 29 of this year. Colonel V. Bogatyrev, a military expert with a working group of the USSR Ministry of Defense, relates to TASS correspondent S. Ostanin the realization of that decree in the armed forces of the USSR.

On September 1 the USSR Minister of Defense signed Order No. 418 on the abolition of military-political organs in the armed forces of the USSR. Their activity has thereby been curtailed.

All of the officers in the military-political organs will be recertified. Commanders have been granted the right to assign them to command, engineer or rear-services posts.

The overwhelming majority of the military-political officers are honest and conscientious people dedicated to their fatherland. It is thus important to place these officer cadres in competent and careful fashion. The resolution of the issue of their further service is determined by the certification boards with the direct participation of the Assemblies of Officers. It is all the more necessary to take into account the opinion of the officer community, since the military-political cadres of the armed forces of the USSR are not homogeneous.

Only a small number of them supported the putsch plotters. They were principally from among the ranking personnel. These people do not belong in the army. It is important only that their shadow not be cast on all.

Those who have served beyond the stipulated time periods and have the right to a pension, as well as those who express a desire to be discharged with the presence of the essential grounds for it, will be discharged in strict accordance with legislation. Their professional orientation and assistance in job placement are envisaged. We are maintaining links today with the official bodies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the RSFSR and the public, counting on their attention and concern for people at all levels, from their discharge from the armed forces to the solution of problems of their job placement and everyday life. The order of the President of the RSFSR titled "Strengthening Social Protections for Servicemen Completing Service on the Territory of the RSFSR" was received among the troops with great satisfaction. One would like to hope that the strict observance of the rights and legal interests of the personnel of the abolished organs will be provided for in the performance of these organizational measures.

I had occasion to be a participant in the prior attempts to disband the political organs. I will state bluntly that they were doomed to failure before, because they were conducted within the party-political structures themselves. And despite the attempts of the genuinely reformist wing of the GlavPUR to depoliticize and de-ideologize the new organs as much as possible, trying to make them truly needed by the people within the framework of the outmoded system could not succeed. The offspring was stillborn.

But the times are changing. Today there is a real hope that the reform will be a truly radical one.

The USSR Ministry of Defense, in conjunction with committees of the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and the RSFSR, is now working on a conceptual framework for structuring the activity of these new structures—organs for combat readiness and the military, moral and psychological indoctrination of the personnel. The essence of the transformations is to provide for close unity between the training and indoctrination of the personnel in the army and navy and the resolution of the chief task of the indoctrination process in the armed forces—the formation of a citizen of one's country, the training of a

defender of the Motherland and his moral and psychological readiness for action under conditions of modern warfare. The discussion concerns the structures that could be in operation under the conditions of a professional army, which would reflect the principles of democratization in a military-service regard and make the role of the serviceman more active both in the military collective and in society. The subunits for combat training will be strengthened, and large groups of military psychologists, sociologists and legal scholars will be introduced into the system of indoctrination for servicemen. The network of structures for the cultural and domestic support of servicemen will be improved. The legal service of the USSR Ministry of Defense will be reinforced.

It is being assumed that the final versions of the conceptual framework will have been developed by the middle of September. It has been resolved to complete the creation and inclusion of the new structures into the work of the armed forces of the USSR, according to preliminary outlines, before December 1 of this year.

Lobov on Republic Forces, Alternative Service

91SV0087A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 36, Sep 91 p 5

[Interview with General of the Army V. Lobov, chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, by I. Morzharetto; place and date not given: "V. Lobov: 'The Reform Should Have Been Started Yesterday'"]

[Text]The term of service can be reduced to a year and a half

Professor V. Lobov, the new chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, first deputy minister of defense of the USSR, general of the army, people's deputy of the USSR, and doctor of sciences, admits that twice in his life he has experienced extremely critical situations: in December 1986, when he led troops against demonstrators in Alma-Ata, and in August 1991, when he did not become the military commandant of one of the rayons of the capital into which the people at the main command post had divided the city. In addition, he has his own ideas about military reform. Our correspondent asked Vladimir Nikolayevich to share them with the readers of ARGUMENTY I FAKTY.

[Lobov] I dare to think that my considerable experience in command and staff work and knowledge of the systems for the setting up of armed forces in practically all of the armies of the world brought me to the conclusion that the existing organization of the armed forces, their status, and system for manpower acquisition are completely obsolete and have long since ceased to conform to the political, economic, and legal situation in the country.

I expressed my view of military reform completely openly, as they say, for the first time in 1986, when I commanded the troops of the Central Asian Military

District. But the leadership of the Armed Forces at that time did not listen to me. We are very late in carrying out reforms and for this reason they must be initiated immediately.

[Morzharetto] We are discussing the Armed Forces of the USSR, but how will the republics look at this? Will a general army be needed at all under the present conditions?

[Lobov] It is my firm conviction that the Armed Forces must be unified. In any case, after all, we are left with a single economic area. And it is all the more true that the nuclear forces must be in the same hands and we do not have a right to disperse them. Try to calculate what it will cost each republic to establish its own army! In short, the republics must delegate some powers to the center, to the president, and to the Council of Presidents, especially in the area of defense. But the new agreement certainly must stipulate in detail the rights and obligations of the military on the territory of the sovereign republic as well as the rights and obligations of the republic with respect to these Union troops.

[Morzharetto] But what should be done with the republic formations that are being established everywhere today?

[Lobov] So far they have talked with me only about the establishment of republic guards. They must be relatively small military formations (500, 1,000, or 5,000 people) mainly stationed in the capitals of the republics. They will perform tasks assigned to them personally by the president of the republic.

[Morzharetto] Do you plan to induct students in compulsory service?

[Lobov] I am categorically against this and am already issuing the corresponding order; they will not be called up. The country needs a scientific potential. If it exists, there will be advanced technologies and there will be defense.

[Morzharetto] What is your attitude toward alternative service?

[Lobov] Positive. Such a service is necessary. After all, some cannot serve for health reasons and others on account of their convictions. It will also be possible to serve in our department, to work, let us say, in an economic unit without picking up a rifle. Or, for example, one may work in medical institutions, nursing homes, etc. In principle, we in the Armed Forces need a social security system and an alternative service may play an important role here.

[Morzharetto] You are now being hit by a bunch of unresolved social problems. It is clear that everything cannot be solved in a single day. But, for example, the position that leave and passes are obligatory for personnel in compulsory service, just as in the armies of other countries, and are not given as incentives not only can but must be resolved. Medical people and psychologists have long ago proved that if the soldier is deprived

of the possibility of seeing his relatives and friends and even of just spending a few hours outside his barracks from time to time, this affects his psyche, for there is no interest in the service. The old position of the regulations, by the way, maintains the traditional ways to a great extent.

[Lobov] This question must also be resolved very quickly.

Transcaucasus MD Forces' Role Suppressing Ethnic Strife

91SV0076A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 Sep 91 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Lieutenant General Yu. Grekov, first deputy commander of the Transcaucasus Military District, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Colonel V. Kaushanskiy; place and date not given: "Many of Our Soldiers Are Still Forced To Be in the Wrong Trenches"]

[Text] The events of recent days have shown particularly graphically how closely the problems of our society and the problems that have developed within the Armed Forces have intertwined, primarily problems associated with the sole functional mission of the Army: to defend the borders of the Motherland and enhance the quality of combat training. The last circumstance became a cornerstone for the troops of the Transcaucasus Military District which by happenstance ended up in a zone of conflict between two republics. How is the divergence between the need to mind "one's own" business and protecting the safety of peaceful citizens to be overcome? Where are we to look for a fulcrum to make combat training, and nothing else, become the Alpha and Omega of the life of the troops? This is what our correspondent discussed with Lieutenant General Yu. Grekov, first deputy commander of the forces of the Transcaucasus Military District.

[Kaushanskiy] Yuriy Pavlovich, being mindful of the fact that you are an Afghan veteran, I would like to quote an observation by one of the commanders from the same connection. Having returned to the Soviet Union, he observed bitterly that grass two meters tall has grown on the "home" training grounds over the time his people had been absent, and that they could resume combat training only after cutting the grass. In addition, figuratively speaking, the grass of interethnic enmity has become a major "weed" on training grounds. It is more complicated to "cut" this grass. [Grekov] As they say, you hit the nail right on the head with your comparison. However, when I look back in my mind at the last two and a half years of service in Transcaucasia, I come to the conclusion that we need to refer to more than just "the grass of enmity." Let us recall something else, for example, an earthquake in Armenia which shook the world. Thousands of people in uniform and hundreds upon hundreds of units of combat materiel were deployed to help the long-suffering people. Some of our training grounds in the republic were used as auxiliary facilities for the dispossessed families, and even as

construction sites. We virtually stopped erecting residential buildings for the families of servicemen, allocating most of our resources and means for the needs of the populace. This was what the situation and decisions of the government of the country compelled. This was when we, as they put it, choked off our own song, that is, combat training. We did not leave Georgia to face its own troubles alone after the earthquake this year.

Nonetheless, our problems were exacerbated by other, purely human elements expressed in skirmishes in the borderlands of Armenia and Azerbaijan. This was precisely where the troops, according to a ukase of the president of our country, were forced to form a human wall in the course of this fratricidal war.

[Kaushanskiy] Nonetheless, I happened to attend tactical exercises more than once even during this period. Is this to say that planned combat training went ahead anyway?

[Grekov] Did anybody relieve us of responsibilities for personnel training? We looked for a way out as we should have and as we were able to. I will note that at present, under most difficult conditions, an overwhelming majority of commanders practice their immediate occupation. Incidentally, in July a Turkish military delegation paid a reciprocal visit to the district. We gave our neighbors an opportunity to visit a live-fire tactical exercise in one of the units. In the estimation of our guests, the skills of personnel exceeded all expectations. The reason was that the leadership of the division, Acting Commander Colonel Yu. Shapoval, was up to the challenge. This means that training can be taken without making allowances for circumstances.

[Kaushanskiy] Unfortunately, such circumstances are occasionally stronger than all good intentions. In early April, you, Yuriy Pavlovich, voiced a supposition that an escalation of violence was possible in the summer, after the snow melted in the mountains where Armenia and Azerbaijan come together, and when passes, gorges, and mountain paths opened up. As a consequence, an interruption in combat training lay ahead. Unfortunately for us all, this is precisely what happened. Several dozen outposts formed a barrier in the path of terrorists. Are these mountain bastions to be there for a long time? Would it not be simpler to bring the soldiers and officers to the barracks right now, today?

[Grekov] This is a very topical issue. I think that it painfully reverberates in the hearts of all soldiers in Transcaucasia. We have lost dozens of personnel who have been killed or wounded in this undeclared war. Those of us who, in the line of duty, had to conduct training and exercises with our subordinates were, and still are, engaged in a perimeter defense, guarding villages, warehouses, and other facilities in the territory of both Armenia and Azerbaijan. You try and recall the days and hours of training now.

I do not doubt that a law will be adopted, after all, which will forever take the Army back to the pursuit of combat

training, ruling out its use in interethnic conflicts. For now, I will merely observe that we did not by any means act on the border as a conduit for someone's political ambitions, and we did not segregate the unfortunate people by nationality—we only defended peaceful inhabitants and guarded state facilities.

[Kaushanskiy] As far as I know, they try to organize the process of instruction at outposts as well. However, a high quality of classes is hardly possible until the personnel return to their garrisons.

[Grekov] I understand that the fate of outposts concerns everyone. Should we bring them back to barracks right away? We only need an order. From this standpoint, I was encouraged by the speech of the minister of defense before USSR people's deputies. As far as my personal position and the military council is concerned, I outlined it at a meeting of the Azerbaijan defense council: The military in the conflict zone are clearly out of place.

[Kaushanskiy] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already repeatedly sounded the alarm on its pages to the effect that not only novice lieutenants but also highly skilled commanders from among the immediate organizers of combat training are among officers petitioning for early discharges from the Armed Forces. To what degree has this process stabilized in the troops of the district?

[Grekov] Everything is interconnected in military service. What good is it if, instead of taking his men out to train, a lieutenant or a captain is forced to go on an officer guard detail in order to guard weapons depots and vehicle pools with combat materiel, because of personnel shortage? Or if, instead of the same training, the officer sets out to look for his deserting subordinate, or listens to abuse heaped on him at anti-army rallies near the compound of the unit... This is how morale and a mental environment develop in a collective which compel one to pick up the pen and write a discharge application. We have convinced many commanders to return to the ranks after all—many, but not all. The stabilization that you mean is associated with accelerating the military reform, switching to a professional footing in the Army, and the skill of politicians in arriving at civic peace through dialogue, negotiations, and the use of legislative devices. I will note that the officers want to serve, they feel for their subordinates, but in all of this they justifiably demand firm guarantees of social protection for themselves. These guarantees should be set forth in legislation in the immediate future.

[Kaushanskiy] Yuriy Pavlovich, we began our conversation by stating that training grounds covered with grass are not an indication in favor of combat training. Nonetheless, now it is September, and fall is the time to count not only chickens hatched, but also facilities prepared to receive new draftees for fire and driver training, and in the environment of Transcaucasia, also mountain training, and many other things. Actually, the readiness of training facilities is a business card of any unit, regiment...

[Grekov] If I may put it so, the production of these "business cards" is very strictly controlled by the military council. In this field a course which was set quite a while ago has proven itself completely. It was decided that division and regimental echelons should not set hopes on one-time and, notably, expensive visits by the people to the training centers of the okrug. Material facilities should be autonomous, first of all. You have mountains, gorges, and rapid rivers right in front of the checkpoint. Training in climbing, fire, and driving in very rough terrain, and classes in subunit command and control should be held "at home" with a minimal use of motor vehicle resources. We have wonderful mountain laboratories created through the skill and, if you will, inspiration of commanders and soldiers. I cannot but refer to the examples of Lieutenant General A. Gerasimov, Major General B. Muratov, Colonel S. Kruzhilin, Lieutenant Colonels Yu. Shapoval, V. Vlasenkov, and V. Kolotilo...

We should also mention the following. Training grounds are the territory of a republic, its, so to say, living space. Under our current, as they say, unclear circumstances, it is extremely important to officially determine and legitimize the status of the troops, their deployment, and operation in a certain geographical area, and to provide conditions for combat training. I hope that the latest events and a certain progress toward the signing of the Union treaty will speed up the resolution of this problem.

There are other issues, for example, the withdrawal of troops from Eastern Europe. Some of the units are added to the Transcaucasus Military District; some of them are assigned to mountainous and mountainous-desert areas. So, we face a full-blown dilemma: What do you build first—shooting ranges, fighting vehicle gunnery training facilities, and direct fire gunnery ranges, or residential buildings and social, cultural, and service facilities. Officers frequently arrive with families who, there is no denying it, are used to a quite civilized and well-established existence. A family that has not been put up gives the commander a headache. In all of this, we consider social problems a priority and divert a significant proportion of resources and personnel for residential development. This is fair. Do we have a moral right to hold officers strictly accountable for the skills of their subordinates otherwise?

[Kaushanskiy] Finally, once again in the sphere of predictions. Can you imagine in the immediate future a picture which now appears idyllic: The troops of the district engage in combat training precisely according to a plan, and this time grass grows not on training grounds but rather in the abandoned trenches of outposts?

[Grekov] All of us have come to the point beyond which there are only two paths—that of civil peace, economic rejuvenation, and support of a defense potential adequate for the defense of a renewed union, or that of self-breakup and of abandoning the high road of world civilization. We, the military, are unambiguously in favor of the first variant. Only this variant, and no other, guarantees that

the trenches of outposts which run counter to common sense will be forever concealed from human eyes by the grass of oblivion.

Defense 'Business Manager' Criticizes Latvian Military Law

*LD1009114391 Moscow TASS in English 1045 GMT
10 Sep 91*

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow September 10 TASS— "An amendment to the law on the status of people's deputies made by the Latvian parliament, which urges all services personnel elected to the Republic's legislature to quit the Soviet Armed Forces by September 15, is an internal affair of Latvia as an independent state," Leonid Ivashov, Soviet Defence Ministry business manager, said.

Ivashov stressed the problem could also have been solved through a bilateral agreement between Latvia and the Soviet Union. "In a civilized world, such decisions are not made unilaterally," he said.

Strike in Novosibirsk Disciplinary Battalion

91SV0087C Moscow TRUD in Russian 12 Sep 91 p 1

[Article by O. Khripunov: "What Is Worse Than Prison? The Disciplinary Battalion"]

[Text] In Novosibirsk, 230 convicted servicemen doing time in a disciplinary battalion declared a strike.

The members of the disciplinary battalion sealed themselves off in the barracks and declared a hunger strike. Arriving generals—the commander of the forces of the Siberian Military District, the chief of staff, the military prosecutor, and others—observed the soldiers through a crack in the doors. The convicts admitted only representatives of a committee of soldiers' mothers and correspondents to the barracks.

The demands of the prisoners are basically well founded. The command personnel of the battalion have already been replaced, there has been an investigation of cases of abuse of power by officers and sergeants, fresh produce has been brought in, and they have abolished stripes distinguishing members of disciplinary battalions from ordinary service personnel.

But the district command and prosecutor's office are not competent to satisfy all the demands. Thus, the convicts demanded a review of the regulations on disciplinary battalions: servicemen here do not receive any money, have practically no meetings, and their rights are restricted in comparison with normal servicemen. Moreover, after serving his time in the disciplinary battalion, the serviceman is obligated to finish his term in the Army.

Today the conflict is over. The convicts ended their hunger strike and removed the barricades from the barracks. But the problem has been raised and it cannot be resolved by taking away stripes and improving food.

Maj-Gen Vorobyev on New Tactical Thinking

91SV0064 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Sep 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Doctor of Military Sciences and Professor Major General (Ret) I. Vorobyev under the rubric "Problems of Military Theory": "Will We Be Able to Think in a New Way?"]

[Text] *"Are Tactics Withering Away?" That was the title of an article by Major General (Ret) I. Vorobyev (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA for 14 Aug 91) on some of the lessons of the recent war in the Near East. The author's viewpoint was of interest to many readers. A number of letters in particular contained a request to dwell in more detail on the use of the term "new tactical thinking" as used in the article. We give the floor to the author.*

This term has not yet moved into everyday circulation here. Whether we like it or not, human psychology is structured in such a way that that which is set, tested by life, seems more faithful and reliable than something unknown. The new always makes its way through with difficulty. That includes military science as well. Thus no matter how substantial and obvious the shifts in the improvement of weaponry or military hardware, they themselves cannot provoke automatic changes in tactics and other realms of the military arts. And if the military scholars, commanders and staffs display a certain slowness and contemplative passivity, a gap will inevitably form between the new and higher level of technical sophistication of the troops and the methods of waging combat operations with the passage of time.

The elimination of this type of "split" in the event of war occurs spontaneously, as history testifies, apart from the will of the military leaders. This is especially typical for periods when qualitative transitions are occurring from one type of weaponry to another, more advanced one.

The contradiction between the outmoded tactics and the new means of waging battle was displayed exceedingly clearly, for example, in the middle of the 19th century during the Crimean and Franco-Prussian wars, when the armies began to be equipped with rifles with rifled barrels. Even though the might of firearms increased sharply as a consequence of this, the troops continued to adhere to the tactics of columns that had taken shape during the era of smooth-bore guns. It ultimately turned out that the soldiers began to switch to a dispersed formation on their own, in spite of orders, under the hail of bullets, so as to make use of terrain features for concealment from enemy fire during short rushes. The tactics of riflemen in extended lines were thus born on the spur of the moment, as they say, from below, and not at the initiative of the commanders.

But whereas it was possible to correct mistakes in tactics in the course of combat operations in the past, albeit at a price in blood, in our times imperfections of this type are inevitably doomed to defeat. The bankruptcy of the positional, tank-and-infantry tactics of the Iraqi army in

the recent war in the Persian Gulf is a visible example of this. When reflecting on the lessons from it, one of course cannot fail to think about the necessity of troops developing and mastering modern tactics that fully meet the conditions and nature of high-technology wars. And the skirmishers in that cause should naturally be the core officer personnel with the necessary qualities for it—high professional training, a broad operational-tactical view and organizational initiative, guided in their practical activity by new tactical thinking when training the troops.

What is the essence of such thinking? First and foremost, in my opinion, it is the ability of an officer to proceed constantly in step with the times, see the long term in the development of tactics and grasp and quickly incorporate into practice all that is new and progressive that is born in military science under the influence of scientific and technical progress. The new tactical thinking naturally assumes an intolerance of clichéd, ready-made solutions and routine in the training of troops, along with initiative in seeking out methods of their application in combat. The officer should be able to make original and bold decisions, know how to deceive and outwit the enemy in battle, force his own will onto him, achieve success with the least losses of manpower and equipment and employ innovative techniques when training and indoctrinating the personnel. All of this used to be required in the past as well, in general. But today, as the experience of the war in the Near East has shown, an officer should be capable of combat work at a qualitatively new, higher level.

The new tactical thinking naturally was not born arbitrarily out of thin air. Its foundation and "master oscillator" are military theory not swaddled in any stereotypes, devising true points of reference in the training of troops, profoundly and correctly forecasting new trends in the development of military science, making a way for itself in tactics, the operational arts and strategy, arming the cadres with a scientific methodology for analyzing the complex phenomena of military activity and progressive methods of commanding and controlling the troops.

The development of the theory of engagement in depth was considered to be an indication of the display of new tactical thinking in our armed forces at one time. The armorization and motorization of the Red Army, intensive development of aviation and artillery and utilization of strike and maneuver qualities of the airborne assault troops, just then being born, were the material foundation of it. Soviet military thought made skilled use of the experience of World War I and the civil war in the creation of this theory. But it did not stop there, relying on the general laws of the military arts that had been revealed at the new stage in its development, and made a bold surge into the future. It is well known what a large role this theory played in the successes of our troops in the years of the Great Patriotic War.

The development of military theory today and, consequently, the formation of tactical thinking among

officers cannot move forward, however, by evolutionary means as in the past, via continuation with the introduction of certain corrections and a few improvements in those methods of combat operations that were employed before. If we address that same theory of engagement and operations in depth, it is not difficult to detect that despite its novelty and originality for the times, a direct continuity of operational ideas from the Brusilov breakthrough or, say, the Amiens operation that was conducted during World War I, as well as the raids in depth by Red cavalry during the civil war, can be discerned in it. The situation is radically altered today. Evolution should give way to revolutionary transformations in tactical theory and views on methods of waging battle. This is conditioned by the unprecedented leap in improving the means of armed struggle.

Much was said about the revolution in military science in the 1960s and 1970s in connection with the decision to arm the troops with nuclear missiles. Looking back and evaluating the contemporary tactical situation, however, one must acknowledge that no genuinely revolutionary turnaround in its development has occurred up to the present. Here are just a few comparisons.

The might of weapons has increased by hundreds and thousands of times or more (counting nuclear weapons) over recent decades. The precision of strikes and the speed of detection of targets and reaction of firepower against them have also gone up tens or hundreds of times (due to the appearance of reconnaissance-strike and reconnaissance-fire systems). The air-ground mobility of troops and maximum range of weapons have grown many times over. And how has military theory reacted to this, what has the substance of battle become?

It would not be fair, of course, not to see the large changes in the methods of organizing and waging battle that have occurred over this time. That can be seen, at least, from indicators such as this: the areas of responsibility of units and formations in defense and on the offensive have increased by 3-5 times compared to World War II, the planned rates of troop advance have doubled or tripled, the time allotted for preparing for battle has been reduced by several times and the work methods of commanders and staffs in the command and control of troops have been enriched substantially.

These and other innovations in tactics are nonetheless far from suited to the qualitative shifts that have occurred in the development of the means of armed struggle. And it is not just a matter of, say, expanding the spatial sweep of battle. Ready-made and clichéd solutions in preparing and waging combat operations have not yet been eliminated from the work of commanders and staffs. And whereas three-dimensionality (in the air-ground sense) has now been added to depth in the nature of contemporary battle, this far from completely reflects the new quality of it, because the airspace had become the arena for vicious battles well before World War II. It is emphasized, when defining the typical features of modern battle, that it has become decisive,

dynamic and maneuverable. But that also does not distinguish it very much from the battles that were waged, say, half a century ago. In short, to assert that new tactics have already been created and confirmed here today is to engage in self-deception. It would be more correct to say the same "split" has formed today between the level of development of arms and obsolete tactical canons that was discussed above, with all of the attendant consequences arising therefrom. The elimination of this contradiction, in my opinion, is the urgent task of the military cadres. One need not be a great seer to predict that the battle of the future will largely not look like battles that were waged before in either form or substance. One can expect that under conditions of the widespread use of the latest systems of high-precision (and possibly nuclear) weaponry, space-reconnaissance equipment and electronic warfare, the necessity of the prolonged positional confrontation of the sides will recede. This means that the proportionate significance of such means of combat operations as the penetration of prepared defenses, with the inevitable concentration of large masses of troops and combat hardware on a narrow section of front, will decrease. Close-quarters battle will be more and more displaced by long-range "remote" battle, which will be conditioned by attempts by the sides to accomplish missions while avoiding losses from using the "breast of the infantry" or even tank battering rams, first and foremost inflicting defeat on the enemy even before the entry of the ground forces into the zone of effective fire of the main body of his tactical firepower using a preliminary bombardment combined with electronic suppression. Maneuver, most probably, will predominate in all types of battle, if it does not conclusively displace positional warfare. One can scarcely preserve well-defined boundaries between defense and offense, and transitions from one type of battle to the other will probably become more frequent.

The main point of reference in the training of the troops, clearly, should consequently be mastery of the tactics of highly maneuverable, "in-depth" operations. Subunits should learn to conduct daring raids against enemy rear areas, wage battle autonomously for prolonged periods apart from the main body of forces, and perform energetic envelopments and flanking movements of centers of resistance and surprise attacks on enemy headquarters, firing (or launching) positions of weaponry, rear-area bases and communications centers. It is important to master the art of waging strongpoint battles with a "moving" front, without close contact with neighboring units, and know how to shift combat efforts to depth and from one sector to another rapidly.

The most marked trend in the development of prospective tactics, however, will perhaps be the fact that its intellectualization will be increasing more and more. This signifies in practice that combat success should be ensured not so much by a quantitative superiority in combat hardware as by the strength of the mind, superiority in art, in the use of more advanced tactical devices unknown to the enemy and the assurance of coordination in the actions of subunits.

It is understandable that new tactical thinking cannot be formulated by some directive indicators, although they do, of course, have great significance. Innovative inquiry among the troops and at institutions of higher learning will have to be made more active first and foremost. Military thought should be boiling over. It is intolerable to lag along behind events, they must be anticipated without fail, a profound tactical perspicacity must be displayed. An erroneous viewpoint of the priority of practice over theory, in my opinion, has become confirmed here for some time. The tactical curriculum at institutions of higher learning, for example, has been divided into theoretical and practical, and a

"pinching" of the theoretical course has moreover been steadily underway. This seems to be a serious delusion. Such a formalized division of the training program is not justified in and of itself—one cannot separate theory from practice and set them off against each other. Theory should without fail "be present" in every class, the more so if the discussion concerns academic training. I would ask the adherents of an exclusively practical thrust in training, if I may, where else, if not at the institutions of higher learning, should the tactical thinking of the cadet and the student be formed, and where and when will the theoretical basis for his training take shape?

Butkevicius on Lithuania's Defense Policy

91UN2543A Vilnius LETUVOS RITAS in Russian
21 Jun 91 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Audrius Butkevicius, general director of the Republic of Lithuania National Defense Department, by LETUVOS RITAS commentator Ruta Grineviciute; place and date not given: "Any Idiot Can Fire a Shot..."]

[Text] Audrius Butkevicius, general director of the Republic of Lithuania National Defense Department, answers questions put by LETUVOS RITAS commentator Ruta Grineviciute.

[Grineviciute] You are an adherent of the doctrine of resistance, even if unarmed. If there is resistance, there must be an enemy. Does this orientation reduce mutual relations between Lithuania and the USSR to a primitive mode?

[Butkevicius] I absolutely do not try to advertise the unarmed resistance you have mentioned. The people should not be oppressed by any authorities—their own or those of an occupier. A citizen is always capable of holding his own. Unarmed resistance came about as a method for fighting for the rights of the people but not at all as a way of defending the state.

[Grineviciute] Are you trying to say that it is also possible in the event of a domestic coup?

[Butkevicius] Both external and domestic. Even if a coup does not succeed, should the authorities behave unworthily with regard to their citizens the latter may stand up for themselves in a nonviolent manner.

As far as we, the employees of protection of the country in a small state, are concerned, we should reject the strategy and thinking of the military specialists of large states. It is hard to imagine how we could secure the desired result through the use of arms.

[Grineviciute] Nonetheless, your doctrine has a probable enemy in mind—Moscow. However, the very next day we would be forced to cooperate with it. Are you not thus creating the image of an enemy which will not be all that easy to destroy?

[Butkevicius] The doctrine also provides for creating assistance groups inside the aggressor state. The example of 13 January appears instructive in this matter. We did not even expect to have so many allies in the USSR. The people there felt guilty for the actions of their government. Likewise, we need supporters in states which do not approve of the aggressor.

[Grineviciute] However, with a view to achieving specific political results, would it not be better to look to the power structures of foreign states, even aggressive ones, rather than spontaneous resistance by public groups?

[Butkevicius] Initially, our limited potential prevented us from acting only through official channels. We

secured good results due to an unofficial policy. After 13 January a psychologically favorable moment came for us. The people in the USSR also came to feel that our lot may befall them. Therefore, public opinion is on our side, and politicians cannot ignore this. On the other hand, at present many political problems may be solved quite efficiently through unofficial but influential political organizations.

However, you are right—Russia and the USSR cannot be considered our enemies. All of us are participants in a single process: the disintegration of the former USSR. This is the common strategic goal of all democratic forces.

[Grineviciute] There was a time when you did not shun meetings with Minister of Internal Affairs M. Misiukonis, former general director of the Department of State Security M. Laurinkus, even former KGB chief in Lithuania R. Marcinkus, and the military. You negotiated, wishing to maintain a balance of the old and new repressive structures. What is the reason for the current confrontation?

[Butkevicius] I would not call our current relations a confrontation. Even now we frequently sit down at the same table with Minister M. Misiukonis and his commissars. To be sure, this table is usually the one in the office of the prime minister... I do not think that our relationship has changed. Perhaps, it has only become more formal.

It is impossible to harm Lithuania more than by provoking an armed conflict. Moscow has not succeeded in creating a Karabakh-type situation in Lithuania. I think that this has been our greatest success. It has been guaranteed by the coordinated actions of all of our so-called repressive structures. Of course, our opponents understand this as well and they try to provoke conflicts, this time on the inside.

[Grineviciute] Do you believe that the feverish creation of new repressive structures in Lithuania will unavoidably bring about the delineation of their spheres of influence? After all, when the interests of armed people are affected, nothing good should be expected.

[Butkevicius] The system of repressive services that is being created complies in essence with the traditional model. At any rate, we in Lithuania do not strive to concentrate excessive force under the control of the same entity. There is nothing bad about the existence of such a number of services. There is one condition: All of them should safeguard the welfare of Lithuania, and they cannot be copied from either the USSR or prewar Lithuania. The system of the protection of the country is no exception. Think about it: If we defended Lithuania in a traditional manner, against enemies violating our state border, this would be ridiculous. They would definitely tell me: Can you not see that the enemy is several meters away, in the Northern Settlement?

What is guarding the border alone worth? We should use forces that realistically will not yield political control in the republic to the aggressor. We do have such forces; all we need is to act wisely. Any idiot can fire a shot. I worked as a physician in intensive care long enough to know the price of human life.

I will stress one more important aspect. Our defense is effective for as long as the parliament and the government enjoy support from the people. Therefore, democracy is a requirement for our defense and existence. If our power drew its support only from the repressive apparatus, we could say that it is worth nothing, and does not merit support. However, at present the new repressive services are merely being created, and they are not sufficiently effective. I will not be in error if I say that the Kaunas office of the KGB is much bigger than the entire department of state security of the republic.

As far as protection of the country is concerned, I for one would object first of all to squandering state funds for the unnecessary expansion of this system. When I leave this office I will become one of the most furious critics of it.

[Grineviciute] Democracy is impossible in the absence of opposition. However, judging by an aggressive attitude toward the opposition on the part of a segment of our society, it may be expected that the emergence of opposition in Lithuania will be quite painful.

[Butkevicius] Opposition is necessary. The sooner it emerges, the smaller the danger of internal tension will become. The birth of constructive opposition, and even stimulating it, is one of the factors of our security. Where is a dissatisfied person to go? It is naive to think that absolutely all the people approve the actions of the parliament, the government, and A. Butkevicius... Someone must represent the dissatisfied.

We are going through a certain stage of national liberation. The worst point is that attempts are already being made to portray things as if Lithuania had already become a full-fledged state with stable democratic relations. We have won in our struggle for independence, the process is underway. The dirtiest stage is beginning—a war for personal power. We, the current government, should resign ourselves to the idea that we are the people who come from a stage that is ending.

[Grineviciute] They frequently refer to enemy actions inside Lithuania. I would like to know who precisely the enemy is.

[Butkevicius] We can hardly talk about enemies among our own people. Naturally, structures of the USSR KGB which strive to destabilize the situation are active in Lithuania. We are hit where it hurts most. First of all, they try to manipulate the interests of an ever-growing stratum of people lacking social protection and to create an economic mess. Lithuania's political isolation is also advantageous for our opponents. Attempts are being made to prove that Lithuanian "national-separatism" is

hindering Gorbachev's reforms. In addition, autonomization is being promoted. If there is success, they may resort to the forces of the USSR for "stabilizing the situation in Lithuania..." OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachments] take training in intelligence and subversion curricula in Kazlu-Ruda.

[Grineviciute] A draft for the Soviet Army has been proclaimed. What advice would you give to our young men? Only to go into hiding, or is alternative service also possible?

[Butkevicius] We are prepared to accept Lithuanian young men for service in the system of the protection of the country. However, the government should make a decision on the draft. The USSR has long been unable to conduct a draft into its military service in Lithuania. Several guys were caught by the Soviet military (and this hurts me badly), but for the state it is trifling. This is what I tell my colleagues in the Soviet Army: "Just fine, guys, you are increasing the number of my agitators in the Soviet Army!"

Arming of Lithuania's Defense Forces Urged

91UN2543B Vilnius LETUVOS RITAS in Russian
5 Jul 91 p 2

[Article by Supreme Council Deputy R. Ozolas: "To Shoot or Not to Shoot?"]

[Text] Do we have an army of our own? Will it ever fire or not? Who is protecting whom: Is the army protecting us, or the other way around? These and similar questions are now being heard under various circumstances. A. Butkevicius, general director of the National Defense Department, was right in saying recently that any idiot can fire a shot (LETUVOS RITAS, 21 June 1991). I would like to carry this further: But only a soldier can do battle. Alas, as of now the employees of the guard of our country are not only unable to be soldiers, but even fools: They are unarmed. They are unable to not only shoot and do battle but also to refrain from shooting and doing battle. In this case we cannot call those who serve in the guard of the country an army. In short, we do not have an army. In this case, we, our society, have to protect our state together with its army.

All kidding aside, weapons are now becoming one of the main issues for the state. The government of the Republic of Lithuania requested the USSR government to sell it the necessary weapons. The response received was negative; more precisely, the other side remained silent, as is the custom. Apparently, we will have to approach the West. However, the West will hardly respond either, because armed detachments of the guard of the country would be in a position to commit at least a symbolic act of protecting the state. The West does not need such radicalism. Meanwhile, the presence of illegal weapons at the disposal of various public groups in Lithuania would indeed play into the hands of Moscow: It would be easier to kick up a fuss.

For some reason the opponents of arming the guard of the country, incidentally, as well as a considerable segment of our pacifist-minded society think that if we have an army, the latter will definitely start shooting. This is a typically Soviet view. An army does not necessarily exist in order to fire on someone. Perhaps one day not only Central Europe, not only all of Europe, but the entire world, all states, will be without armies. Police, or something along these lines, would be quite sufficient. However, for now all states have armies in one form or another, which ensure the realistic possibility of defending the states against external threats. If need be, the armies can be reinforced by public formations, but merely reinforced. The army as a state institution should definitely exist. Personally, I am against any murders committed in the name of the state allegedly for the benefit of the people living in this state: I am against shooting people convicted by the courts, against police reprisals, against death in the course of war. However, I am also in favor of the strictest courts and the most reliable police; I am in favor of the army, especially in present-day Lithuania: The very fact of the existence of an army will become a reliable guarantee of our independence. After all, the army is not a self-contained institution. The army is an instrument of dignity of the state. Peace rather than war—this is what a dignified foreign policy of a state is about. Only this testifies to the wisdom and assured future of a state. However, a freely elected opportunity not to shoot should exist to make this possible.

USSR Military Commissariats Placed Under Republic Control

*OW0509122691 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1100 GMT 5 Sep 91*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] President Mircea Snegur of Moldova has signed a decree putting the USSR Defense Ministry's military commissariats on Moldovan territory under the control of the republic's government.

The decree instructs the commissariats to register and draft citizens for army service exclusively on the basis of republican legislation, as well as orders and resolutions issued by the Moldovan government.

Independence Related Decrees Issued

91UN2684B Moscow TRUD in Russian 6 Sep 91 p 1

[Article by P. Rashkov: "Moldova: Creating Their Own Army"]

[Text] **KISHINEV.** Moldovan Republic President Mircea Snegur has issued a package of decrees which envisage concrete steps toward achieving true independence for the Moldovan State.

The principal decree, "On The State Border of the Republic of Moldova," specifically states that sector of

Western border of the USSR which gives access to republic territory falls under its total and exclusive jurisdiction and is an integral part of state territory. This includes all the buildings, structures, equipment, arms and other property of the Nizhnednestrovskiy Border Detachment. The President of Moldova has decreed turning over the guarding of the State border to the Committee for State Security of the Republic of Moldova, subordinating to it all personnel of the USSR KGB Border troops presently situated on the territory of the republic. Questions of performance of further service by personnel of the Nizhnednestrovskiy Border Detachment will be resolved in coordination with the commander of USSR Border Troops.

In his next decree, Mircea Snegur subordinated to the government of the Republic of Moldova all customs institutions located on its territory, and instructed the government to begin talks with the USSR Customs Committee on questions of conducting an inventory of property at USSR customs points located on republic territory, and to determine the procedure and period for transferring it to the Republic of Moldova State Department for Customs Inspection. The President of Moldova has also decreed creating armed forces of the Republic of Moldova, and has instructed the government to draw up within one month a concept of operation and specific measures for financing and establishing their material-technical base, and for staffing the cadres with conscripts and officers.

The President also decreed to demand of the USSR leadership the unconditional withdrawal of Soviet Army troops from the territory of the Republic of Moldova, and for the government of the republic to begin talks with the USSR Government on the procedure and terms for this process, and to determine compensation for use of the land and structures, and for contaminating the environment.

Meanwhile, the situation on the left bank of the Dnestr remains complex. The railroad remains blocked, and the appeal by Pridnestrovia leader I. Smirnov, which he wrote in the isolation cell and read yesterday morning to the picketers, has not led to the desired result. It specifically states that blocking the railroad is forbidden both by national legislation and by the laws of the Republic of Moldova, and orders the people to halt this action, which is causing harm to both the economy of the republic and the country.

Yeltsin Order on Protecting Servicemen

*91UM0846A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
31 Aug 91 First Edition p 2*

["Order of the President of the RSFSR on Strengthening the Social Protection of Servicemen Who Are Performing Service on RSFSR Territory"—KRASNAYA ZVESDA headline]

[Text] For the purpose of ensuring measures for the safety of citizens of the USSR and the protection of the

constitutional structure of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], the creation of conditions and guarantees for the proper performance of their military duty and service responsibilities by servicemen who are in active military service on RSFSR territory, and also by RSFSR citizens who are performing service on the territory of other Union republics, and on the basis of Paragraph II of Article 121-5 of the RSFSR Constitution, I order:

1. The RSFSR Council of Ministers:

- to accelerate the preparation of the RSFSR draft laws "On Social Guarantees for Servicemen on RSFSR Territory," "On Nonmilitary (Alternative) Service of RSFSR Citizens," and "On Social Guarantees for Veterans of War and Labor";
- in the introduction of proposals on the formation of the 1992 budget, to provide for the special financing and transfer of resources directly to the USSR Ministry of Defense for the upkeep of servicemen on RSFSR territory within the bounds of RSFSR jurisdiction;
- to develop and approve a program for providing housing space for servicemen who are performing active military service on RSFSR territory, and for members of their families. In developing a program, proceed on the basis that it should contain realistic dates for providing housing space for servicemen performing active military service on RSFSR territory, and specific measures for providing special housing construction for the indicated servicemen;
- to resolve by 1 October 1991 the question of payment to servicemen who are not furnished housing space on RSFSR territory of a monthly monetary compensation to a family for subleasing (leasing) temporary housing space. The payment of this compensation will be accomplished at the expense of the resources of the RSFSR budget and it will be conducted in addition to the compensation established on the basis of the decision of the government of the USSR;
- to introduce by 1 December 1991 proposals that plan to exempt servicemen performing service on RSFSR territory from the payment of income tax, a tax on bachelors, single persons, and citizens with small families on monetary allowances, monetary rewards, and other payments received by them in connection with the performance of military service duties.

2. The creation of necessary conditions for the organization of rest for those servicemen performing service on RSFSR territory; and increase the social guarantees of the rights of members of their families.

For these purposes, the RSFSR Council of Ministers will:

- ensure servicemen the right to special acquisition on RSFSR territory of travel documents for all types of transportation when traveling to their place of leave and return;
- resolve the question of granting the wives of servicemen on active service on RSFSR territory annual leave simultaneously with the regular leave of their husbands. Moreover, the leave for wives of servicemen is granted taking their desire into account, and the duration of the leave can be equal to the duration of the leave of their husbands. In such cases, members of families of servicemen must additionally be granted leave without the retention of pay;
- at the expense of the means of the RSFSR state budget, pay wives of servicemen who are performing active military service on RSFSR territory a gratuity in the amount of two months average pay in cases when their cancellation of a labor contract is occasioned by the transfer of the serviceman for service reasons to another location of the RSFSR or of the USSR.

3. The RSFSR State Committee on Defense Issues:

- to speed up the completion of work on the military reform project, ensuring defensive sufficiency and the preservation of the constitutional structure and statehood in the RSFSR, and prepare it for submission to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet;
- to provide for participation in the structure of local organs of state authority by commanding generals (commanders) of large formations (large units) that are deployed on the territory of the republics in the structure of the RSFSR, krais, and oblasts;
- to develop and approve regulations on the formation of economic mutual relations of subunits of the Soviet Army with local organs of state authority, having in mind their participation in joint transportation companies, construction enterprises, and agricultural work, stipulating the allocation of a significant part of the income of the indicated companies to a special insurance fund for servicemen;
- jointly with the RSFSR Ministry of Justice and the RSFSR Ministry of Finance, to implement proposals on the creation of a fund of social guarantees for servicemen.

4. RSFSR state insurance inspectorates to undertake the necessary measures for obligatory state insurance of citizens of the RSFSR on active military service in the event of their death, severe injury, or loss of health in the performance of military service duties. Establish that insurance will be carried out at the expense of the RSFSR republic budget, with the subsequent recovery of insurance sums from the appropriate ministries and departments of the USSR, or from culpable parties.

5. Executive organs of the RSFSR Soviet of People's Deputies immediately to examine the question on the possibility of providing housing space for servicemen who are performing active military service on RSFSR territory.

6. To propose to the RSFSR Procuracy:

—to ensure oversight over the undeviating execution on RSFSR territory of legislation that guarantees servicemen pertinent rights, freedoms, and privileges, and, in established procedures, make officials answerable who do not comply with the guarantees of legal and social protection of servicemen who are performing active military service on RSFSR territory, and members of their families;

—to take measures to stop anticonstitutional illegal actions of individual representatives of organs of state authority and administration with respect to servicemen and members of their families.

[signed] President of the RSFSR B. Yeltsin

28 August 1991

Russian National Guard Starting To Form

91UN2722C Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 14 Sep 91 p 2

[Article by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA special correspondent Nikolay Parusov: "Advance, the Presidential Guard!"]

[Text] *How our correspondents tried to enlist in the "Russian Legion," and be issued uniforms and sabers, and how they were out of luck: They ran out of forms...*

On 12 September, the editorial office received the following telegram on a government letterhead:

I ask that the following announcement be published on the pages of your publication:

The Shchit Union is holding a registration of candidates for the Russian National Guard. The acceptance board is open daily from 1000 to 1800 hours at the following address: City of Moscow, Red Square, 3 Rybnyy Lane, Entrance 1; Metro stations Revolution Square or Negin Square. Telephone numbers for information: 206-79-29, 298-06-46, 298-74-90, and 924-22-73. Fax 205-55-26.

[signed] V. Urazhtsev, chairman of the Shchit Union, RSFSR people's deputy.

Having read this announcement, we also decided to try our luck and to try to enlist in the guard, telling our readers at the same time how this is done and what the Russian National Guard is all about. Who knows whether it will turn out to be like the national formations in other regions of the country which we have heard a great deal about—a whole lot of the most incredible things? Could it suddenly turn out to be something like the guard which gained fame under our fathers, the tsars?

In our mind's eye, we could already see our new portraits with epaulets and sabers, or even riding dashing horses in saddles embroidered with gold, all the more so because we hoped to be, at the very least, among the first to report to the acceptance board. As it was, we were the only ones to have the announcement in our pockets at the time.

However, it appears that word of mouth does spread fast! As we saw in the corridor of the house on Rybnyy Lane, no fewer than 20 people waited to be invited in by the acceptance board. Another 10 or so people filled the room in which the volunteers were being registered. Despite this being early in the day, entering our personal particulars in the personnel files of guardsmen was not in prospect for any of us that day. It turned out that because more than 1,000 people had managed to visit in the three before days before we did, they had run out of forms.

Dmitriy Prokhorov, a member of the acceptance board, comforted the alarmed candidates: "Forgive us, please. Do come tomorrow..."

In general, as we ascertained firsthand, there was no dearth of those wishing to become guardsmen. We were not the only smart ones. People of all ages were there: pre-draft age young men, active duty servicemen, and even older men no longer on personnel rosters. Why should they not come, given that the talk there was of salaries of up to 2,000 "per uniform." Currently, military men cannot even dream of this, even if they are generals.

People came singly and in entire groups. At precisely the moment we were talking to Dmitriy Prokhorov, an official on duty reported to him the arrival of officers from the Military Pedagogical Academy (formerly the Military Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin). They turned out to be students from the graduating class, Majors Viktor Ulanskiy, Sergey Fomin, and Yuriy Kolomiytsev. They brought both their forms, which had been filled out the day before, and the forms of their comrades. So virtually the entire class went into the guard.

Despite this complete "outward goodness," we were tormented by many questions. First, what will the Russian National Guard stand for? What are we to consider it—a segment of the renewed Armed Forces, or something with tasks similar to those of the current militia? Explanations by Shchit members suggest that it is neither. These are special formations, the main task of which is to ensure the security of the Russian president and the Russian Government and to defend them in possible extreme situations. They say that it is also planned to use the guard to eliminate the consequences of natural disasters, for which the civil defense units used to be deployed.

But why the duplication? After all, it appears that civil defense units have not been disbanded yet. The principal issue is: Why do we not still have sufficient legal grounds for creating the national guard? Clearly, someone's verbal instructions are insufficient to this end. After all, this appears to be a very serious undertaking. It appears that we absolutely cannot do without appropriate ukases from the

USSR and RSFSR presidents in this matter. Otherwise, as we understand it, the most incredible "incongruities" may develop. For example, could this entire guard be covered by the ukase of the USSR president on illegal military formations which, as is known, nobody has canceled yet? Who is going to finance the guard, arm it, and clothe and outfit it?

But all of the above are problems for the upper echelons. The tasks of the acceptance board on Rybnyy Lane are

both simpler and more specific: To select the most worthy people. The questions asked by candidates for guardsmen are also simpler: What conditions of service await them? What will the salaries be? Will service in the national guard be equated with service in the USSR Armed Forces?

The guard sign-up continues. Those who so wish still have an opportunity to show themselves in this pursuit.

Ethnic Groupings Dangerous Problem in Military
91SV0079A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Sep 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Captain 3rd Rank V. Maryukha: "Ethnic Groupings as Dangerous as 'Dedovshchina': A New, Alarming Phenomenon in Military Collectives"]

[Text] Of all the letters on this topic received by the editors, this one differed in one respect. Of the two military construction units located near Moscow that were the brief duty stations of Turdybek Nurpolatov's son, the father described one of them as more or less the best subunit in the entire Armed Forces, referring to the other one as a collecting point for all kinds of vices. Nurbek Nurpolatov, as a member of the latter unit, experienced such heavy psychological pressure and outright violence that he could no longer withstand the humiliation and, as described by the father, was "forced to leave his unit and wander like a vagabond, winding up at his home."

The following day, I managed to locate the military construction detachment which N. Nurpolatov left without authorization, in city outskirts, close to a plant known throughout the nation. The letter led me to believe that I would find decrepit barracks, semi-intoxicated military builders looking for a fight with the first person they come across, and indifferent commanders who would have nothing to do with subordinates. However, no matter how closely I looked, I could not see the outrages the letter told about. By the same token, I would not go so far as to say that the unit was the best I had ever seen.

Major V. Perestoronin, the deputy commander of the military construction detachment, did not conceal the fact that the state of affairs in the detachment left something to be desired. It turned out that military builder N. Nurpolatov was certainly not the only person who had committed AWOL. In the second quarter of this year alone, the detachment listed 11 men as fugitives, one of whom was given an early discharge; he should not have been inducted in the first place, because of, shall we say, the level of his mental development. Another one was a patient in the Hospital imeni Yakovenko for the same reason. Some of the fugitives are at large. Their homes are located in areas racked by interethnic conflicts. The men who either returned to their unit or were picked up by the provost service and subjected to disciplinary action have returned to duty. That included military builder Private Nurpolatov. It is true that a dispensation was made in his case by permitting him to remain in a unit located close to home.

Let us return to his previous duty station. Why did a young soldier who was transferred to a unit new to him leave this unit the following day, receive punishment for the first violation, only to turn around and commit AWOL a second time? It bears mentioning here that the latest case of humiliation of a man by a fellow serviceman occurred last year in the unit, after which the

guilty soldier was appropriately disciplined. Other barracks hooligans are kept in check by considerable pressure applied by the military procuracy and by the increasing interest in state of affairs in the unit exhibited by parents. Quite a bit has also been done by commanders - from effecting some improvement in routine garrison duty (something that "suffers" in the case of builders, for subjective and objective reasons) and in normal living conditions on the one hand, to the provision of additional food on the basis of subsidiary farm and greenhouse operation on the other.

"Nonetheless, we still receive reports of 'quiet' rights violations from time to time," said Vladimir Vladimirovich Perestoronin. "They are 'quiet,' largely because there are no witnesses to the offenses, and also due to hesitation to lodge complaints on the part of the victims. There is little chance to spot rights violators some other way, since the victims as a rule can show no bruises or abrasions on their bodies."

Incidentally, those who dare to assault their fellow servicemen for no reason at all are known to command personnel, who take swift action against them. In addition, if one realizes that Nurpolatov himself had nothing against serving in his previous unit, in fact insisted on doing so, we must seek an explanation for his behavior somewhere else, in something other than hazing of recruits by older servicemen or lack of responsibility on the part of command personnel.

I would be less than honest if I were to say that the true cause came upon me all of a sudden or that I have never experienced anything of the sort. When I was starting my military service, I heard men use the word "fellow countryman" and its affectionate form "zema." The term "fellow countrymen" was employed by inductees in referring to men from the same rayon, region, or republic, naturally in the context of ethnic origin. The geographic principle was decisive in selection of friends; even length of service did not have any particular influence on this thinking among fellow countrymen. Protection of the weak and helping fellow countrymen were considered to be a matter of honor; the particular ethnic grouping involved did not show its "unconsecrated" side for some time.

Nonetheless, as it so often happens, righteous matters are often followed by immoral ones. Looking backward, it is difficult to pin down the beginning, the time when a community of fellow countrymen decided to take on another community, or an entire military collective, for that matter; the time of appearance of some kind of "Mafia of fellow countrymen," which has the strong prevail over everyone else in an attempt to facilitate the tour of duty of their fellow countrymen. There is this kind of "unofficial" structure in the unit abandoned by Nurpolatov, also. This kind of structure also exists in other military collectives, such as the one the unfortunate fugitive took a liking to, for example. There was a reason for this liking. With all conditions equal, the two units differed in one respect: In the second military

construction detachment, an ethnic grouping of Chechen held the upper hand, while in the first detachment Nurpolatov's fellow countrymen held sway. It goes without saying that the new location alone - even ignoring humiliation by fellow servicemen of another nationality - frightened Nurpolatov out of his wits. On top of that, there is no real cause to bring charges against members of ethnic groupings. This is merely the initial manifestation of their inherent self-discipline, something that metes out punishment to those who dare to set their doubtful preferences above common interests. The grouping attempts to install its candidates in junior command assignments and endow them with unquestioned authority over other servicemen. In this connection, it sees no need for violence: The use of implied threats is sufficient. Discord arises only with change of personnel, a time when there is a struggle for influence in the unit or subunit. Thus, apparent calmness in a unit in which an ethnic grouping takes root is followed by domination of some servicemen by others.

Of course, hazing of recruits by older servicemen as a phenomenon manifested by individual hooligans still exists. It was the subject of a complaint in a letter written by the mother of Private Golubev, who is serving in Saratov Oblast. A telegram expressing alarm was sent by reserve officer Boronilov, whose son has also suffered from actions in violation of regulations in his tour in Zavitsinsk, Amur Oblast. Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to fail to take notice of a phenomenon as dangerous as the ethnic grouping.

There is no doubt about the pain caused us - military people - by the fact that the great, labor-intensive and, more than anything else, necessary and noble work that was being done to bring about ethnic harmony among personnel of the Army and Navy was not permitted to stand the test of time, in that it has suffered damages from the blows inflicted by the centrifugal ethnic trends existing in the country. Of the many concepts compromised by the propaganda that was in the service of the old administrative command system, I believe that the concept of internationalism is least deserving of this. A person asks himself again and again: Is it possible to draw boundaries between multi-ethnic families or set up demarcation posts on millions of pieces of land and postage-stamp size apartments housing representatives of nations and peoples? Is it possible to organize in any place of your choosing - let alone in unified Armed Forces - companies, battalions, and regiments, along the lines of "pure blood?"

Therefore, the concept of internationalism is now infused with a new meaning, a mutual show of respect for traditions, customs, and a right to exercise genuinely equal rights. This in my view has been most fully understood by persons who have gone through Osh, Fergana, Nagornyy Karabakh, and other "hot spots." This kind of understanding is even showing up in the Armed Forces. There is a reason why a position of priority importance is attached in the Ministry of Defense Collegium's appeal to Armed Forces personnel

to problems of internal unity of military collectives, strengthening of military comradeship and soldierly friendship, formation of internationalist qualities among youth, and consolidation of age-old traditions of friendship between peoples. These problems must be resolved by the renewed agencies involved with combat training, with military, moral, and psychological education, and by all Army and Navy command and enlisted personnel working in close harmony with all nations and peoples whose representatives will be serving in the Armed Services of the renewed Union.

Servicemen's Social Problems Need Bold Solutions

*91SV0086A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Sep 91 First Edition p 3*

[Article by Colonel S. Vikulov, doctor of economic sciences, professor, and Lieutenant Colonel V. Shurmanov: "Bold Solutions Are Needed"]

[Text] The issue of the social welfare of servicemen keeps becoming more and more acute year after year. The growth of prices and the progress of inflation bring about less purchasing power and a deteriorating financial standing. Harsh regimentation in paying for military labor does not make it possible to use the available reserves of time, as well as intellect, in other spheres of activity in order to secure extra incomes.

The lagging salary levels of the servicemen compared to specialists with comparable stature and skills employed in the national economy and uncertainty about the future cause an outflow of skilled cadres from the Armed Forces. This trend is becoming increasingly threatening.

It appears to us that the problem will not be solved solely by increasing the pay of the servicemen (and consequently increasing the corresponding item of defense expenditures). Apparently, a search for acceptable solutions should proceed in a different direction, toward developing various forms of commercial operations, which would make it possible to utilize more fully the potential available in the Armed Forces and to accomplish social tasks.

Most probably, combat and combat support units should not engage in operations that distract them from accomplishing strictly established tasks. However, even in this matter there is a certain leeway codified in a directive signed several days ago by the USSR minister of defense. In particular, those "supported from the budget" will be able to sign contracts for performing work and providing services for outside consumers on their own; the rights of military unit commanders to sign contracts have been expanded—naturally, wherever this will not impair combat readiness. At the same time, the economy of the Armed Forces is very multifaceted, and its structure is far-flung. Many units are economically accountable. Why should commercial activities in all forms not be stepped up, and in such a manner as to get the people in

uniform interested, if this is advantageous for the Ministry of Defense? Therefore, some more precise criteria for measuring the feasibility of such operations in the environment of the Armed Forces should be worked out.

At present, all of these issues are sort of up in the air. Many legal aspects of the problem have not been resolved. Frequently, a paradoxical situation develops in specific cases: On the one hand, it is not forbidden, but on the other hand, it has not been authorized. As a rule, officials are also against developing "unaccustomed" forms of economic operations in the Armed Forces. Their argument is "chiseled in stone": to prevent the squandering of the assets of the people and the distraction of servicemen from the performance of their immediate duties.

At first sight, this is a weighty argument, but only at first sight. After all, military units and establishments are state organizations and are based on state property. Therefore, they may create only state structures when they act, for example, as founders of small enterprises. In this instance, this may only have to do with improving the effectiveness of using state property rather than its "squandering." All we need are reliable economic indicators. As far as the use of servicemen for work at small enterprises is concerned, it is quite possible, provided that they perform their responsibilities in a fine and prompt manner.

As we see it, it is expedient to conduct an experiment involving the creation of one or several small enterprises in various spheres in order not to read tea leaves. In the process, it is important to determine the sources for accumulating the charter fund of such enterprises, terms for their transfer, and procedures for the use of founder profits, as well as procedures for tax and fee settlements with the budget and local organs and legal norms for part-time jobs held by servicemen.

We believe that an extensive scientific discussion of these issues is needed at present, when work is underway on adapting army structures to a market economy and when different, at times directly opposed, opinions exist on this issue. Bold and vigorous solutions in the economic sphere, including economic operations of the Armed Forces, are necessary at this difficult time for our country. Inconsistency and delays in the implementation of an economic reform may unfavorably affect the combat readiness of the troops.

General Inspectorate Described as Sinecure

91SV0070A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 35, Sep 91, p 6

[Article by A. Kravtsov under the rubric "About the 'Paradise' Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense": "I Should Live Like That!"]

[Text] The Group of General Inspectors of the Ministry of Defense was established as a component off the central apparatus in 1958, at the height of the campaign of

massive reductions in the Armed Forces of the USSR, which affected also officers in high positions. Since then, military leaders have ordinarily taken positions in the Group of General Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense at the advent of natural retirement (for reasons of health or age, when they can no longer carry a full load) or forced retirement (for inadequacies in their performance) from their positions. This was the case with former Minister of Defense S. Sokolov and former Commander in Chief of National Defense Forces A. Koldunov, who paid with their positions following the "test" arranged by the famous M. Rust.

There are three categories of membership in the Group of General Inspectors, according to position and rank previously held.

- The positions of general inspectors form the first category. They are filled by marshals of the Soviet Union, chief marshals and fleet admirals of the Soviet Union.
- The next category consists of inspectors/advisors. These positions are held by marshals of troop arms and army generals.
- The third category consists of consultants to the group. These positions are designated for lieutenant generals and vice admirals.

Military personnel join the group by a special decision of the CPSU Central Committee, which is subsequently set forth in an order issued by the USSR minister of defense. The procedure is defined in a separate decree of the government. The abolishment of this decree was never announced, despite the fact that Article 6 of the Constitution of the USSR was repealed and the Constitutional Oversight Committee ruled that such decrees are illegal. Nor has the group's status been made public.

The inspectors are served by motor transport bases of the USSR Ministry of Defense and are provided with official dachas (from among the 142 official dachas belonging to the USSR Ministry of Defense), free telephone and telegraph service, secret and government communication services. Adjutants are assigned to the inspectors.

The pay and allowances of the inspectors (salary plus a rank increment, plus percentage increments based on number of years served) amount to at least 80% of the pay and allowances of commanders of military districts.

The group's members have an open and unregulated work schedule. They are not given any assignments or regular, mandatory duties. Some of them are appointed chairmen of state commissions for final exams at academies and schools, and from time to time they participate in troop inspections and help compile documents on such matters as the concept of the military reform or military doctrine, which have not yet been ratified by the USSR Supreme Soviet. Many of them write their memoirs, in which they share their combat experience. With

good reason, this group has long been called "paradise" by the army officers and generals.

They occupy comfortable offices with a view of the Moscow river on three floors in one of the buildings housing the USSR Ministry of Defense. They rarely meet, especially at the height of the vacation season, coming together only for party meetings, lectures on the international situation, and so forth.

As of the beginning of 1991 the group had 57 members: 22 marshals, four fleet admirals, 29 army generals and two civilians. The head of the group is 80-year-old MSU S.L. Sokolov, former USSR minister of defense, and his deputy is 82-year-old Army Gen I.G. Pavlovskiy.

Army Gen I.N. Shkadov was until recently secretary of the "paradise" party bureau of the CPSU; his deputy, Fleet Adm A.I. Sorokin, formerly deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy.

Listed by former positions, in addition to a former USSR minister of defense, chiefs of the General Staff, commanders in chief of the Warsaw Pact forces and commanders in chief of the branches of the Armed Forces, the group includes two former ministers of civil aviation, a former USSR minister of internal affairs and a former deputy chairman of the KGB, who have the military ranks of marshals of troop arms or army generals.

The group also includes individuals who are not high-ranking marshals, however: for example, L.N. Zaykov, former secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, and S.A. Afanasyev, former member of the CPSU Central Committee and formerly in charge of the

Ministry of General Machine Building and Ministry of Heavy and Transport Machine Building. They are listed as consultants.

Some of the inspectors in the group fell under the "spotlight" of the Commission on Privileges and Benefits of the USSR Supreme Soviet for illegally enjoying air and vacation privileges, the squandering (privatization) of dacha furniture, and so forth. They include S.F. Akhromeyev (who recently committed suicide), S.L. Sokolov, A.D. Lizichev, N.M. Skomorokhov, M.A. Gareyets, F.G. Kulikov, V.M. Shabanov and others. It was learned that instead of monitoring, inspecting, eliminating violations of the law and maintaining social justice in the Armed Forces of the USSR, they were themselves enjoying illegal benefits and privileges.

I hope that the commander in chief of the Armed Forces of the USSR will not ignore the following questions.

How effective is the work of the inspectors with respect to enhancing the nation's defense capability? After all, the pay and allowances of members of the Group of General Inspectors exceed the pay and allowances of all current commanders of military districts taken together.

Who specifically decides, and based on what principles, which of the military leaders in high positions are simply to be retired on a fairly large personal pension, and also who is to be made a member of the Group of General Inspectors.

From the editors: There is no questioning the fact that individuals in the "paradise" group possess a great deal of experience in life and professional expertise which can benefit the Armed Forces. The people know nothing about this, however. If members of the Group of General Inspectors wish to take exception to or report something, ARGUMENTY I FAKTY is prepared to provide space for this.

Carpathian Combat Firing Exercise Detailed

91UM0851A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Sep 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by correspondent Colonel V. Bogdanovskiy:
"Combat Training Quality Parameters: 'Ground' Aviation"]

[Text] In the Carpathian Military District, a demonstration battalion tactical exercise using live fire was set up for a training session attended by military district deputy troop commanders and army deputy commanders for combat training, corps combat training chiefs, district aviation directorate chiefs, and commanders and chiefs of staff of Ground Forces helicopter regiments.

Demonstration drills and exercises. Some generals and officers have developed a kind of allergy to such measures. On the training grounds, I ran into one acquaintance who said in a fit of temper: How many times can a person watch the same thing? What sense does it make to gather so many people from all over the Union? To be frank, this author, too, has seen more than once how participants in various training sessions are shown things that no one has doubted for a long time.

In a conversation after the exercise was over, Lieutenant Colonel A. Chernik, chief of staff of a helicopter regiment, said: "I consider it to have been very useful. We got a fuller picture of the basic features of a technique of organizing combat coordination with ground troop subunits."

"I saw a lot of things for the first time during the exercise," said Colonel V. Safonov, joining in the discussion. "Each stage of the battle gave me a lot of food for thought."

And here is the view of Lieutenant General A. Murylev, Carpathian Military District deputy troop commander for combat training:

"The value of the exercise undoubtedly lies in the fact that the commanders employed interesting tactical techniques, and did so on a defensive theme that has not received proper attention in the past. And, of course, I consider it valuable that the exercise enriched us with skills in organizing teamwork between ground troops and aviation. We clearly saw what should be avoided in troop training and what should be adopted."

According to the scenario, the "enemy," having broken through our troops' defenses, was mounting an attack. The battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ye. Smirnov was assigned the mission of taking up defenses at a designated line, stopping the "enemy," and then launching a counterattack. It is a typical mission in situations of this type. But subsequent events during the exercise can hardly be called typical or predictable.

The motorized infantrymen, tank crews, and artillerymen not only "dug into" the ground; they also prepared their defensive positions in such a way that the

defended area made it possible to engage "enemy" troops and combat hardware with all weapons assets. The artificial obstacle and fire systems that had been set up enabled the battalion to impose its will on the opposing side and to impede actions by the attacking subunits. Those attending the training methods session watched the battalion orient itself toward dynamic actions and an encounter with an active and strong "enemy."

For three days the soldiers had virtually no rest. An experiment was under way to determine if those taking part in the exercise could overcome great physical and psychological trials. Not all had an easy time of choosing their firing positions, preparing them, and concealing them. However, the efforts of officers A. Khokhlov, Ye. Smirnov, S. Andrushko, V. Kuzin, Yu. Zapryagaylo, and others were not in vain. The subunit commanders crawled up and down the forward defense line, deciding on the spot just what should be done and how, so that any ruse by the attackers would not catch the defenders unaware and any clever move by them would meet a skillful countermove.

I noticed in particular how carefully the motorized infantrymen had prepared their switch positions.

"We now understand that in defense, infantry fighting vehicles are a kind of armored fortress," said Sergeant A. Madzhidov. "But a fortress can also be used in different ways, especially when we have to deal with an 'enemy' with highly accurate weapons and powerful fire assets. Needless to say, he will try to deal our battalion a crippling blow. How can we survive under these conditions and keep our combat hardware intact? There is only one answer: We must effectively conceal ourselves by making rational use of the infantry fighting vehicle's combat and maneuvering capabilities. Consequently, we prepare several firing positions for it, thereby ensuring full freedom of maneuver. After getting off some aimed fire, we immediately change positions and hit the attackers from a place they don't expect."

In the field exercise, the training session participants saw rocket launcher operators who were also armed with assault rifles. Why?

"It's not easy for a soldier to operate with a rocket launcher and an assault rifle in battle," recounted Major S. Andrushenko. "But in actual combat, a soldier might have to deal with not only armored targets but also with 'enemy' troops, as in this exercise. When a soldier has an assault rifle at hand, he feels more confident."

Meanwhile, the situation grew difficult for the defenders. The attackers, using various ruses, concentrated their efforts first on one sector, then another. And they ultimately succeeded in penetrating the defense at the boundary between two subunits. Then those attending the training methods session watched the flamethrower sections go to work (they were commanded by Lieutenant O. Soyko). The flamethrower operators set fire to several armored targets, and the "enemy" was forced to

begin a retreat. The role that automatic mortars could play in the developing situation was also demonstrated convincingly. And, needless to say, the coordinated actions of the motorized infantrymen and the helicopter squadron (the acting commander was Military Pilot 1st Class Major A. Akimenko) was instructive for all. Incidentally, battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel Ye. Smirnov made skillful use of the strike by helicopters providing close fire support.

Allow me to make a small digression at this point. Army aviation has now appeared in the Ground Forces. And commanders are faced with the task of making effective use of it. Tactical exercises in which ground troops and aviation practiced teamwork were held in the past as well. But let's admit it: The exercises were sometimes of a pro forma character. Blunders were sometimes made, as aviators carried out strikes not against the "enemy" but against the troops they were helping to accomplish assigned missions. It is gratifying that a method for providing commanders with training in such an important area is finally beginning to appear.

Lt Col Smirnov also made skillful use of his own assets—namely, his armored group. At the culmination of the battle, a tank and two infantry fighting vehicles in concealed positions struck a blow against the attackers' flank. It was not only strong but also unexpected.

In my opinion, the exercise demonstrated a search for a broader formula of modern tactics.

After the "enemy" had been worn down, a tank battalion operating in the regiment's second echelon launched a counteroffensive on the left flank of the defended area. Motorized infantrymen rushed forward behind the tanks.

In recent times, demonstration exercises and training method sessions have not been held all that often. Hence it is all the more important that they serve as an authentic school of field combat proficiency and enrich officers and generals with new methods of organizing personnel training and instruction. This was the aim of the tactical exercise described. The exercise could not be called a standard one, which is to say an exercise whose organizational methods could be applied to other theaters of military operations. Other areas have their own special characteristics. The personnel of subunits and units should learn how to operate on the basis of those characteristics. The conditions of this exercise gave those attending the training method session some things to think about—and in some cases to doubt—in order to find answers to questions that are arising. And there are many such questions in the wake of the war in the Middle East. It must be assumed that all those attending the training session learned firsthand that modern warfare will not tolerate predictable moves and that some adjustments must be made in the way it is waged. The defensive military doctrine of our state also requires this.

Soldiers Found To Have Sold Weapons on Black Market

*PM1109152791 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 10 Sep 91 p 1*

[Correspondent F. Sizyy report: "Armor-Bearer P. and His Friends"]

[Text] I have learned from reliable sources that during a 6 September check on the contents of the Omsk arsenal of the USSR Ministry of Defense Missile and Artillery Directorate, 14 Kalashnikov assault rifles (AKS) and 208 Makarov pistols were found to be missing. It has been established that the weapons were sold at market prices by servicemen who were guarding that installation. An assault rifle, 38 Makarov pistols, and 60,000 rubles were confiscated from one of them—Private P.

Better Safety Measures Needed in Flight Training
91SV0075A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 Sep 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Colonel V. Dudin, honored military navigator of the USSR, candidate of military sciences, under the rubric "Point of View": "A Pilot Can End Up in an Emergency Situation. Is He Ready To Come Out the Victor?"]

[Text] Captain V. Echkenko was supposed to bomb from the stratosphere on a bombing range that was new to him. After the supersonic bomber took off on after burner, it headed into thick cloud cover. And suddenly the malfunctions began—the landing gear was not in a retracted position, communications were lost with the command post, and the navigation system stopped putting out coordinates. But for every four minutes of flight, the aircraft was covering more than 100 kilometers...

Inasmuch as "they studied" accident preconditions in the regiment very carefully, the pilot tried by himself to cope with the situation that arose. He did not immediately switch on the "distress" signal, and he did not report what happened when communications were restored, and, after coming out of the clouds, he did not land at an airfield of another authority.

In the end navigation was restored but there was not enough fuel now to reach home base—it was necessary to eject. Instead of preconditions, there was a crash. Only in the course of the investigation of this accident did Captain Echkenko learn that there were quite a few accidents like this in aviation practice.

Indeed, the recurrence of flight accidents (LP) whose circumstances are quite similar is still considerable in aviation. To reduce it, representative conferences are held, extensive plans for measures are developed, systematic checks of the troops are conducted, and, finally, strict orders are published. However, there is no steady reduction in accidents in general. Why?

Apparently, to clarify the reasons for this, it is necessary first of all to find new approaches to an analysis of the whole complex of flight accidents.

At the present time, analysis consists mainly of defining an LP according to cause, or, as aviation administrators like to put it—according to blame: the managerial staff, flight services, industry, well, and, of course, the pilots themselves. Simply, it is clear and immediately apparent where the main enemy of "flight safety" is in this case.

But how useful are such generalizations to a specific pilot who takes to the air at times in an aircraft that is not of the best design, from an airfield that is not ideal, and, unfortunately, where air traffic control and support is not ideal. When on takeoff the engine starts to "ping"—the pilot and the flight operations officer checking him out do not have time to analyze why an emergency situation arose that in several seconds will end with one of two possible outcomes—a flight accident or only a

precondition for one. Which to a great extent depends on the actions of the pilot. But impassive statistics indicate: It is precisely in such a situation that many accidents occurred, because the pilots continued the takeoff, and under its specific conditions—speed at the moment of malfunction, weight in flight, runway length, weather conditions, etc., it should have been stopped. And, at the same time, almost as many tragedies occurred when the takeoff was stopped but should have been continued to clear obstacles. But an incorrect assessment of the situation and making the wrong decision, or slowness in doing what is proper, did not enable it to be done. And there are dozens of such "if only" cases every year.

Therefore, while not denying the usefulness, especially for superior offices, of traditional accident rate analysis, it would not be a bad idea to supplement it with a methodology that is more "germane" to the pilots themselves—variety of accident situations, the dynamics of their development, and the possibility of localizing and reducing the gravity of the outcome. This kind of an approach gives rather meaningful advantages that make it possible to look in a new way at the potential for preventing LP's. After all, despite the outward diversity of circumstances of accidents, their absolute majority in each air component is caused by a limited number of various emergency situations. These are cases in takeoff and landing, stalling in aircraft handling and performance and in operational maneuvers, loss of orientation, approaching obstacles on the ground and in the air, and running into dangerous weather phenomena, etc.

There has been enough of convincing pilots of the actuality of the dangers of flights on "a world scale," and of frightening them with figures. It is time to teach prevention of specific accidents. As a rule, one occurs in the life of a pilot, and it impacts on the personal flying and everyday fate of an aviator who has one. Such a concrete expression of accident prevention in air units and subunits, that is, direct work with pilots on flight safety, which present-day practitioners and theoreticians see in their own individual way, can be started without special expenditures, and only with methodological modes.

This is what the proposals constitute. It is considered advisable to work up a list of the emergency situations that are repeated most frequently, and the methods for their prevention. As it is done in special case sections of flight operations manuals for each type of aircraft. There, however, there are only cases associated with equipment failures, but they constitute only one-fourth of all accidents. And the rest? It is necessary, without superfluous theorizing, to analyze all flight accidents and the preconditions for them in recent years; most of all, those situations and factors whose prevention would really reduce losses due to their recurrence. This list should be compiled in each component of the Air Force by a group of specialists of combat training centers under the direction of a responsible individual who specifically flies on the type of aircraft in question. This list could be updated periodically, for example, once each year or two,

and regimental commanders should have the right to insert their own additions to it, conditioned by the specific character of a given regiment.

This will be in the nature of a flight safety course, organically combined with the existing operational training course for a given air component. Incidentally, in the process, an interested cooperation of the two leading services—combat training and flight safety—which, unfortunately, are sometimes more zealous about mutual criticism than about constructive work, could be achieved for the first time.

After working up the list of emergency situations, recommendations must also be prepared for their prevention along two avenues: How a pilot should avoid falling into a given situation because of his own negligence, and how to counter its exacerbation if he got into it for any other possible reason. Here, of course, it is necessary to know thoroughly the limitations and peculiarities of one's aircraft (helicopter), plus to master the skills of countering emergency situations with confidence. Of course, these actions will be particularly specific for a fighter, missile carrier, and helicopter, and they cannot be described by one center. But it can be done most qualitatively right in the operational training centers of each air component.

But, there are well-known methods of training in how to inculcate and maintain skills for getting out of emergency situations—self-training, exercises on simulators, in cockpits, and in controlled rehearsals, and in practices in flight of elements stipulated in the operational training course. The periodicity and priority of each case is the prerogative of the regimental commander and of the individual pilot.

Of course, this process would be enlivened by the use for training purposes of short movie and video films about the most difficult situations, tape recordings (real and dramatized), radio exchanges between pilots and air traffic controllers, and, unquestionably, electronic devices, especially personal computers, with a selection of programs for the evaluation of special cases and the development of solutions for countering them. Unfortunately, there still are no electronic games at all in the units. But even given this lack of training resources, and taking advantage of the personal interest of the pilot in his own safety, skills in preventing specific emergency situations can be activated significantly.

Something should be said especially about cases of hushing up flying accident circumstances between various departments (MGA [Ministry of Civil Aviation], MAP [Ministry of the Aviation Industry], and others), most of all on the same types of aircraft. This experience is too valuable to let it remain "under lock and key," especially because many representatives of the press with their superficial articles in fact mislead pilots. Realistic information and preventive recommendations should be received in all professional channels, regardless of with

whom the LP occurred—with a first class test pilot, a chief pilot, or with a regular pilot.

There is one more important question—the treatment of people who permit preconditions for flight accidents. After all, practically every emergency situation frequently is a unique albeit unplanned flying experiment that often happens not to an ace test pilot, but to an ordinary line pilot. The punitive approach, which is frequently practiced, is not justified. It almost always revolves around the concealment of dangerous situations and facts, which later appear once again. The proposed optimization of accident prevention among the troops, of course, will add work to the safety service. Arranging the training of pilots in reliable prevention of emergency situations is more difficult than engaging in the collection of endless deficiencies in units, especially in drawing up documentation, or in compiling different directives. But this should be done. It is this route that will raise the real professionalism of all specialists of the flight safety service and, in the final analysis, lower the accident rate in aviation. Without this, its substantial reduction is unrealistic.

PVO Radar Officer on Personnel, Equipment Problems

*91SV0077A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Sep 91 First Edition p 2*

[Interview with Colonel A. Onov, chief of radiotechnical troops in an Air Defense Troops unit, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Colonel A. Ladin; place and date not given: "Going to Alert Duty... Hat in Hand"]

[Text] **The latest events indicate that substantial changes have occurred and will occur in the USSR Armed Forces. This gives us hope that numerous issues of concern to the servicemen of the Army and the Navy will be resolved sooner. Our correspondent discussed some of these issues, which perhaps are more characteristic of the Air Defense Troops, with Colonel A. Onov, chief of the radiotechnical troops of an Air Defense unit.**

[Ladin] Aleksandr Nikolayevich, I see a chart on your desk with a multitude of little circles. I surmise that these are radar units located along the border and reporting to you. Allow me to ask what straight and broken lines between them indicate—is it operational coordination?

[Onov] You did not guess right. Figuratively speaking, this is an attempt to patch up the holes. What am I talking about? Look at the map. Radar companies are located in isolation for the most part. Hence everything necessary is delivered to the "points" only by motor vehicles. In previous years, some civilian organizations helped us out on the basis of mutually advantageous contractual obligations. These partners have now jacked up the prices for their services so we cannot afford their help any more. Therefore, the chart which leaped at you is an attempt to assign motor vehicles which have not been dispatched to grain harvesting in Kazakhstan. After

all, deliveries of glass, cement, plumbing fixtures, and what have you from the center are not being made.

[Ladin] I appreciate such difficulties, but frankly we have always had them...

[Onov] This may seem strange to you, but is what I mentioned not a subject for reforms? Judge for yourself: Should I, the chief of radiotechnical troops who, as they say, has his hands full of his own concerns about directly ensuring the protection of our country's air border, rack my brain over what is purely a supply procurement problem? If only you knew how much time and energy it claims! I have given more than 20 years of my life to the Air Defense Troops, and all these years I have dreamed that finally a time would come in the Army for the supremacy of the tasks and priorities of combat training. Meanwhile, the already restricted potential of commanders and specialists is by and large infringed upon. On the one hand, demands are made to prepare true professionals in respective fields while on the other hand, there is the complete indifference of some superior headquarters concerning the creation of necessary conditions for the training of personnel. For example, in the last five years not a single piece of modern teaching and training equipment has been delivered to the radiotechnical troops of our unit. We train using junk which should have been discarded long ago...

[Ladin] However, apparently it is not that simple to replace all equipment at once?

[Onov] Granted. However—you will have difficulty believing this—we have pieces dating back to 1951! Let us look at the following aspect. For several years now, the number of discharged sergeants and men has not been replenished. By now, subunits reporting to me lack on the order of 500 men. Would you say that such a personnel shortage is a factor? I will be frank: Those who are in service are endlessly and boundlessly overworked, both physically and morally. There is no end to this arbitrariness in sight.

Why do I emphasize it? Because from the moment an officer or a warrant officer comes to serve with us he is refused the right to set reciprocal conditions and demand that they be met. I agree that it is hard to ensure a standard work day. However, violations of this condition should be compensated for in certain monetary terms. Officers, warrant officers, and sergeants should have a right to demand materiel of an appropriate standard and the manning of subunits in keeping with the approved tables of organization in order to accomplish the tasks assigned. Alas, in prestigious forums little has been said about this so far. Finally, the Ministry of Defense should guarantee, in a mutual contract with a serviceman, that he will be given housing and that foodstuffs and necessary social services will be provided for his family, especially in remote areas. If the state has no such opportunity, the serviceman should be compensated for the loss.

[Ladin] I agree that all of the above are necessary prerequisites for successful military service. Incidentally, some of these things are already being implemented. In particular, housing rentals by officers are being paid for to a certain extent, and additional preferences for those on alert duty have been introduced... However, previously the people used to selflessly and honestly do their duty as servicemen under even worse conditions.

[Onov] Self-sacrifice, service to great ideals, and sense of duty have always been characteristic of the Soviet people. However, in recent years the exploitation of ethical values such as patriotism and conscientiousness has been driven to the absurd. After all, missions aimed at protecting our state borders are accomplished at the limit of what is possible only because our officers and warrant officers have such traits. I will once again give an example from the life of the subunits reporting to me. Only 48 percent of them are equipped with modern materiel. How can you serve if your superiors have the right to demand quality combat alert performances but subordinates do not even have the right to turn down a combat mission when everything necessary for it is not provided? Judge for yourself: Eight pieces of combat materiel are now being repaired, and some of them have been under repair since June.

When I was a young lieutenant this was out of the question. At the time, breakdowns at the stations also happened, but they were promptly taken care of. If a particular part was out of order the commander was given a new one. At present, I cannot tell this to my subordinates. Our depots are empty. However, if anything goes wrong he who now sits in front of the screens of old radar installations but does not have reliable arrangements for protecting his rights will be blamed.

[Ladin] As I see it, there is no dearth of problems. Are your subordinates of the same mind as you are? Do they also suggest that something be changed?

[Onov] As far as my subordinates are concerned, they would first of all like to have normal conditions to improve their professional skills. What do we mean? An entire set of measures, beginning with time allocated for training and mastering new materiel for officers, warrant officers, sergeants, and soldiers—in reality rather than in theory. As I see it, they are entitled to demand quality training and, certainly, knowledgeable leaders during the training process. Unfortunately, this process has now been completely muddled. Classes are planned but not held because men are assigned to various duties. Personnel training is frequently conducted with bare hands, especially in our remote companies. The skills of the officers are deteriorating...

This is how I see it: Since at present the development of democracy is on the agenda, all of us, regardless of rank and position held, should vigorously contribute to the elimination of shortcomings in military collectives. We should have a right to a weighty word, or a firm opinion which matters.

[Ladin] To your mind, what is the main obstacle to reforming the Air Defense Troops and the Army as a whole?

[Onov] It seems to me that until recently there was no uniform understanding of what needs to be changed among the people and the Armed Forces themselves. After all, most frequently the debate is about how long soldiers should serve or, for example, where they should serve, in which part of the country. However, is this the only meaning of the reform? Why does no one from among those who should see, notice that the Army has long been going around hat in hand, begging for absolutely everything, from foodstuffs to spare parts and materiel, and that deliveries of materials to the troops are not being made? I for one do not understand who is to blame for this. Either financing for defense programs is poor, or the funds allocated for the production of new materiel and weapons are not spent efficiently, or this is the result of ill-conceived actions in the course of conversion. However, be that as it may, the Army suffers, and its combat readiness is undermined.

I would like the people to learn the truth about our problems. This is the main point.

Ulan-Ude Enterprise Builds Modified MIG Helicopter

*PM1309074491 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 12 Sep 91 p 4*

[Correspondent Gennadiy Gypylov report from "Correspondent's Office on the Line" column: "MIG Success"]

[Text] Ulan-Ude—Designers and workers at the Ulan-Ude Aviation Association have carried out the first flight test of a new MI-171 helicopter, and the crew headed by experienced test pilot V. Tonkikh gave a high assessment of the machine.

For the first time in its experience the enterprise has modified the familiar MI-8 helicopter and, most remarkably, built it with its own money. "The economic crisis has severed ties between our enterprises, and for a long time we have received no orders for new helicopters, but the development of a new type of 'chopper' required substantial expenditure," designer R. Solovyev said, "and so we decided to improve the obsolete version of the MI-8."

The first orders have come in from many regions of Russia. The new helicopter is expected to take part in an international exhibition in Britain at the end of September.

Sub Tries To Flee Soviet Waters During Coup
91SV0060A Moscow TRUD in Russian 4 Sep 91 p 3

[Article by Major V. Korolyuk, BOYEVAYA VAKHTA correspondent, under the rubric "Details Given": "We Are Authorized To Use Weapons"—This Signal Was sent to a Submarine Which Put Out to Sea on Its Own During the Anxious Days of August"]

[Text] "The editorial office has learned from reliable sources that on the night of 20 to 21 August, Captain Lieutenant Medvedev, executive officer of a submarine, took it out to sea without authorization. This happened immediately after an interview which the plotters gave..."

"The desperate officer...stated on the radio that he would not go back to the base until the USSR president was released and the former order restored.

"...Official structures are maintaining complete silence and investigating."

(From the newspapers dated 24 August 1991)

ANDREY MEDVEDEV, 30, a 1987 graduate of the naval school, categorically refused to talk to the representatives of the press. While serving time at the guard-house, he told me:

"The reason I am here is for drinking while on duty. The submarine putting out to sea has nothing to do with my arrest, and this is why I am not going to discuss it."

SERGEY KRAVTSOV, 23, warrant officer, with the navy since 1985, senior in charge of steering signalmen. Boatswain. Warrant officer in charge on the vessel that morning:

[Kravtsov] I was awakened by the watch of the central station at 0530 on 22 August (according to instructions, I can rest until 0600 while on duty, too), and told that the executive officer wanted to see me. I came out to the pier and reported as supposed to: No incidents had occurred. He said: "Let us get going urgently, we are heading for neutral waters." Being half awake, I did not think straight. The executive officer told us later that the crew had watched TV until 0300, but nothing was clear by then. They had seen enough. The GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency] was beginning "to fret and fume," and Yeltsin alone stood against them. Three divisions were on his side, and we also needed to come out in support, to cast away and say that we were also his guys, that there were heroes in the Pacific Fleet as well!

We did not succeed in cranking up the gyrocompass. We navigated visually. Later, they sent a message from a minesweeper which was dispatched to chase us: "We order you to stop. We are authorized to use weapons." After all, nobody knew then what kind of submarine it was and where it was sailing. The executive officer responded to them on the radio: "I demand to meet the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]

president or vice president. Otherwise, if my demands are not met, we threaten to sink the vessel."

[Korolyuk] Did Medvedev discuss the sinking with the crew in any way?

[Kravtsov] No. This was his threat to the minesweeper. A hunger strike was approved in principle. They said that there was nothing to eat on the submarine anyway, and they could go for a hunger strike too. We unloaded foodstuffs and combat supplies on hand before repairs began. We had a few dry rations with us—the remainders of the evening tea, and then only for the watch crew. Meanwhile, the executive officer brought seven more sailors with him.

[Korolyuk] What happened next?

[Kravtsov] We drifted. Subsequently, several more vessels approached us, lined around us in a horseshoe, and barred our exit to the sea. The commander's motor launch came, with Vice Admiral Oleynik on board, and a torpedo retriever with the submarine commander, brigade commander, and chief of the political department. They brought a radio set and began to persuade us that everything was normal in the country. We went back: There were songs and music on Mayak...

I cannot understand myself why the hell we put out. Had all of this happened at least one day sooner...

[Korolyuk] Was the executive officer sober during this sortie?

[Kravtsov] How should I put it? Not exactly.

[Korolyuk] Did you try holding him back?

[Kravtsov] There was no holding him back... Besides, I did not consider it to be that serious. I thought that we would move from the plant to the base, and that would be it. I failed to quite appreciate the situation. After all, we, the watch crew, had been aboard the vessel since 1900 hours of the previous day. We had no information at all: The radio was not working, and there was no TV.

[Korolyuk] Did everybody sail out voluntarily, driven by patriotism?

[Kravtsov] Most likely the watch crew went spontaneously, obeying an order. Some did not manage to understand anything, and woke up while at sea... Even those whom the executive officer brought from the barracks did not follow him right away. Later, the sailors told me that he had lined them up several times from 0400 hours on and had appealed to them. He had persuaded them only when he had begun talking to each one separately.

[Korolyuk] Did you fly St. Andrew's standard over the submarine?

[Kravtsov] We did. Sailors put it together with a sheet and clippings from a blue blanket.

MAKSIM KUZMINSKIY, navigator of the same submarine, senior lieutenant, spent that night at home, and

he knows about the event from stories told by his fellow servicemen and the press:

"He just wanted to express his protest. So what if he did not express it right away and if he spent three days preparing? After all, you cannot make such a decision right away... Had they sent for me, I would have gone with them at the time.

On 1 September 1991, A. Medvedev was released from confinement at the guardhouse; while in confinement, he submitted to the fleet commander a request to be discharged from the USSR Armed Forces. According to Brigade Commander A. Pobozhiy, no criminal charges will be filed against him, and by all signs the request will be granted.

Lobov, Velikhov on Nuclear Arms Security

*91WC0161A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 31 Aug 91 pp 1, 3*

[Article by V. Ostrovskiy: "Should We Be Worried About the USSR's Nuclear Weapons?"]

[Text] The Western mass media have repeatedly brought up the following problem: Who will get the nuclear weapons in the event of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and how many new nuclear states will arise in place of the USSR? Undoubtedly this problem could become the subject of debate and reflection of idle people on a hypothetical level. But we should ask the Western mass media who has informed them that the president of the USSR has stopped being the commander in chief of the country's Armed Forces and where they learned that he has lost control over the country's nuclear potential.

How do General of the Army V. Lobov, chief of general staff of the USSR Armed Forces, and Academician Ye. Velikhov, leader of the USSR's thermonuclear program and USSR people's deputy, see this problem?

General of the Army Vladimir Lobov, chief of general staff of the USSR Armed Forces:

Nuclear missile weapons in our country are under the strictest and most rigorous control. It is part and parcel of the very system of administration of these weapons.

The security of nuclear warheads during storage, transportation, and existence on alert status is guaranteed by a multistep system of control which consists not only of technical but also of biophysical principles. The process of oversight is such, said General Lobov, that a chain of controlling elements functions at each state of the upkeep of a nuclear weapon. The control mechanism is such an integral part that it absolutely excludes any possibility of any kind of mistake. The chief of general staff of the USSR Armed Forces categorically rejected any possibility of nuclear blackmail in the event of the theft of the codes.

Both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons are reliably controlled by the appropriate services of the USSR Armed Forces. General V. Lobov said that the Soviet military command authorities understand all the depth of the anxiety of the international community at the problem of the condition of the nuclear potential and the reliability of its control by the state. We have received requests by scholars to examine this problem, said the general. I believe that a discussion of this problem by Soviet scholars may serve as a new impulse first and foremost for halting the nuclear tests of the United States and the USSR, which may lead to a halt in the development of new nuclear weapons systems. Such a step by both powers could contribute to a decline in the numbers of nuclear arms in the world.

Academician Yevgeniy Velikhov, leader of the USSR's thermonuclear program and USSR people's deputy:

In order to discuss and examine the aforementioned problem we need a high degree of trust in the attitudes of those people who will be charged with the practical embodiment of such an idea.

The very process of administration of nuclear weapons requires secrecy, and it would be intolerable to go completely public on this issue. However, it is necessary that a study of this problem be conducted, but in such a way that such a study would provide the necessary guarantees and would lead to a concrete result. The people appointed to it should have the trust of the people. The academician presumes that the best variant would be to create a special committee for these questions and not to postpone such a project indefinitely. Yevgeniy Velikhov noted that control over the project should be assigned to the USSR Supreme Soviet and that it should involve a broad circle of deputies, and not just members of the parliament.

In the opinion of the academician, inasmuch as nuclear weapons are connected with the international obligations of our country, all proposals should be carefully studied, as should the procedure itself of administration (and control) of the nuclear weapons, in order to absolutely know to what degree the procedure is guaranteed or not guaranteed against any accidents.

Edward Teller, the American scholar and nuclear scientist, expressed approximately the same point of view in a 23 August 1991 letter to Ye. Velikhov. He writes that he believes the question of the reliability of control over nuclear weapons should be discussed in the Soviet Union and the results of such a discussion should be accessible.

In our turn we can only add that premature alarm concerning the possible partition of nuclear weapons among the republics cannot have any serious foundation.

Col Gen Sergeyev: Training Problems, Lack of Simulators

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[Report on interview with Colonel General I. Sergeyev, deputy commander in chief of the Strategic Missile Troops, by Major A. Dolinin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Combat Training: Facets of the Problem; 'Toys' for the Missile Men"]

[Text] Every time that the question comes up about the "ailments" of operational training, the specialists mention, among other things, the lack of an improved material training base. But the problem, for example, of providing troops with highly effective simulators remains as critical as ever. Moreover, in the current economic situation in the country, it is hardly likely that it will be resolved soon. Why? It is simply unprofitable for defense enterprises to produce training equipment in small batches. Then, is there no solution at all?

How this official problem is being resolved in the RVSN [Strategic Missile Troops] is the subject of an interview by our correspondent with Colonel General I. Sergeyev, deputy commander in chief of the Strategic Missile Troops.

[Dolinin] Igor Dmitriyevich, not everyone by far knows that the RVSN is the only armed service of the Armed Forces where the services of industry are not utilized in the manufacture of complex simulators. Before answering how this was achieved, explain why it is so important for missile men, as, probably, for no one else, to have modern teaching and training equipment?

[Sergeyev] I do not want to contrast our troops with others: Each has its own tasks and specific character. But you will agree that the strategic missile men have a unique service. Like surgeons, they require not simply the highest training, but, if you will, a manual memory. But you cannot conduct total training on an operational missile. For training purposes, only prelaunch operations are possible with it. And the most complicated situations are modeled only for teaching and training systems. Only here can you go through the dynamics of the coordinated actions of missile site systems. That is why operators at training command posts perfect skills to the point of automatism, which is especially important for continuous missile readiness for operational employment. Imagine, before receiving admittance to operational readiness duty, an officer must undergo several hours of training each time.

But it is not just a question of equipment training, but also of psychological preparation. After all, every second officer in the rocket troops is up to 30 years old. Operational readiness duty, especially in regiments, is performed by lieutenants and captains. Do they have psychological tension before going on duty? Undoubtedly. Drills on training equipment removes it.

And finally. The weapons of the missile men require collective action. Thus, it is easier to sense the shoulder of a comrade in a training exercise where, in fact, operational crews are born whose prestige is determined not by the stars on shoulderboards, but by competence and experience.

[Dolinin] Well, Igor Dmitriyevich, you have convinced me that this question is especially important to you. But why, nonetheless, did you refuse the services of industry in the creation of complex simulators? After all, in its time the RVSN was given special priority...

[Sergeyev] There are several reasons for this. One of them is their high price. You see, the cost of individual simulator models is hundreds of thousands of rubles. Moreover, there is a significant delay in its manufacture. Training equipment, as a rule, is received following three-four years after the delivery of missile systems for operational duty. Imagine what this means... And, finally, there is the low "intellectual" capabilities of the simulators. Alas, we are usually offered the elements of

table of organization systems and aggregates in cut-aways. They can be used only in the stages of initial theoretical training.

We at times make the simulators more complicated than the operational equipment. Almost each one constitutes a complicated programming apparatus system whose foundation is an electronic system based on computer equipment. Our simulator is a full model of a missile site in all phases of its functioning. We manufacture this kind of equipment at repair plants of the missile troops...

[Dolinin] Strange: But why did the defense industry turn out to be weaker than departmental plants?

[Sergeyev] Here is what is the matter. The most metal-consuming missiles—training missiles—for example, are supplied to us by industry. Our plants manufacture the insides of simulators—specialized computer systems are their most complicated part. But a detailed knowledge of the operational employment of missile systems is necessary for their creation. It is clear that no one knows these questions better than the missile men themselves. Therefore, the production of such simulators is more easily understood by our enterprises. Although at one time missile plants of the rocket troops also were not prepared for the production of complex electronic equipment. Neither technologically, nor psychologically. It was necessary to introduce new assembly lines, where accuracy is in the microns and the machine tools are program-controlled. Briefly, we had to resolve a vast complex of technical questions. Not forgetting, moreover, about the teaching of workers with the help of operational training specialists.

[Dolinin] Is there not a contradiction here? It turns out that officers taught the workers...how they have to work.

[Sergeyev] There are no contradictions, although at first a lot were given a hostile reception. Of course, the plan fluttered, there were no profits, and no bonuses, either. The first two years were especially painful. But, afterwards, everything got onto a normal track. The work efficiency of the plants increased. They moved from computer equipment to microprocessors. It became profitable to produce such equipment.

These simulators are five-eight times cheaper than the industrial ones, and, nonetheless, unfortunately, they are not cheap. Most of all, because this is not large-scale production—the troops do not need many. And, indeed, you cannot make modern simulators cheaply. The main thing rather is that we do not divert production capacity from the national economy.

[Dolinin] But does it not seem to you, Igor Dmitriyevich, that an increase in the output of "intelligent" equipment could resolve many problems?

[Sergeyev] It appears so. Moreover, we have thought about this, and we came to the conclusion that it was necessary to create our own scientific production association. This would resolve a whole complex of questions.

In the organizational plan, we would concentrate all sources of financing in one person. We would develop a single technical policy. But for the present, inasmuch as each one of our own directorates orders its own training equipment systems, a dissipation of resources results. In general, if this matter is approached in an official way (and that is precisely the way it should be), it would not be bad to standardize the production of simulators on a scale of the Armed Forces, which would make it possible to increase borrowing up to 80 percent from previous elaborations.

By the way, in the NATO countries, the development of simulators is considered one of the key tasks of the military industry. In the United States, it was scientifically substantiated that, to maintain the required operational readiness in the forces, expenditures for the manufacture of simulators and for support personnel who provide operational training should constitute one-eighth of the resources allocated for defense.

[Dolinin] As far as I know, the scientific-technical center in the rocket troops is the organizer of all work regarding teaching and training systems. But is this its only role?

[Sergeyev] You will agree that amateurs are not able to develop modern intelligent teaching and training systems. This task can only be resolved by a programmer collective. We gathered as many gifted people as we could. From the Academy imeni Dzerzhinskiy, the scientific research institute. They constituted the skeleton of the now existing scientific-technical center. Today, several dozen first-rate specialists work in the center who are capable of the entire cycle of work—from the development of programs to their scientific-technical conveyance to the troops. These people are possessed, and they can work 14-16 hours a day. And they see the incentive for their activity in the fact that their vast skills are realized in short periods in concrete ways.

One thing is still bad. The fact that the scientific-technical center is temporary, and not a regular entity. And various difficulties arise from this, for example, service advancement of officers... The reorganization of the center into a structure with its own table of organization would make it possible to remove many problems. Incidentally, this coincides with the plan of the minister of defense.

...Summing up what has been said, I will note that in two months of practical exercises on the simulators that we produced, personnel are completely mastering the new missile system and, as a consequence, they are performing operational readiness duty on them in a qualitative way. Thus, the search for ways to successfully implement operational training tasks and the most effective use of the capabilities of modern weapons and equipment is having its results.

As for the remaining problems, their resolution must be subordinated to what is most important—increasing the operational readiness of the Strategic Missile Troops.

Nuclear Weapons Control Mechanisms Discussed

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[Article by Academician V. Goldanskiy, people's deputy of the USSR: "In Whose Hands Is the Nuclear Button?: A Large Part of the USSR Nuclear Forces Is Located in the Territory of Russia"]

[Text] The three days in August "that shook the world" now belong to the past. But the West has not yet recovered from the shock that occurred when the "nuclear button" was in the hands of the conspirators.

At a meeting of Soviet and American scientists in Washington in April 1990, the exchange of reports on measures being undertaken in both countries for this purpose was one of the main points on the agenda. It thereby turned out that many such measures in both of our countries are surprisingly similar. For example, after three unsuccessful attempts to select a code to unblock a given nuclear warhead, its nuclear explosion becomes altogether impossible—even if a subsequent code is correct. True, this does not at all mean that the atomic bomb turns into a harmless toy. It is still possible that there will be a chemical explosion of the substance surrounding the nuclear charge and the dispersion in the air of very fine particles of alpha—radioactive and extremely toxic plutonium.

One can imagine the alarm experienced by all of humanity when after the coerced isolation of M.S. Gorbachev all three "safeguards" of the network of Soviet strategic offensive nuclear arms (normally kept with the president, minister of defense, and chief of the General Staff) were essentially in the same criminal hands. The alarm was all the greater on account of the fact that—according to American information—a system was developed in the USSR at the beginning of the 1980's that makes it possible for the top leadership of the country and armed forces to by-pass a lengthy chain of intermediate links and to launch live missiles by direct command from the "highest level."

This time, fortunately, no irreparable harm was done. According to the information that has appeared in our press, people were able to block the possibility of a command for an attack with strategic nuclear forces not just in one (which would have been sufficient) but even in two of the three notorious "little suitcases." This was done on 18 August by Gorbachev's receiving party—officers of the GRU—prior to the confiscation of his "little suitcase." And on 21 August, Yazov's receiving party was able to do this when they remained behind at Vnukovo-2 Airport after Yazov's departure for the Crimea to see Gorbachev (which he, by the way, had no right to do without his receiving party). All that took place is, of course, a colossal lesson for the future.

The republics are unanimously striving for independence and in this connection the question arises of what will become of the nuclear forces of the USSR when the republics gain this independence, if in so

doing several nuclear superpowers arise in place of one. Look how the nuclear facilities are now distributed in the republics (this information comes from the English journal ECONOMIST):

Facility	Russia	Ukraine	Kazakhstan	Belorussia	Lithuania
Nuclear power stations	13	6	1		1
Nuclear weapons plants	2				
Bomber bases	5	1	1	2	
Missile bases	13	2	2		
Bases for submarines and surface ships	5				
Antiballistic missile bases	2				

Thus, the lion's share goes to Russia but much remains for the others. We say that there are two missile bases in the Ukraine. In reality, this means 200 SS-19 intercontinental missiles each with a force of one megaton.

The union leadership and the Joint Military Command must take over the command and control of the

nuclear forces. A very proper and balanced decision was made by the Ukraine, which declared that it is becoming a nuclear-free zone. This is an extremely important step in the direction of the reduction of the nuclear danger and think that it would be most reasonable for Belorussia and Kazakhstan to undertake similar steps

Col-Gen Makashov Interviewed on Military Reform

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pp 3-7

[Interview with Red Banner Volga-Ural Military District Commander Colonel- General Albert Mikhaylovich Makashov by VOYENNNY VESTNIK Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel V. Kutishchev: "Military Reform: Gains and Losses"]

[Text] Albert Mikhaylovich Makashov was born on June 12, 1938 in the city of Levaya Rossosh of Voronezh Oblast to the family of a worker. After the fourth grade, he entered Voronezh Surovov Military School where he studied until 1956. Since he desired to dedicate his life to the army, he selected Tambov Military School. But the school was disbanded after a year. He continued his studies at Poltava Military School but it also closed after a year. He completed the third course in 1960 at Tashkent Combined Arms School imeni V.I. Lenin. Along with a diploma with distinction and the officers' rank of lieutenant, he received an assignment to the Group of Soviet Forces Germany.

From the position of motorized rifle battalion commander, he entered the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze. Later he served in the Red Banner Kiev Military District. Since he was already a division commander, he entered the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR imeni K.Ye. Voroshilov. He graduated from it, just like from the Academy imeni M.V. Frunze, with a gold medal.

Military reform. It is being implemented with difficulty. Especially right now when the country is undergoing a very deep crisis. And the weight of reform is lying like an ever increasing load on the troops of the internal military districts. The first losses have occurred as well as the first gains. What do they consist of? In general, what does reform bring for the military man? And the main thing, will the combat readiness of units and subunits become higher? Our Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel V. Kutishchev's conversation with Red Banner Volga-Ural Military District Commander Colonel-General A. Makashov was about this.

[Kutishchev] Albert Mikhaylovich, tell us a bit about the history of the military district and the troops that you command.

[Makashov] In accordance with a Soviet Government decision and a USSR Minister of Defense directive, the new Volga-Ural Military District was created based on two military districts—the Volga and the Ural. Its history formally began on September 1, 1989. But historically you can consider its beginning as May 4, 1918 when both the Volga and the Ural military districts were formed by a single decree signed by Vladimir Ilich Lenin. Therefore, today the revolutionary heritage and combat traditions of the Volga and Ural soldiers rightfully make up our common gold fund.

While turning to our history, we will find in it not only blank spots which today some would like to soil with black paint but also bright pages about people whose revolutionary fortitude and selflessness for the sake of future generations won them the recognition and love of their descendants.

The 24th Samara-Ulyanovsk Railroad Division and the 25th Chapayev, 26th Zlatoustov and 21st Perm, 15th Inza-Sivash and 27th Omsk became famous on the Volga and Ural expanses. It was here that the military leadership talents of M.V. Frunze, M.N. Tukhachevskiy, V.K. Blyukher, V.I. Chapayev, V.N. Azin, G.D. Gay, and I.S. Kutiyakov were clearly revealed.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, the Ural and Volga became the forge of the cadres for the front. The Kuybyshev Reserve Flying Brigade alone provided tens of thousands of crewmembers to the front. And the Ural Volunteer Tank Corps became a Guards Corps. On the whole, over 3,000 military formations, including six armies and 184 divisions were sent from here to the front. The banners of many of them flew over defeated Berlin and over rebellious Prague. On all fronts, the Volga and Ural soldiers fought shoulder to shoulder for the freedom and independence of our Homeland. Such names as Aleksandr Matrosov, Viktor Talalikhin, Musa Dzhalil, Mikhail Devyatayev, Nikolay Kuznetsov, Aleksey Kashirin, Ivan Borshchik, Aleksey Sokolov are famous not only in our country but also far beyond its borders.

During the postwar period, Volga and Ural soldiers continued to strengthen the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces. I need to note that this was intense labor to insure the security of our state and the peoples' peaceful lives. It is noteworthy that a January 15, 1974 USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Decree awarded Orders of the Red Banner to both military districts—both the Volga and the Ural—for their great contribution to the cause of increasing the defensive might of the Soviet State.

[Kutishchev] As far as I know, military district soldiers, like thousands of Soviet Army servicemen, fulfilled their international duty in Afghanistan with honor.

[Makashov] Actually our soldiers have had to carry out quite a few complex and responsible missions in recent years. This, as you correctly stated, was also participation in the Soviet Armed Forces' international mission in the Republic of Afghanistan where 18 men became Heroes of the Soviet Union and in the elimination of the aftereffects of the tragedies in Armenia, Sverdlovsk, and near Ufa. Our soldiers annually assist rural dwellers to gather the harvest. But the main, primary mission for the military district—is improvement of combat proficiency and fighting skills and training officer cadres and young specialists for the branches and services. And this is being successfully carried out.

We have entered into the single Volga-Ural Military District combat family with this baggage of good deeds

and glorious revolutionary and combat traditions. Its geographic space has been significantly increased—one seventh of the country's population lives here. The military district is located on the territory of seven autonomous republics and 10 oblasts. The ancient bonds of friendship, brotherhood, sponsorship ties and the common tasks of defense structural development link us to the workers. And henceforth we will strengthen these ties, make them multifaceted, and saturate them with practical matters. The guarantee of the unity of the army and the people and the might of the Armed Forces is in this.

[Kutishchev] Since we have touched upon the issue of Armed Forces might, I would like to talk about this. We all know that the mission of the new military doctrine—is to determine the optimal directions in preparing the country and the Armed Forces to repel possible aggression. Specifically, training of reserves that are capable of conducting active operations is one of these directions. What is the role of the Volga-Ural Military District here? And the main thing, what problems will you encounter?

[Makashov] You have correctly pointed out that supporting the reserves—is one of the most important directions in preparing the country and the Armed Forces to repel any aggression. Recent events in the Persian Gulf region also confirm this. Suffice it to say that the United States of America sent 525,000 reservists there in a short period of time.

That is why we recall that, although our doctrine is defensive, nevertheless the nature of a possible war has not changed. And losses are inevitable under conditions of the employment of nuclear or precision-guided weapons. As a result, the role of these internal military districts like ours has increased significantly. Especially if you consider that it is located on territory where an enormous population lives, the majority of whom are representatives of the working class. They are mainly technically literate people that allow us to teach them shortage military specialties in a short period of time. That is why we are training thousands of Ural and Volga residents for the Ground Forces at training centers alone.

Well, and problems, who does not have them? Today the work style and methods of command and political cadres is being renewed at the military district headquarters and directorates, at VUZ's [higher educational institutions], and at units and institutions and an atmosphere of independence and responsibility is being confirmed. Customary stereotypes of thinking that have lagged behind for years are being broken and the psychology is changing. At the same time, troops are coming to us from Eastern Europe and our own troop strength in the district is being reduced. Naturally, this makes an impression on the quality of work to train reserves.

[Kutishchev] You mentioned the troop reduction process and I was thinking that your cadet years occurred during a period when the Army was living through the sadly famous Khrushchev reductions. At that time, the

latest for that time tanks, aircraft, and even artillery were put under the knife. What did this provide? Three decades later, we are once again becoming witnesses to an unprecedented Armed Forces reduction, including in the military district entrusted to you.

[Makashov] I admit that I painfully recall that time. Especially right now, when I think about what occurred from the heights of the years I have lived and my commander's experience. Khrushchev's voluntarism cost both the country and the Armed Forces dearly. The fates of thousands of officers, and first of all those who had fought at the front, were disrupted and ruined. Many of them were separated into the reserve, without having provided them with either work, housing, or pensions.

I remember how commanders retired who had grown up during the years of the Great Patriotic War. First class professionals retired. I can hardly forget the tears on the faces of Moscow PVO [Air Defense] District pilots when they kissed their latest models of combat aircraft that were being shipped out for dismantling! And how the artillery men of one division cursed their mothers when they saw how their beautiful equipment was being destroyed. They were released into the reserve or at best sent to other branches of the armed forces because they were no longer needed. And they cursed the "gods of war" who shot practically without using firing tables and whose fire the Fascists feared most of all.

Khrushchev's euphoria, which bet only on missile weapons, and the main thing, his lack of knowledge of the fundamentals of military structural development, resulted in the most important link in the complex chain of troops training being broken. And precisely—the opportunity for officers who had served at the front to transfer their combat experience. I do not think that I have to explain how this turned out for the Armed Forces. But nevertheless, I will cite one example. In 1984, during training in the Western Group of Forces, artillery men permitted an error in their calculations and one of their projectiles fell... right in the garden of a local resident. At that time, I had to explain this not only to government representatives but also to the farmer [bauer] who was the victim. And you know what he told me in response? "Yes, yes, I know, Russian artillery men are no good...." [Ta, ta, ya znay, russish artillerist plekh...."]

And now, three decades later, history is repeating itself and the mistakes along with it. We are announcing unilateral Armed Forces and arms reductions and only later begin to perform the calculations. Is this really in a state-like manner? And later, as soon as there is no quality, then in the military profession it is always compensated for with quantity. This is elementary logic reinforced with the experience of world military art. Right now we have neither the one nor the other. They do not say for nothing that hasty conversion is like sabotage.

In several years, economists will calculate the achieved "effect." For now the best specialists are leaving KB [Design Bureaus] and skilled craftsmen are leaving military plants. Junior officers are leaving. And this is natural: they do not sense real concern from the state. Only promises and assurances. And they were not previously spoiled with material benefits but at least they were not spit on or disparaged. Now, as if by command, many mass propaganda methods have been raining a storm of criticism and dirty fabrications down on the army.

In their turn, unscrupulous political leaders are treating the army like a stepdaughter. You observe these leaders and you come to the conclusion: they are doing everything in order to separate the army into parts and to undermine its prestige and military might. Yes, we can and need to reduce the Armed Forces but to rational limits. And we can achieve this only if we first think and then we reduce. We have enough military academies that can scientifically substantiate the real requirement in divisions, tanks, artillery, and aircraft. For now, I repeat, everything is the reverse. And this is sad.

[Kutishchev] It is also sad that reduced-strength units are inevitably being formed during the quantitative reduction of the Ground Troops. Officers of these formations have been significantly divorced from the generally accepted functional responsibilities of combat subunit commanders. What solution do you see in this situation? How do we maintain the professionalism of military cadres and of all the personnel of these units?

[Makashov] Reduced-strength units are our weakness and our strength. They are both our laughter and our sorrow—and... our pride. A paradox? Hardly. I will not touch upon the weak and bad aspects of reduced-strength units. Everyone knows them well. I will focus attention on the strong aspects.

What do you think, why did I say: such formations are our pride and strength? Well, because in the event of a threat for the country, a full-fledged unit will emerge from a small cadre nucleus in several days. Let it be a "raw," not completely organized, closer to partisan in outward appearance unit, but this is already a combat unit. And after several weeks it will exceed fully-manned units in its qualitative characteristics.

Let us recall the Siberian regiments and Panfilov's division that were formed based on such units. It was they who played the decisive role in the defeat of the Fascists near Moscow. And that was no accident. Because the life experience of 30 and 40 year-old men cannot be compared with that of youth. In contrast to those people who assure everyone that they served exclusively in deployed divisions, I am proud of the fact that I commanded a reduced-strength division-sized unit for several years. I am proud that along with the people with whom I served, I repeatedly had to mobilize a division-sized unit and in so doing achieve high combat readiness. At that, the

soldiers called up from the reserve were of various nationalities. Although I admit that it was quite incredible.

Through personal experience, I know that the training of officers is the most complex issue for reduced-strength units. But there is a way out. For example, alternation of service in deployed units and reduced-strength units. Or to not promote commanders to those positions until they undergo on-the-job training (for six months) in deployed units in their previous position.

Maybe it makes sense to return to the practice of category 2 units [chasti vtorogo shata]? Be that as it may, we cannot get by without reduced-strength units—the country's economy cannot withstand it. And we need reserves for the army.

[Kutishchev] Albert Mikhaylovich, you mentioned that soldiers of various nationalities were called up from the reserves. I am interested in how you regard the idea of national armed formations?

[Makashov] Negatively. Both the Panfilov and Siberian divisions which I discussed above were multi-national in composition. And how they fought! It is hard to say if purely national formations will fight like that. At least, the experience of the Great Patriotic war showed: no national unit manifested its best side until it was replenished with representatives of other republics. But unfortunately, today appeals are once again being heard to create national armies. Ultimately, they may result not only in the breakdown of the USSR Armed Forces but also in the breakdown of the Russian State which was created centuries ago by our ancestors. I am convinced that attempts to divide the army into national apartments is the path to oblivion.

[Kutishchev] And your attitude toward the idea of creating a professional army in our country?

[Makashov] Negative.

[Kutishchev] Why?

[Makashov] First of all because the state cannot afford it. We cannot provide everything necessary to today's army. I am already not talking about the symbolic monetary allowances which our compulsory service servicemen receive. But those people are soldiers. For comparison: a corporal in the British Army who performed service in West Berlin received 1,800 West German marks. I, the 20th Army commander which was deployed near Berlin, received 1,780 GDR [German Democratic Republic] marks. The British corporal actually received a salary that was 10 times greater than the salary of a Soviet general. Now imagine how much we will have to pay soldiers and sergeants, I am already not talking about generals, if a purely professional army is created in our country.

[Kutishchev] Before this meeting, I reread your speech at the Russian Communist Party Congress. And now I can better understand the pain which you experienced as a

result of the decision to withdraw Soviet troops from Eastern Europe. It was already clear to you at that time that this would result in the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty and the loss of strategic positions. But obviously you also foresaw other negative consequences of this decision. Specifically, the increase of social tension among servicemen and first of all among those who have been withdrawn from Europe in such a short period of time?

[Makashov] I think that you did not need to be a prophet to foresee what is occurring right now. But it is not commanders of military districts and groups of forces who conclude international treaties on Armed Forces reductions. This is a case when civilians lead generals. I can say: the army and the state have not known such shame since the time of Peter the Great. Look, the ink had not managed to dry on the treaties when the wheels began to clatter of rail echelons loaded with Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Germany. But to where are the troops being withdrawn? Are we really richer than France whose representatives announced that they will withdraw their troops from Germany only when houses have been built for the soldiers in their homeland! I will add that 1,060 officers and warrant officers have not had housing in Samara Garrison alone since January 1, 1991. And Samara Garrison is one of the satisfactory ones. What does this say about those poorly habitable regions where troops are arriving or will soon arrive from Germany and Eastern Europe.

[Kutishchev] Albert Mikhaylovich, do you feel the support of the local authorities in the solution of social problems, specifically, the improvement of everyday living conditions of officers and members of their families?

[Makashov] In words, yes, in deeds, no. Deliveries of material resources to military district units through state funds are worsening. These are both foodstuffs and petroleum products. For example, at a unit where Comrade A. Lyulkin serves, soldiers did not receive 17 percent of the planned deliveries of butter, 40 percent of the meat, and 30 percent of the fish during January and February.

Year in and year out, the military district is not being allocated its share of housing which was constructed using our proportional share. I am already not talking about the debts of local Soviets of People's Deputies. Suffice it to say that on January 1, 1991, it totaled 58,268 square meters of usable living space. This is nearly 2,000 apartments. According to the proportional share, the total debt is 24,766 square meters. Furthermore, 6935 families and individuals, who have lost their ties to the Armed Forces, are subject to resettlement from military posts in 1991. Local Soviets of People's Deputies have actually offered housing to just 231 families.

Of the 10 oblasts and seven republics, only the Mordovian and Mari Autonomous Republics and Orenburg

and Ulyanovsk Oblasts can say that they assisted the Armed Forces at this difficult time.

As you can see, the support from the local Soviets is not great. Although I do not know of any instance when the military district refused reasonable assistance. Suffice it to say that six motor vehicle battalions were tasked to gather the harvest and servicemen worked 402,000 man days at suburban kolkhozes and sovkhoses. They worked well and conscientiously.

You know people are kind in Rus. If they need to, they will share their last things with a soldier. They understand that we do not have a mercenary army. But, for example, the question was raised about deploying a unit headquarters that has been withdrawn from the Western Group of Forces. The "fathers" of Ulyanovsk Oblast placed such conditions and requested such a sum that even the Pentagon budget could not withstand it, not to mention the Volga-Ural Military District budget.

The military district command staff is itself doing everything possible to provide housing to the families of servicemen. Specifically, we are employing legal measures against debtors and we are increasing the capacity of steel-reinforced concrete item combines which will permit the military to build nearly 3,000 apartments this year. A great deal more resources have been allocated to construct homes using economic methods as compared to previous years. We are laying great hopes on this.

[Kutishchev] And the last question. In light of everything that has been said, how legitimate is it today to talk about the attainment of new qualitative parameters in troop combat readiness?

[Makashov] Although I have described the state of affairs in the military district on the whole, I will nevertheless restrain myself from an ultimate conclusion. We will live and we will see.

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Defense Commission Report on Military Political Reform

91SV0083A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Sep 91 First Edition p 1

["REPORT of the USSR Defense Commission on the Abolition of Military-Political Organs and the Establishment of Combat Training Organs and Structures for Work with Personnel of the USSR Armed Forces"]

[Text] By ukases of the USSR president, the activity of political parties and movements has been stopped, and military-political organs have been abolished in the USSR Armed Forces, troops of the USSR KGB, Internal Troops of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], and the railroad troops.

In coordination with the USSR president and the president of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], a commission of the USSR Ministry of

Defense has been established on the abolition of military-political organs and the establishment of combat training organs and structures for work with personnel of the USSR Armed Forces.

Such commissions have also been established in the directorates of USSR deputy ministers of defense, commanders in chief of troops of sectors and military services of the Armed Forces, commanders of troops of military districts, groups of forces, fleets, armies (flotillas), and arms of service, in the main and central directorates of the USSR Ministry of Defense, and in large units [soyedineniye].

The USSR Ministry of Defense commission must prepare proposals on the tasks, order of activity, and periods for establishing combat training organs and structures for work with personnel. It is charged with tasks associated with the reorganization of the Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin, military-political schools, social science departments, military training institutions, and training centers and courses of the USSR Ministry of Defense, and changes in the content of training plans and programs for training students and cadets in social disciplines.

The commissions, together with appropriate efficiency report boards and officer panels must conduct the certification of officer personnel who are performing service in the military-political organs and party structures that are being abolished.

Difficult and responsible work lies ahead. At the same time, a reduction in the combat readiness of the troops and of the forces of the Navy cannot be permitted. It should be taken into account that the abolition of the military-political organs does not signify the abolition of work with people. Such work is peculiar to any army, and it is dictated by life. Under conditions of the reduction of the USSR Armed Forces and the conduct of military reform, its activeness, on the contrary, should increase, and the character and content should acquire a new quality. Rejection of previous forms and methods of purposeful party-political influence on an individual, the shift of efforts to the sphere of comprehensive moral-psychological training of servicemen, the assurance of their legal and social protection, and the education of the soldier-citizen and the soldier-patriot who possesses high moral and psychological qualities will become an indispensable condition.

The measures being undertaken will affect the fate of thousands of people, and they will be conducted with maximum evaluation in accordance with legislation in effect and principles of social justice. Questions on the future assignment of personnel who previously worked in military-political and party organs will be decided on the basis of the opinion of officer panels in conjunction

with their expanded authorities. Those who have comported themselves well in work with people, who have not served the established term, and who have not attained the maximum age for remaining in military service, can count on an appropriate position in new structures after certification.

Obstacles should not be put in the way of those who want to and are capable of continuing service on command staffs, and in engineering-technical, rear services, and other positions, or who see prospects for themselves in other spheres, including under civilian conditions.

Defamation, threats, settling of scores, and persecution of workers in activities of party structures that have been suspended and of abolished military-political organs must be ruled out. At the present time, they are under the jurisdiction of appropriate commanders and chiefs and, on their instructions, will perform the full range of work in the military and moral-psychological education of personnel. At the same time, their spontaneous and premature certification has been started in a number of military districts and fleets, at times assuming the form of a reprisal. There are cases when individual commanders and chiefs personally decide the fate of an officer-political worker, which is absolutely impermissible.

It is necessary for workers of abolished military-political organs and party structures and the entire officer staff to maintain calm and presence of mind in the transition period, not to panic, and not to believe various rumors. Their interests and the interests of members of their families will be reliably protected by USSR laws.

All questions associated with new assignments, moves, and job placement of people must be resolved openly and democratically.

The USSR Ministry of Defense commission expects that everyone who wants to promote the process of reforming the Army will contribute his own proposal. This will make it possible to execute planned measures jointly, fairly, logically, and openly, so that there is not even one worker of a former military-political and party organ who is offended or hurt in some way.

Working groups have been set up in the USSR Ministry of Defense commission to summarize proposals, develop solutions, and examine letters and complaints of workers of abolished military-political structures and suspended activities of party organs, and of members of their families. Work is also being conducted on the organization of relations with the public and the mass media, and informing the troops.

Direct all questions that arise to the address: Moscow K-160, 14 Marshal Shaposhnikov Street, Letters Office. Contact telephones: 293-05-54, 293-42-78, 293-05-64.

Results of Equipment Sales in Moscow MD

91SV0041A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 Aug 91 First edition p 2

[Interview with Colonel Yu. Krasnikov, chief of district engineer troops, by Col F. Semyanovskiy, under the rubric "The Economy and We": "Lessons in Commerce"]

[Text] More than two million rubles was earned from the sale of engineer and other equipment at the Moscow Military District's first market.

Colonel Yu. Krasnikov, chief of district engineer troops, tells how the event went.

[Krasnikov] I would say first of all that an order issued by the USSR minister of defense, which recommended that unutilized engineer equipment be sold to the civilian sector of the economy, actually made it possible for us to conduct the market. Another motivating factor was the fact that we regularly write off engineer vehicles which have served out their established service life for military conditions. Particularly great demands are made of them in the military situation, you know, because of the need to maintain the units and subunits in a combat-ready state. They can still be used under other conditions, however. In addition, we also write off that engineer equipment whose storage life at depots and bases has elapsed.

[Semyanovskiy] Just what specifically was offered for sale?

[Krasnikov] For the first market we prepared five excavators, three road construction vehicles, one bridge construction unit, four field water supply units, twenty field generators and some other equipment.

[Semyanovskiy] How did the potential buyers learn about the market?

[Krasnikov] Just before the market we made a filmed advertisement. It was shown on the commercial channel and on Central Television's Channel 2. This cost a considerable amount of money. We recouped it from the money earned from the sale of the engineer equipment. I have to say that for the first time we learned from personal experience the role of advertising in commerce, and I believe that we will give more attention to it in the future.

[Semyanovskiy] And how did the sales go?

[Krasnikov] We had a fairly quick response from potential buyers. Agents of kolkhozes in Russia, the Ukraine and Belorussia, geologists, timber procurers and members of cooperatives attended the market.

Since this was a commercial venture, the prices were agreed upon at the market. Ultimately buyers were found for everything displayed at the market. A total of two million rubles worth of engineer equipment was sold.

[Semyanovskiy] And what did you do with this money?

[Krasnikov] The amount of the retail price of the equipment was transferred to the budget of the Ministry of Defense. The money received over and above that was left at our disposal. All earnings from the sale of engineer equipment written off or for which the storage life had elapsed was distributed in accordance with a directive issued by the deputy USSR minister of defense and chief of Rear Services of the USSR Armed Forces. Part of the money went for improvements at the military units and for bonuses for personnel who were active in setting up and conducting the market.

[Semyanovskiy] The market is over. What lessons did you derive for yourself?

[Krasnikov] The first thing I would like to say is that there were far more potential buyers than we had equipment to offer. We also learned that there needs to be more rigid control over the evaluation of the equipment to prevent either over- or underpricing.

I also need to say that it is far from easy to hold such markets. They require a lot of painstaking work. One has not only thoroughly to prepare the equipment itself but also thoroughly to train people to conduct this sort of thing, which is new to us. We therefore feel that it would not be practical to hold them more often than once a year.

Military Housing Problems in Rostov-on-Don

91UM0833A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Aug 91 Single edition p 2

[Article by Major V. Salmin, deputy, Rostov-on-Don City Soviet of People's Deputies, under the rubric: "Focal Point - The Housing Problem": "Finding a Way Out of the Impasse"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] The problem of housing for servicemen grows more critical with each passing day. This is understandable: The Armed Forces are undergoing manpower reductions, and troops are being withdrawn from Eastern Europe. Local organs of authority often refuse to have anything to do with "aliens" or attempt to search for some kind of acceptable solutions.

As of 1 July 1991, there are in the Rostov garrison 1,096 servicemen without apartments, with another 98 families requiring improved housing.

What can the city do to help in this situation? There presently are 216 construction and installation organizations, 15 construction associations, and 31 trusts. They employ 63,000 people—11 percent of the total labor force. It would appear at first glance that such a behemoth of a construction industry could move mountains and handle housing problems. Alas!—fewer than half the construction organizations are involved in the municipal

area; the rest of them are engaged in building industrial, reclamation, and other facilities beyond the boundaries of Rostov.

Involved directly in erecting residential housing in the city are two specialized associations: Rostovstroy and Rostovgrazhdanstroy. However, even they suffer sharp drops in work output and do not complete planned tasks involving residential housing and construction of engineer structures, due to rising prices of construction materials and loss of specialists migrating to cooperatives. The first half-year results indicate failure to turn over a single social area facility for use.

The above are the facts. The net result is that the local soviets cannot be counted on to resolve the personal housing problems of servicemen. The soviets themselves are able to go no further. Thus, workers in the housing agencies and ispolkoms in response to complaints and requests made by military personnel can do nothing more than make gestures of helplessness.

It seems that A. Godunov, the gorispolkom housing distribution department deputy chief, sees no way out of this impasse. Last year the city authorities when pressed by the deputies and the Army community did provide dozens of apartments built on the basis of centralized state capital expenditures, but this year this system is no longer effective. Enterprises and organizations are erecting housing with their own resources, with the result that they have no desire to share the "square meters" with anyone. In addition, the effective period of the USSR Council of Ministers decree providing officers and warrant officers with housing ran out in 1990. There are no other normative documents. It is not known how many apartments the renewed soviet will release to military personnel this year. Or whether it will release any in general. The point is, in Rostov there are 76,000 persons on the waiting list for apartments and improved housing. A third of the available housing controlled by the local soviets consists of communal apartments. Eighteen percent of the municipal holdings is dilapidated and hazardous housing.

The people's deputies after sharp debate at a city soviet session held in July of this year arrived at the following conclusion: It is necessary to complete the general construction of two new microrayons on a priority basis, even though they would lack roads, sewage treatment facilities, and pipeline systems, the goal being to furnish housing within the next two to three years to resettle people living in the decaying center of the city. However, it is a fact that there are no servicemen living in the central city.

A new procedure for providing building lots for housing was adopted at the session. Under this arrangement,

organizations and enterprises erecting housing in available areas are obligated to hand over to the gorispolkom 30 percent of the apartments. However, these apartments likewise are intended not for servicemen, whose problems the gorispolkom feels should be resolved by the Ministry of Defense, but rather for people being resettled from the central areas undergoing reconstruction. Thus, the municipal authorities in their successful resolution of the future of thousands of Rostovians who have been treated unfairly once again have no intention to surrender any "square meters" to the Ministry of Defense.

Bearing the above in mind, what conclusion is to be reached? The municipal authorities obviously are not interested in holding a dialogue with the district leadership or searching for solutions to servicemen's housing problems. This is a situation in which the greatest reliance must be placed on efforts of military builders. However, plans call for the district construction directorate to erect in Rostov in 1991 a single 72-apartment building in the microrayon Voyenved.

Presently residing in this area are about 35,000 servicemen and people who for one reason or another have lost all ties to the military. This area is undergoing intensive construction, with the population expected to increase by a factor of 1.5. This, even though the microrayon's municipal services are carrying such a load that they are at the breaking point. There is virtually no way to connect the buildings being erected to heat, water, and sewage systems.

"Rostov-on-Don and the environs," said city architect A. Ryzhakov in explaining the situation, "has exhausted the ecological, municipal services, housing, and raw material production capabilities as far as accepting more military personnel is concerned. This means that the military will have to find building lots in the suburban areas in the future, and they must erect post structures in other populated localities of the oblast. The way things are now, the session's resolution calls for priority financing in this year's third quarter of the first section of a residential building for single elderly persons and Armed Forces and labor veterans."

In my opinion, the Rostov Rayon KECh [billeting unit] and the district KEU [billeting directorate] should have foreseen development of this situation ahead of time and come up with more efficient use of available lands with an eye toward devising a definite plan for resettling in Rostov officers, warrant officers, and their families in need of housing. As of now, there exists a mere program of future construction of housing for servicemen, this to take place in the period 1992-1995. This program also is not tied to the gorispolkom's plans.

Billeting directorate workers obviously must act more forcefully, strengthen their ties to civilian builders, develop construction in a share arrangement, and seek other ways to effect mutual support. It is necessary to take definite action on an urgent basis.

Military Housing Problems Examined

91SV0092A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
18 Sep 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Major V. Salmin: "Sad Stability"]

[Text] In tracking the progress of the provision of housing for servicemen, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, as a rule, examines the situation in military districts and large cities. How does this problem look in a "mid-level" garrison, that is, not a garrison in which everything is in plain view of the district command, but not in the boondocks either?

As of 1 August 1991, there were 304 servicemen without apartments in Maykop. Forty-six families needed improved housing; 26 officers and 14 warrant officers lived in dormitories. Fifty officers and 28 warrant officers lived in apartments leased under contract, and 142 officers and 44 warrant officers rented dwellings privately.

The statistics are not impressive in their own right; after all, there are hundreds of thousands of servicemen without apartments in the armed forces. However, there are specific individuals behind the statistics, each of which cannot leave us indifferent. For example, Captain A. Shamrin, chief of the clothing service of a unit, with his wife and three children, until recently rented a private apartment. However, the landlady demanded that the apartment be vacated... At present, the officer temporarily spends his nights at the military unit, in a... car, and his wife and children stay with friends. It is virtually impossible to rent an apartment even for 150 rubles [R].

The city housing and legal service is not in a position to help the unfortunates either. Chief of this economically accountable organization V. Nikolayev does not handle "private operators," to say nothing of servicemen trying to rent an apartment: There is no dearth of other problems. The city executive committee maintains 15 waiting lists for housing; more than 3,000 families are on the general list, and about 27,000 are on the preferential list. In total, there are 30,000 people on the waiting lists in a city with a population of 160,000. As a rule, waiting periods are about 10 to 25 years.

According to the data of V. Gorelikova, secretary of the housing commission of the Maykop Garrison and KECh [expansion not identified] engineer for the upkeep of the housing fund, previously, local soviets allocated 800 square meters of housing to servicemen annually in keeping with the decisions of the Union Government. By 1991, the city executive committee is in arrears to the tune of 630 square meters—this means approximately 20 two-room apartments.

Therefore, under the circumstances, they attach their main hopes to military construction personnel. It should be mentioned that vigorous housing construction is underway in the garrison. This year alone, a 57-apartment building and a 105-apartment building have been commissioned. By the end of the year, military construction personnel promise two more high-rises with 72 and 107 apartments.

However, we cannot fail to see something else. The construction of a family dormitory for officers has been frozen. As Lieutenant Colonel P. Piskizhev, chairman of the housing commission of the garrison, explained, the plan was to commission this 12-floor house with comfortable one- and two-room apartments in 1992. Four stories have been built by military construction workers with the funds of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

The construction of social and service facilities in the garrison, including a general school with an improved floor plan, is on the brink of failure. The pace of construction is hampered by the incomplete and uneven delivery of reinforced concrete products and bricks by the Capital Construction Administration of the city executive committee.

Lieutenant Colonel V. Cherenkov, a deputy of the city soviet of people's deputies and KECh chief of the Maykop Garrison, observed: "The number of servicemen without apartments in our summary reports has remained virtually constant for many years. There is sad stability. We provide housing primarily for servicemen arriving from Eastern Europe and families of servicemen who have left the regions of interethnic conflicts. In the process, 'old-timers' remain on the list for years."

One would think that now that Adygeya has become a republic, new opportunities will appear for solving the housing problem. However, it is necessary to act. It is also hoped that the development of individual construction will help the homeless at least to some degree. The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Savings Bank in Maykop has an opportunity to issue loans and extend credit to developers on preferential terms.

In a word, every opportunity needs to be taken in order to resolve the housing problem.

Substandard Equipment Deliveries to Navy

91UM0841A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Aug 91 Single edition p 3

[Report by Captain 1st Rank S. Turchenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "Returning to What Was Published": "Two Years Later"]

[Text] A conference was recently held in the Committee for Defense and Security of the USSR Supreme Soviet. It dealt with problems pertaining to deliveries of shoddy hardware and equipment to Navy ships and units by enterprises of the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry. Our correspondent was invited to attend.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has repeatedly brought up these problems in its issues. The article "Departmental Dictate" (30 Jun 89), for example, evoked a large response both from our readers and from officials. Using the production association headed by Director G. Ivanov as the example, the conference discussed factors permitting the supplier plant to produce equipment not measuring up to contemporary requirements and force the navy to accept this into its arsenal. It would probably be worthwhile to recall these, at least in brief: the absolute

monopoly of the manufacturer of items for delivery to the client (which means no choice and no competition); the unwieldiness and even a lack of concern stemming from this on the part of the enterprises for constantly improving their product and mastering new technologies; the dual dependence of the Navy's agents at the enterprise (upon their command element and upon the management of the production association), which forces them to maneuver and sometimes even close their eyes to imperfections in items; the tactic, developed during the period of stagnation, of all-around defense when it comes to revealing departmental deficiencies. Various examples of this were cited in the article. I would mention just one, to which we are going to have to return. When V. Korotkov, a worker at the production association, began persistently raising the matter of deficiencies and the padding of figures in the operation, the administration decided to get rid of him. Various devices were put into play, from a layoff attributed to a personnel cut to slander and persecution as a criminal. The association management took the worker to court seven times, and he won in every case. As the reader will learn somewhat later, however, Korotkov's subsequent fate is not to be envied.

The "infallible" department took up an all-around defense also following publication of the article "Departmental Dictate." The very next day "representatives of the administration and the public" arrived at the editor's office and demanded a retraction. Soon thereafter the production association's managers sent to various authorities, including KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, voluminous letters totally refuting all of the facts and conclusions contained in the article.

The situation developed in such a way that it became necessary to turn to yet a "third authority" capable of determining who was right. Such an authority was found in the person of the Moscow Garrison's procuracy, which checked out the facts brought out in the article. Its conclusions were "conciliatory," however. It acknowledged some of the facts as valid and refuted others but in general took no serious steps whatsoever.

Confident that they were right, the editors were forced to publish yet another article on this subject, "Criticism Greeted With Hostility" (14 Nov 89). It ended this way: "We can see that it is still too early to close the case. This is borne out by the fact that the production association's management greeted the criticism with hostility and absolutely refused to acknowledge it. Also by the fact that worker V. Korotkov is still being subjected to persecution (he was recently issued a reprimand under the same old pretext, which has been disaffirmed by people's courts more than once). Also by the fact that N. Treyerov, member of the collegium of the ministry of which the enterprise is a part, sent the editors an official letter in response to the article, in which he totally defended the defense enterprise producing the defective products. In view of all this, the editors have sent all the

information they had on the performance of the enterprise to the Committee for Defense and Security of the USSR Supreme Soviet."

The editors are also certainly aware of the difficulties faced by this enterprise. The manufacture of this equipment was assigned exclusively to it. But the deficiencies in its work are a result also of disorganization in our managements ties, the absence of new scientific research projects and the state of the production capacities. While we understand this, we also hoped for understanding from the enterprise management and higher authorities for our position. Defense interests demand a strict and principled approach in assessing inadequacies of the industry serving defense. In any case, we provoked interest in the problem only in order to initiate a search for a solution, among other places, at the level of the Supreme Soviet's Committee for Defense and Security.

For almost two years we and the readers have waited for the committee's response. And, finally, it has now arranged a conference on, among other things, the problems raised in the aforementioned articles. Naturally, the discussion was not just about the production association headed by G. Ivanov (it is actually a partial illustration of the navy's overall problems). I shall cite just a few facts enunciated at the conference. According to data provided by the Main Military Procuracy, just during the past few years major manufacturing defects which could have serious consequences have been detected on 12 nuclear-powered submarines, 29 surface ships and five service craft. During the past 2 decades neither the designers nor industry has offered them a single fundamentally new design concept for assuring ship survivability. How is the Navy's command element to ensure safety at sea with this approach? The high noise level of our submarines is cause for great concern. Detecting a ship is the main element in ASW today. The rest is up to the equipment. Homing torpedoes will not pass it by. The key problem is that of assuring concealment for our submarines.

Clearly the defense enterprises are not to blame for the monopoly in the production of this or that new equipment. Our entire economic system is still set up this way. Nor can they always be blamed for the poor quality of the product. The general disintegration in the nation has generated a closed circle of defective production from which it is practically impossible for one certain enterprise to escape, since it is always dependent upon co-producers.

During the past 2 years the USSR Supreme Soviet's Committee for Defense and Security has been unable to find design solutions to these problems. Take that production association headed by G. Ivanov. At the conference the fact was stressed that, along with first-rate equipment, it continues to turn out inferior and obsolete equipment, while truth-seeker V. Korotkov has been fired once again and is looking everywhere for justice from courts at various levels but has lost confidence that it can be found.

No, the committee has not been idle all this time. The information turned over by the editors and by a group of scientists and specialists of the Navy was initially sent to the People's Control Committee of the USSR (which still existed at that time). In our unshakeable tradition, however, it was sent for review to the organization which was the target of the criticism, so to speak. It issued a nice reply signed by the aforementioned N. Treverov. The committee then sent the information to the State Commission on Military-Industrial Matters of the USSR Council of Ministers. The reply was signed by V. Bukatov, deputy chairman of the state commission. It is difficult to assume that this person, who has previously held the position of deputy minister of shipbuilding industry and undoubtedly shared responsibility for the deficiencies in it, could seriously try to find shortcomings there. His reply—also very nice—was based on the "investigations" (about which we already know) of N. Treverov and the findings (also already mentioned) of an inspection by the Moscow Garrison's military procuracy. In short, at that level as well no one lifted a finger to study the problems raised by the press and by specialists.

The committee had to look for yet another authority, one which would respond more effectively. The material was rerouted to the USSR Supreme Court. They did not investigate the matter there, however, but sent the information to the General Procuracy of the USSR. We still do not know what is being done with it there. There was some sort of response, however. Col Justice V. Polev, senior deputy procurator for the Moscow Garrison, informed me that the Procuracy of the USSR had suddenly demanded a conclusion based on the procurator's verification of the implementation of the law on combatting the output of inferior products at the production association headed by G. Ivanov. I read it. What a surprise! Now, based on a two-year verification process, the conclusion differs in spirit and findings from the one the editors received in response to the article "Departmental Dictate." It contains not a single word of reproach to the newspaper.

But that is not the main thing, of course. Thank God, as they say, the Moscow Garrison's military procuracy is now on the side of those who are attempting to alter the situation in the industry serving the Navy. One wonders what will now provide the props for the "pillars" of the former system in their attempt to protect it from the winds of change.

The summation of the conference, conveyed in the closing statement by V. Ochirov, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Committee for Defense and Security, seems realistic and balanced to me:

"We have become convinced over the past two years that it is impossible to solve the old problems based on the existing system of relations between the navy and industry (and this also applies to the other branches of the Armed Forces). The system itself has to be changed. And not with primitive words, but by systematically and judiciously creating more modern, flexible and durable

structures for controlling the defense industry and monitoring its quality, based unconditionally on the economy's renewal. We have therefore proposed that plans be made for inviting representatives of the military-industrial complex and leaders from the army and navy to attend a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet for a parliamentary airing of these problems.

The conference participants supported the proposal and asked KRASNAYA ZVEZDA to monitor the resolution of these problems. We shall certainly continue to keep the reader informed. At this point I would like to add the following.

In the minds of the Soviet people the Navy has long been the personification of order, reliability and the highest level of technological culture. Glasnost has helped us to see also the submerged part of the iceberg: the fact that the cracks from stagnation which have opened up throughout our entire society have penetrated into the navy as well. Sad as it is, intolerable accidents are occurring the navy, and irresponsibility, sham and negligence are finding fertile soil there.

Public opinion, stunned by the accidents which have occurred in the navy in recent years, has focused its indignation on the Navy's command element, demanding that resolute steps be taken to prevent accidents and provide the sailors with everything needed for their service. And this is certainly fair. Only in part, however. We can see that there are serious problems which extend to other ministries and departments. And the Navy's command element cannot resolve them without the help of our highest authorities.

Kiev MD Construction Chief on Housing Problems

*91SV0078A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Sep 91 First Edition p 2*

[Interview with Colonel E. Karmarchik, chief of the Kiev Military District Construction Administration, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Colonel A. Polyakov; place and date not given: "Those Without Apartments Are Increasingly Many..."]

[Text] Soviet troops continue to come back from abroad. A year ago, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA analyzed the housing situation in the Kiev Military District where this problem has always been acute. What is the situation at present?

Our correspondent Colonel A. Polyakov began his conversation with Colonel E. Karmarchik, chief of the Construction Administration of the district, with this question.

[Karmarchik] Alas, from this point of view, last year was not gratifying in any way. As of now, there are approximately 23,000 families of servicemen without apartments. I believe that quite a few families will not have an apartment with amenities not only by the year 2000, but also later, notwithstanding the fact that we have committed all resources to building housing.

For example, the plant of reinforced concrete products headed by Lieutenant Colonel Nogtikov has been relieved of producing all other products. New UNR's [Chief of Works Administrations] have been created, new units are expanding. In 1990, we needed to build 33 buildings according to the plan, whereas we built 37 houses. This year, we should commission as many as 60 buildings, and in 1992 it is planned to erect between 70 and 80 buildings.

However, we have so far been unable to blunt the acute nature of this problem even given this faster pace of construction: Thousands of families without apartments have arrived from abroad. We have been forced to put up three families in three-room apartments, and two families in two-room apartments. Many have been put up in remodeled barracks, headquarters buildings, and in wooden dormitory huts which have a single kitchen for almost 20 families.

[Polyakov] Perhaps, under the circumstances you must look for unconventional solutions...

[Karmarchik] We are looking indeed. I have just talked on the phone to Polish specialists who have built a gas pipeline here and are now returning home. Last year, we bought from them 18 modular homes, which are easy to transport and assemble, for 500,000 rubles [R]. We now intend to buy 10 more such homes. We are vigorously using construction cooperatives to do work. We provide materials for them, and they build quality housing rapidly and within cost estimates. There is one more way for which I could have been punished, perhaps just yesterday. The construction industry of the Ukraine is now clearly beginning to operate below capacity: There is a shortage of raw and other materials, and of personnel. The district assigns military construction workers to enterprises, and receives materials in return. We also sign contracts, and enterprises build houses for us.

[Polyakov] You have mainly referred to the problems of those who are coming back home. What is the situation of servicemen who have been waiting for an apartment here, in the district, for years? Do they feel short-changed?

[Karmarchik] We allocate 53 percent of housing for those who arrive from abroad; correspondingly, 47 percent remains for others—that is to say, one-half of what is usually available. Consequently, the period of waiting for apartments grows by a factor of two. You are right: A new problem is emerging in that some people come back to apartments, such as they are, whereas others have to wait and wait again. It will be necessary to take specific measures in garrisons where social tension will arise in connection with this.

[Polyakov] Eduard Kazimirovich, after the war, thousands of officers were discharged. The housing shortage was extremely acute then, and the state gave them loans. They received materials and built private houses. At present, this scenario is apparently not even being discussed.

[Karmarchik] Of course, discharged officers had time to take care of construction, whereas a cadre serviceman frequently does not even have days off. Of course, everything is more complicated than that. However, it is clear that we cannot sit on our hands and wait, and that all reserves should be used.

[Polyakov] Fine, you embarked on building a house for a specific military unit. Do you cooperate with its command closely? How does the command help the construction personnel?

[Karmarchik] This is a quite acute issue, and I will respond to it frankly: In this sense, the troops act as dependents. For example, we are building more than 10 houses for the unit commanded by Major General Ye. Chizhevskiy. The district commander issued an order to assign to us a certain number of soldiers as help. Yet, they do not give us even one-half of the helpers. I understand that there is combat training and details. However, this is about solving a very acute problem. After all, we are seeking because at present we lack 1,000 construction workers, at a minimum, rather than because we do not apply ourselves.

Let us go on. The house has been assembled; wallpaper needs to be hanged and windows need to be washed. We take all clerical employees from our offices and assign them to this work. Would you say that units organize help on the part of the families of servicemen? Not at all. I will tell you for comparison: Recently, we commissioned several houses for workers at military plants. The situation has been completely different in that case. Representatives have come to us and said: Give us paint and wallpaper, we will do it ourselves. They have done it, too.

[Polyakov] We may appreciate how you feel, but you must agree that the situation in the district may only be changed at the expense of internal reserves in the construction administration, if at all.

[Karmarchik] Of course, there are reserves; for the most part, this does not have to do with the productivity of labor. Military construction workers exceed norms by factors of one and a half to two. However, there is a high price to be paid for that: The quality of work deteriorates; in addition, absences without leave and desertions from units are now associated with being overworked at construction sites rather than recruit hazing. For example, let us look at the battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Demchenko. Marvelous living conditions have been created here; experienced officers are in service. However, this is also where the worst accidents happen. The personnel of the battalion work at a reinforced concrete products plant. The people work for 10 to 12 hours, whether it is hot or cold. This is why they cannot bear it and break down.

There are organizational problems as well. Three new UNR's were created as recently as the beginning of this year. The Construction Administration of the district needs new staff positions; otherwise, the effectiveness of

our work will deteriorate. There is another sensitive issue: our dual subordination to the district and the Main Military Construction Administration. It appears that there should be one master on construction sites. That the wages of workers in the Soviet Army are considerably lower than those of civilian specialists does not help matters, either. We have lost many experts in their fields because of this.

[Polyakov] Recently, I was told at one of the rayon executive committees of Kiev that they could not move people into finished buildings because they lacked window frames and plumbing fixtures. Tell us whether the situation is the same at military construction sites.

[Karmarchik] That picture looks familiar. However, we have our own timber procurement section as far away as Irkutsk Oblast, as well as a lumber plant in the vicinity of Kiev. The subordinates of Colonel V. Turkevich handle their job masterfully at the section. However, the plant is absolutely worn out. Recently, we signed a contract with an American company on fully retooling it. However, the company is moving slowly for some reason. Apparently, the unstable situation in our country is a factor. Therefore, we do have problems.

[Polyakov] You have said that you exceed norms. Meanwhile, I know that in Kiev it takes you years to build houses.

[Karmarchik] This pains us. This has to do with building only brick buildings in the capital of the Ukraine. We need 40 million bricks a year for the district. Meanwhile, the local authorities allocate only one-half of this to us, and even these bricks have to be "hacked out." This is why out of six buildings in Kiev, we will commission only two this year.

[Polyakov] Eduard Kazimirovich, a foreign company has now embarked on building housing for the servicemen in Krivoy Rog. What can you learn from them?

[Karmarchik] They have well-timed delivery of materials. There are precisely as many people and machines on the construction site as are needed. If we organize work like this, we will accomplish a lot.

[Polyakov] Is this to say you are optimistic?

[Karmarchik] Of course. We have fulfilled the half-year plan on all indicators. We will endeavor to fulfill the yearly plan, though it will be hard.

Group Chief on Help With Harvest in Moscow Oblast

91SV0085A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Sep 91 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Major General Ye. Mikhalko, head of the operational group for the harvest in Moscow Oblast, by Colonel F. Semyanovskiy; place and date not given: "In the Soldiers' Fields Near Moscow"]

[Text]

[Semyanovskiy] Yevgeniy Lvovich, first I would like to hear how the units and military educational institutions

accepted the decision to send soldiers, sergeants, warrant officers, and officers to bring in the harvest in the area near Moscow.

[Mikhalko] We all understand very well that for military people the main question is the support of combat readiness and a high level of training of units and subunits. At the same time, the Army has never set itself apart from those problems, cares, and concerns of which—let us be frank—the Soviet people have so many.

Today we are on the forward line. You yourself know how much talk there has been about the hunger advancing on the capital and about the necessity of guaranteeing the people produce from the fields.

[Semyanovskiy] Where specifically are the servicemen working at this time?

[Mikhalko] It would take too much space to name all of the specific sites. I will just say that they are working in 33 rayons of Moscow Oblast. They are working in kolkhoz [collective farm] and sovkhoz [state farm] fields. Most of the soldiers represent personnel of units and military educational institutions of the Moscow Military District. There are subunits of the air forces and air defense, there are missile men, and there is even a naval crew that is located in Moscow.

[Semyanovskiy] What could you say about the initial results of the work of the military personnel?

[Mikhalko] The sovkhozes, kolkhozes, and enterprises of the agro-industrial complex summarize the overall results. The data that we have indicate that the contribution of the military people is very great. The average yield per person amounts to 600 to 900 or more kilograms per shift depending on the kind of farm produce. This exceeds the normative indicators. Overall the work of the guards of the Kantemirovskaya Tank Division, Moscow Higher Command School for Road-Repair and Engineering Troops, Moscow Higher Combined-Arms Command School imeni RSFSR Supreme Soviet, and students of military academies is distinguished by good results.

[Semyanovskiy] A question of concern to many of our service people is: "How will their labor be remunerated?"

[Mikhalko] According to Decree No. 15 of the Moscow Government, dated 6 August 1991, an average daily wage of R25 per worker is set for the fulfillment of the output standard. Touching on questions of payment, Yuriy Mikhaylovich Luzhkov, premier of the Moscow Government, stressed that the indicated system will be adhered to.

[Semyanovskiy] And one last question. When is it expected that the work of military personnel in the fields near Moscow will be completed?

[Mikhalko] Around the 15th to the 20th of October, according to the schedule.

Corrections to Adm Kuznetsov Statements on Contract Service

91UM0839A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Aug 91 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed article: "Corrections Required"]

[Text] On July 17 this year KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published an interview by our staff correspondent with the Northern Fleet, Captain Second Rank P. Ishchenko, with the chief of one of the staff directorates of the Northern Fleet, Rear Admiral V. Kuznetsov "Are unsuitable persons joining the Fleet?"

Following the publication the chief of a branch of the Naval Supreme Command, Captain First Rank B. Tsybenko, wrote to the editor. He reported that Rear Admiral V. Kuznetsov was not entirely accurate in presenting certain statements of the document on the transition in the Fleet to a two-year tour of duty for seamen and petty officers and on conducting an experiment in organizing personnel service contracts.

In particular, Rear Admiral V. Kuznetsov, in referring to the existing situation, stated that "a seaman can sign a contract immediately after finishing training—that is, before arriving on the ship, at his unit." Thus, it turns out that the commander in a number of cases does not participate in the selection of candidates for serving by contract.

The following clarification should be made: in the current draft of the temporary Resolution there is no such statement. It states that a contract with seamen and petty officers after they have served no less than six months of military duty is concluded by ship and unit commanders. The right to conclude a contract is offered to the commanders of troop units, who have disciplinary authority of a ship commander second rank, or an equivalent or higher rank. During these six months there might be five months of learning at the training unit and one month of service on a ship (which is offered to seamen and petty officers for passing tests which will allow them to independently perform their duties) or six months of service on a ship, if the seaman has learned his military specialty at a DOSAAF school, maritime academy or other educational institution. The temporary Resolution stipulates that the ship or unit commander is obliged to train a candidate for serving by contract and only after such training is he to make a final decision.

With regard to financing of the experiment there was also an inaccurate statement. In the article "Join the Navy—by Contract," published on April 13, 1990 in the newspaper IZVESTIYA, the deputy chief of the General Staff Colonel General G. Krivosheyev cited a figure of 82 million rubles set aside for the experiment. The interview in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA erroneously cited a different figure—540 million rubles.

In the interview cited in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Rear Admiral V. Kuznetsov stated that "seamen and petty

officers, who have concluded a contract, will not even be or in any other way be assigned to ships and units of an "experimental" strategic formation. Crews and subunits will be made up entirely of them." This is not true and directly contradicts the concept of the experiment. Because the resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR allows only 1991 conscripts to participate in the experiment, the currently effective principles of uniformity of assignment by time periods of six months and one year will be retained. Nobody intends to disband ship crews and units in order to assemble them only of persons who have signed a contract.

By and large one should note that in the interview of Rear Admiral V. Kuznetsov, changes which have occurred in the psychological attitude of the young reinforcements of the Northern Sea fleet sailors were thoroughly and accurately analyzed. It is believed that the results of this analysis will help the fleet commanders in their work with sailors and petty officers.

Problems of Uzbek Military Recruits Viewed

91SV0071A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
15 May 91 p 3

[Interview with Turkestan Military District staff department chief Colonel Valeriy Fedorovich Rudyuk by L. Savelyev under the rubric "Not Top Secret": "Call-Up by Agreement, Service by Oath"]

[Text] *These days, as many springs in a row before, seventeen-year-olds are preparing to take their first steps on the difficult road of the army. The USSR Cabinet of Ministers has announced the spring call-up for active military service. This is no longer charged to the Ministry of Defense, as it used to be, but to the government of the country.*

The spring call-up of 1991 will be a special one for some of the youth. The USSR Supreme Soviet, first and foremost, has instituted changes in the USSR Law on Universal Military Service, and today those who are being called into service in the navy will be in uniform for just two rather than three years.

There is a specific feature of republic significance, so to speak, as well. The Decree of the President of the Uzbek SSR titled "Steps to Improve the Call-Up and Completion of Military Service by the Youth of the Republic"—toward which the supreme military command of the country has an understanding attitude, by the way—has begun to take effect. An agreement was signed between the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR and the government of Uzbekistan on April 30 regarding improvements in the call-up and completion of draft active military service by citizens of the Uzbek SSR.

PRAVDA VOSTOKA has published that document.

"This is the first such document in the practice of military organizational development," emphasized Colonel V.F. Rudyuk, a department chief on the staff of

the Turkestan Military District, in a discussion with the lead reporter of the "Not Top Secret" column. "The agreement, against a backdrop of endless discussions on the lack of legal and social protections for servicemen, has become a concrete document reflecting both the interests of the whole armed forces and the republic, as well as each of its citizens who enter the ranks of the army.

"We will begin with the fact that the basic principle of the negotiating parties is felt to be the impermissibility of the induction of ill youth or young men with weak health into active service."

[Savelyev] But the draft boards, after all, are guided by the Statute on Medical Fitness Examination for the Armed Forces, or whatever you call it—the Minister of Defense Order No. 260. It specifies almost a hundred ailments and physical drawbacks with which youth are deemed to be unsuited for military service, or are suited with restrictions.

[V.F. Rudyuk] The very many articles on that statute are creating confusion, both among physicians and among the officials of the draft boards, as well as commanders. Judge for yourself—the list does not permit assigning youth with a number of ailments into certain types of troops, but permits them to be sent to others. These fellows, by the logic of the matter, require treatment or should be released from military service entirely during peacetime.

The whole army needs healthy people, and not only, say, the navy, marines or missile troops. Great physical burdens are placed on the soldier everywhere. He will not be up to it if he is weak. And one can thus only welcome the almost 70 additions that have been made to the list by the Ministry of Health of the Uzbek SSR. Today youth with a number of ailments are either deemed unsuitable for military service during peacetime, or are written off the military rolls entirely.

Military people have long been talking about the need for a review of the statute on medical fitness certification. A sick soldier, after all, serves less and is treated more. Young men with many illnesses and physical drawbacks will not be entering service in the Moscow Military District this fall, due to which same the citizens of Uzbekistan will not be entering the ranks already this spring.

Youths with a number of other ailments will be granted deferments from induction for medical treatment.

[Savelyev] By the way, Valeriy Fedorovich, according to the USSR Law on Universal Military Service—which remains in force—the draft board has the right to grant deferments for other reasons as well. Could we, for instance, get into the situation of reader S.B. Aminova, a teacher, from Bukhara? How she writes to the editors that she is 41 years old, working at school, her husband died tragically three years ago, and she is thus raising three children alone. The youngest son is six years old

and the oldest has reached 18, and he should be drafted into the army. Aminova asks whether he could be granted a deferment until his sister, in the ninth grade and 14 years old, reaches working age?

[V.F. Rudyuk] The law does not envisage the granting of deferments in such cases. But the rayon and oblast draft boards have the right to resolve this issue.

[Savelyev] The General Staff and the government have agreed not to send youth from Uzbekistan to serve in the Transcaucasus or the Caspian Fleet, as well as subunits in the Black Sea Fleet stationed on the territory of the Transcaucasus Military District [ZakVO]. There are no obstacles here, however, to volunteers becoming servicemen called to the Transcaucasus, or Black Sea or Caspian sailors. How is that voluntary desire expressed?

[V.F. Rudyuk] The drafting of an agreement that grants a series of benefits to the soldier or sailor. According to the order of the USSR Ministry of Defense on voluntary conscription to a region mentioned in the agreement, monetary sustenance is set up for the conscript serviceman equal to the salary for extended military service—170-210 rubles. These soldiers are granted mandatory leave of 20-25 days over the term of service, depending on rank and position occupied. The volunteers receive an exit stipend equal to double their pay upon discharge.

Officers and warrant officers who are completing service in the ZakVO, by the way, also have a series of benefits. A year of their service, in particular, is counted as one and a half.

[Savelyev] Comrade colonel, the agreement also names another district—our own, the Turkestan. True, for a different reason.

[V.F. Rudyuk] Yes, we will not send conscripts from Uzbekistan who are legally married outside our borders. They will moreover serve in the garrisons closest to their homes, naturally if there is a need there for specialists in the fields they have mastered in their pre-draft training. This practice, it must be said, already exists. There are 515 married soldiers and sergeants drafted from Uzbekistan serving in our district today.

[Savelyev] Valeriy Fedorovich, retiree Ye. Yarochkina from the town of Verkhnevolynskoye in Voroshilovgradskiy Rayon of Syr-Darya Oblast has written a letter to our column on just that topic. Her son is serving in the Soviet Army. Judging from the letter, he is serving somewhere not far from home, since he has a wife and child. Ye. Yarochkina is interested in how often married soldiers are given leave? And for how long?

[V.F. Rudyuk] She should remember that her son was called upon to master a combat specialty. That is his chief business in the army. Leave is one type of incentive for diligence in combat training. I think that commanders make use of the opportunity of providing an

incentive to a diligent soldier when it is convenient. But that, of course, will be only during days off and holidays.

[Savelyev] We are talking about young men who are called up for conscript service. But the agreement also stipulates concern for reinforcing the officer corps as well.

[V.F. Rudyuk] Yes, and moreover a bilateral concern—both the government of the republic and the General Staff. One of the clauses in the agreement stipulates that “The government of the Uzbek SSR, in conjunction with representatives of public organizations, will ensure the selection of worthy candidates from among the young men of the indigenous nationality who have knowingly chosen for themselves the path of service as an officer in the armed forces.”

It must be said that attention toward training among the officer corps has always been unchanged in the republic. Boarding schools with advanced study of the Russian language and increased physical fitness were opened several years ago in Tashkent, Fergana, Samarkand and Urgench. The fellows at them are engaged in the programs of Suvorov schools. They are training future cadets for the service schools there.

A definite drop in interest in the profession of officer is being observed nonetheless. Whereas in 1988, say, 582 Uzbeks became cadets at the military schools, there were just 477 in 1989 and even fewer—442—last year.

The General Staff, however, having concluded the agreement with the government of the republic, is prepared to enroll up to a thousand youths of the Uzbek nationality in military educational institutions outside the competition this year. They will take exams through correspondence acceptance commissions at the service schools located in the republic.

[Savelyev] The civilian aspect of the participants in the agreement should probably have particular attention paid to it for so many young men to become cadets?

[V.F. Rudyuk] And a very great deal depends on the military. Here is a typical example of this. Ninety people from Andizhan Oblast entered the country's service schools in 1988, 80 in 1989 and just 20 last year. They were mostly from the region in which Lieutenant Colonel Abdurakhman Abdurashidov was serving as the military commissar in both the first and second instances. But that officer was discharged into the reserves at the beginning of last year...

He was discharged, and look how many of his countrymen entered the ranks after their commissar was replaced.

The person had a special talent to arouse love of officer service among young men. He always took his leave at the height of the entrance exams for the service schools, and personally came to “root” for his own people at the schools where they wanted to get in the most.

[Savelyev] Comrade colonel, since we have started talking about the military commissariats, please clarify the situation with the creation of the first military commissariat in the Uzbek SSR as part of the structure of the country's military directorate.

[V.F. Rudyuk] The republic military commissariats, it is true, were not provided for by the Law on Universal Military Service. But the General Staff of the armed forces of the USSR has agreed in its directive with the government of the Uzbek SSR to create such a military commissariat in Tashkent. It started operation on July 1. The local authorities are now looking for accommodations for it.

The commissariat, which it is accepted to consider a republic one today, has been endowed with the functions of the Tashkent Oblast one. It will perform them while remaining in its own building on Sapernaya.

Does the republic need a military commissariat? Undoubtedly. The oblast commissariats maintain close ties with oblast organizations on the most varied of issues. Who will conduct the mobilization or military-patriotic work on the scale of the republic if there is no such body in the system of military administration, even just possessing information on the republic level? The new army structure will thus serve both the armed forces and the leaders of the republic to an equal extent.

By the way, it has been agreed to invest funds of the government of the Uzbek SSR in the maintenance of the republic commissariat.

[Savelyev] And, finally, something else: we know that a series of legislation is being prepared for the country on defense. The agreement could not, of course, envisage all of the points in it.

[V.F. Rudyuk] The agreement, as is stated in this document, is in permanent effect and will be made more specific where necessary.

Problems of Officer Turnovers in Army

91UM0832A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Aug First Edition p 2

[Article by Captain First Rank S. Turchenko: “Those Who Return”]

[Text] *In a period that was very difficult for the Army, these officers quit its rank. Now they are asking to be taken back...*

Senior Lieutenant Igor A.'s wife left him. She left incidentally, for the chairman of a local cooperative. Her farewell was to hurl this: “I have grown tired of wandering about from place to place and worrying about every ruble of your beggarly pay. Now clever people with ideas have started to live...”

Even in this troubled time for the Armed Forces, this case is not typical. Neither, probably, is the fact that

because of this the command had an understanding attitude toward Igor and made an exception for him; of which the reader will learn at the end...

The words of his former wife had a strong effect on Igor. And the press was also pouring dirt on the army and elevating to the level almost of a national hero anyone who was able "to make money." And he wanted to show first and foremost his former spouse that he was not just a "useless lump" but was also capable of this. The report about his transfer to the reserve arrived. And just as the senior lieutenant had not listened to his commanders and fellow officers, so, too, he disregarded their conclusions.

He did not do badly for himself—he was a brigade leader at a large plant in Moscow. In six months he earned almost double what he had earned in the army. At first he was satisfied. But then he started to dream more often about the company. He would go to the plant but the talk there was about nothing near or dear to him. By this time Igor was already missing army life, and he saw only that his surroundings contrasted sharply with him and that he had no heart for it. And when the pain caused by his family drama had subsided he realized that he had made a serious mistake.

He compiled a wordy report and with it he went to the Main Administration for Personnel in the USSR Ministry of Defense. It turned out that he was by no means the first...

In recent years thousands of officers have resigned from the ranks of the Armed Forces. They included people who had truly become dissuaded from the military profession, and those who were shirking the difficulties of service. But most often they had been deceived by the mass anti-army propaganda. It was this that offered the opportunity to compare the level of organization, and the moral and psychological atmosphere in military and other collectives that was suddenly sharply reversed. The Main Administration for Personnel alone has in these last months received more than 200 letters and applications for reinstatement in the ranks of the Armed Forces. If we take into account the fact that similar requests are being made in the republic, oblast, and kray military commissariats and the personnel organs in the districts and fleets, then this figure grows several times over. In short, what we are seeing is a massive "recoil wave" back to their own element...

I read the reports and requests of "those who return." Behind each one there is a complicated human destiny, often a life's drama.

"During the time I have spent as a civilian, from September 1990 to August 1991, I have realized that this life is not for me" writes Captain of the Reserve A. Isakov from Tyumen Oblast. "I work as the chief of a supply section at a transport pool and I live an adequate life, but my heart aches. It is only now that I understand what a mistake I made when I resigned from the army.

There are real things there for a man to do. I ask for assistance in returning to any duty at any place..."

"Help my son to return to the army," begs Vera Pavlovna Vladimirova from Pushkino city in Moscow Oblast. "My husband spent all his life in service in the USSR Armed Forces. My son, Nikolay Vladimirov, a captain of the reserve, served for 10 years with the airborne assault troops and then two years in a construction detachment [stroyotryad]. He stupidly had himself transferred to the reserves. But he is incapable of adapting to the civilian life. Save this man..."

A quite new situation has arisen for the personnel organs of the Armed Forces. What is their attitude toward it?

I have spoken on this subject with various categories in the officer corps in the troops. Among those asked, a sharp but perhaps quite understandable opinion prevails: They quit the army when it was going through a difficult time, you might say that they retreated from it, and so there can be no question of their return. What kind of authority would such officers have among their subordinates? What could they be taught?

We also discussed this with the deputy chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Main Administration for Personnel, Colonel General A. Mironov.

"During the last three years," Aleksey Kirillovich told me, "three percent of the officers have resigned. This is about as many as replaced them from the ranks of the graduates from the schools. But of course what is happening is a normal process of self-purging of the officer corps of people whose hearts are not in it and who have an inappropriate level of understanding of their duties. And in my opinion, if the unstable people leave it is more of a gain than a loss for the army and navy... Competition for the military schools has grown (by an average of two and a half to three people for every place countrywide). If we take into account the frenzied anti-army campaign that many of the mass media have been waging for a long time, then it is not difficult to conclude that people of true conviction and calling are now enrolling in the schools... As for those who resigned from the army and now want to comeback, the attitude toward them is unambiguous: The Armed Forces have no need for such people. They have shown that they are unstable on the moral plane, and during their two- to eight-year absence from the troops have to a certain degree lost the habits of service, or during this time they have managed to become involved in some unseemly business. Finally, we cannot disregard financial discipline. Many of those who resigned received five times their salary when they resigned, and now, if they are taken back into the ranks of the Armed Forces it is necessary to pay out more in travel expenses. Not a top-priority issue, perhaps, but combined with the other factors mentioned it also influences resolution of the problem... From this it does not follow that the procedure excludes the possibility that we may call from the reserve officers who resigned early if they insistently request it. But this will be only the

exception to the rule, when we are convinced that they really will be of some use to the army and that they will not be resigning again.

And what of Senior Lieutenant Igor A.? Taking under advisement the fact that this junior officer had showed weakness during a period of spiritual crisis but was prepared to devote himself totally to his service, the Main Administration for Personnel granted Igor's request. The officer recently joined one of the remote garrisons.

Most of the others who resigned in a hasty manner or in a moment of weakness will not be allowed to return. And although this is tough, it is fair.

Report on Alternative Military Service

91UN2684A Moscow TRUD in Russian 7 Sep 91 p 1

[Article by P. Rashkov: "Moldova: There is an Alternative"]

[Text] **KISHINEV. Moldovan Prime Minister V. Muravskiy has signed a decree on the republic's first call-up for alternative service in September-October of this year.**

Subject to call-up are draft-age men born in 1973, or before, if they have not yet performed active duty in the army. The call-up is voluntary—all those who express

the desire to perform alternative service (which according to the law of the Republic of Moldova will be carried out in emergency-rescue, fire-fighting and ecological units, at health-care institutions, in the social sphere, municipal facilities, construction, construction-repair, road-building and road-repair organizations, and in agriculture or organizations and enterprises for production and processing of agricultural products) must submit prior to 15 September their motives (having in mind religious and pacifist convictions, which give the draftee the right to refuse military service) in a statement to the commission on alternative service at their place of residence. And those who do not express the desire to be called up for alternative service will perform their tour of military service in the army in accordance with existing laws in the Moldovan Republic.

And this too about the army; a precise translation from the Romanian language of the decree of Moldovan Republic President Mircea Snegur, quoted in yesterday's issue of TRUD, reads as follows: "Present the leadership of the USSR with the question of unconditional withdrawal of troops of the Soviet army from the territory of the Republic of Moldova."

Moldovan Republic President Mircea Snegur also approved by decree a temporary identification card for citizens of the Moldovan Republic, which proves citizenship in the republic until the issuance of passports to the republic's citizens.

US Stealth Developments Reviewed

*91SV0061A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Sep 91 First Edition p 5*

[Article by Col Yu. Omelchenko, doctor of military sciences, professor, under the "Military Technical Developments" rubric: "How to Counter the Stealths?"; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] The subject of the war in the Persian Gulf has been receding into the background in newspaper coverage. There has been a cooling of emotions and arguments, which have influenced the forming of contradictory opinions in various quarters, opinions ranging from unqualified praise of the battle capabilities of coalition forces armament on the one hand, to deep skepticism of Iraqi weaponry on the other, perhaps with the air defense weapons largely in mind, although this is not completely certain.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has dealt with the above topics. ("Shilka Against the B-52," 5 April 91; "The Dynamics of Parity," KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's Round Table, 25 June 91; "The S-300 More Effective than the Patriot," 27 June 91) The newspaper continues to receive letters from officers and warrant officers of the PVO Troops [Air Defense Troops] - real professionals in their field - who express an interest in new information on the combat capabilities of offensive air weapons designed along the lines of the stealth technology, with an even stronger interest in how to counter the "invisible" craft. In general, is this complex technical problem solvable? This is the subject of discussion by a military science specialist.

Let me say without hesitation that the NATO armies' acquisition of offensive air weapons possessing reduced radar vulnerability has placed PVO, including in my opinion that of our Army, in a difficult position. The point here is that stealth technology, which has been applied to the creation of the F-117, causes a sharp reduction in radar vulnerability of offensive air weapons. This was shown in the war waged by the coalition forces against Iraq. However, the problem of detecting the above kind of weapons, as is now being brought out, is not as unsolvable as previously thought. The stealth technology in a number of cases does not provide complete invisibility, something that is admitted by highly authoritative specialists. Thus, D. Rice, the secretary of the Air Force, and Air Force Chief of Staff L. Welch have stated on a number of occasions in their support of B-2 bomber production that the B-2 is not completely "invisible," in certain cases experiencing detection by certain radars. Similar statements may be made concerning other aircraft. While American F-117 fighters were flying in the Persian Gulf area, it was learned that they were detected in Saudi Arabian air space by radar of the French firm Thomson.

Also concluding that B-2 bombers could be detected by over-the-horizon radars were Australian specialists. It is

known that these radars illuminate a target from above. The bomber presents a so-called "shiny surface" on the upper fuselage, the location of the air intakes, thus rendering it vulnerable to detection.

However, specialists believe that the principal solution to the problem of low-signature aircraft is closely linked to the realization of advanced technical solutions, including the use of super-wideband radars; combining radars into a network that includes real-time correlation data processing; application of the nonlinear radar effect, and others. These technical solutions to some degree or other are even now being put into practice. Thus, Congress in 1990 provided 25 million dollars for the creation of ultrawideband (UWB) frequency radar systems and powerful microwave systems employing light excitation. This kind of radar is based on the transmission of very short and powerful wideband pulses that make it possible to detect and track aerial targets.

ITT Gilfillan, the well-known American firm, is conducting research on the application of integrated and super-high speed millimeter-range circuits used in multimode phased-array and active-aperture radars. These radars would be considerably lighter and more effective than existing types. They will offer a wide operating band and significant frequency stability, with the capability of transmitting a considerable amount of energy in the direction of distant or low-signature targets, using a system of improved power control. The firm's specialists believe that the transmitting and receiving module developed by the firm is typical for the technology that will be employed in the next generation of radars featuring a phased array and active aperture.

Another effort in which ITT is involved is the development of bistatic radars that can function in the passive as well as active mode. They would receive signals reflected from targets illuminated by other radars, including enemy radars.

Intensive efforts are also under way to improve radar jamming resistance. Highly successful in this has been the French firm Thomson-CSF, for example. Its jamming-resistant medium-range TRS 2620 Gerfaut and long-range TRS 2630 Griffon surveillance radars are digital pulsed Doppler equipments offering pulse compression and carrier frequency variation. More than 75 of these radars will be delivered to the French Army under the Samantha Air Defense Program. Orders have also been placed in support of forward area air defense by armies of the U.S., Finland, and two Latin American countries.

To what can the success of the Thomson-CSF be ascribed in its creation of such popular jamming-resistant radars? The Griffon radar, for example, employs the upper portion of the 10-centimeter band. The radiation pattern is of a pencil type, with random change of carrier frequency from one pulse packet to another, thus providing good defense against response

jamming. This variation in transmitter operating frequency within a broad spectral range forces the wide-band jamming aircraft to set up barrage jamming within that wide frequency range, thus suffering a substantial reduction in density.

At what distance can targets be detected? One of the ways being sought to solve this problem is the development of new over-the-horizon radars. The USA in 1990 demonstrated the command post of an over-the-horizon radar that offers the capability of observing aerial targets at a range of 3,300 kilometers. A radar set located in the northeastern part of the United States (city of Bangor) is capable of watching the air space over a large territory, from Greenland to the northern areas of South America. The equipment is designed to provide early warning of aerial targets. The new radar is based on the principle of atmospheric reradiation of direct and reflected pulses. All the data produced, which is processed by computer, assist the operator in selecting the ionospheric areas most favorable for signal transmission and the associated pulse frequency. It is planned to set up this kind of radar in North Dakota, California, and Alaska, thus making it possible to monitor the air space over the approaches to the entire territory of the USA.

Also in progress is work involving installing radars or antenna systems aboard dirigibles or balloons. As part of the air defense initiative program, the American firm of Westinghouse and the English Airship Industries are working on several versions of a prospective multi-purpose dirigible that will be employed as a long-term aerial radar observation platform. For example, the radar carried by the Sentinel 5000 dirigible should detect - depending on altitude - low-flying aircraft at ranges of 187 to 209 kilometers, and high-flying craft at greater distances. A low-altitude surveillance system employing the radar-equipped captive balloon LASS was deployed over the territory of Kuwait during the Persian Gulf War.

I would like to stress that virtually all the abovementioned radars are capable of accomplishing their assigned missions in an environment of present and future offensive air weapons designed along stealth lines.

In this survey of present and future radars, it is easily seen that they all to a great degree are science-intensive and require an advanced manufacturing base. For this reason, the requirements relating to radar development emerge as a powerful motivation for creating and implementing advanced technologies for which there is also a well-known need in our national economy. The development and mastery of these technologies, while making it possible to manufacture at a modern level not only military products, but national economic items as well, will promote the resolution of a number of highly important problems related to strengthening the country's defensive capability.

Cheney Cited on Post-Coup Relations

91UF1148A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Sep 91
Union Edition p 4

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent A. Shalnev: "U.S. Defense Secretary Prepared To Cooperate With the New Soviet Commanders"]

[Text] New York—As U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney declared, he is impatient to begin "working with the new generation of Soviet military leaders." And, the secretary said in an interview with CNN, we are in fact talking about a "new generation. Mr. Shaposhnikov is approximately 20 years younger than his predecessor. He is roughly the same age as I.... The advent of a new generation, the advent of people who are prepared to take a fresh look at their country's military requirements and who understand what the appropriate role of the Soviet military is—not an aggressive role, not one fraught with a threat to its neighbors—we see this as a very positive development of events."

Announcing that he would send his Soviet colleague an invitation to visit the United States, R. Cheney observed, however: "We have not settled on a date for the visit, he is a man who, as is perfectly obvious, is now very busy: He is attempting to restore—and establish—control over the Soviet military."

"We are lucky, the defense secretary continued, "that there are currently at the helm of government such people as Yeltsin and Gorbachev. Perestroika, glasnost, the start of the reforms—Gorbachev's contribution here is great... and Yeltsin has contributed tremendously to the defense of democracy. We will be required to deal with both of them. We have to deal with those who are at the center. And, of course, we have to deal also with the head of a country which is as big as the Russian Republic."

But while welcoming the political changes in the Soviet Union, the secretary is not, however, disposed to draw "military conclusions" from the qualitatively new situation. He categorically rejected the idea of a reallocation of U.S. military-strategic priorities. "We cannot," Cheney said, "make fundamental decisions concerning the long-term requirements of the United States in the area of security based on how the situation develops in the Soviet Union by the day, or even by the week."

From the viewpoint of the head of the Pentagon, in the past two years the United States has done much as it is: It has appreciably reduced the defense budget, there are now fewer men on active service than at any time in the past 40-plus years, Army divisions are being cut by one-third, the Air Force by more than 30 percent.... According to Cheney, it would meanwhile be premature and wrong to make more rapid or more extensive reductions.

The secretary made it clearly understood that it is now the turn of the Soviet Union: "We hope that they will be prepared to appreciably reduce their forces."

R. Cheney emphatically supported the preservation and development of the Strategic Defense Initiative. "The arguments in support of SDI," he said, "have probably become even more well-founded precisely at this time, when we are encountering the possibility of the fact that, in place of one nuclear power, there could in the Soviet Union be several. The defense of the United States and our friends and allies overseas against a possible missile attack is one of our most urgent priorities. We need the Strategic Defense Initiative."

Cheney declared, "Although there have been phenomenal changes in Moscow, which we welcome and which we view with enthusiasm, a fact—if we take the military outlook—remains a fact: Thousands of nuclear warheads are targeted on the United States at this stage, as before. We have no reason to express concern over who is controlling the Soviet nuclear arsenals. But we do not know, of course, what the situation will be like two or three years down the road inasmuch as they (the Soviet Union—A.Sh.) are still trying to determine what their internal arrangement will be."

At the same time Cheney announced that the meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group in the next few weeks would be discussing in earnest the question of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, but weapons which, according to the secretary, "are no longer particularly relevant, considering the situation that has taken shape" on the continent.

Cheney was asked about the options of rendering the Soviet Union economic assistance which could in one way or another be connected with the U.S. military budget. One of these options, proposed by Democratic Senator P. Moynihan, provides for America's virtual redemption of the Soviet nuclear arsenals: "You eliminate all or almost all your nuclear forces, we will make available to you extensive assistance." A second option, proposed by Congressman Aspin, is as follows: \$1 billion of assistance to the Soviet Union from the Pentagon budget.

Cheney considered both options premature. It would be a mistake particularly at this time, he said, "to cut back our defenses in order to help the Soviets."

Speaking about assistance, Sunday's NEW YORK TIMES brought truly depressing news. Neither American nor European bankers are prepared to avail themselves of the guarantees which the administration has provided for the latest batch of credit for the Soviet Union for the purchase of farm products in the United States. Some \$315 million are simply up in the air.

It was somewhat easier with the first batch of credit of \$600 million, and, although with difficulty, bankers were found, not in America, it is true, but in Europe, who

availed themselves of the American Government guarantees. Food is already being acquired under this credit. But now, when the food situation is becoming catastrophic in the USSR and when the need for purchases overseas has risen sharply, creditors are not to be found.

Commentary on Pentagon Research, Development Budget

91SV0088A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Sep 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Colonel M. Rebrov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA science observer: "The Hand of the Provider Is Not Running Short, or What Is Behind the Figure 3.14 Billion"]

[Text] Those who are naive think the world is moving inexorably toward the elimination of weapons. If we use quantitative indices to judge, then this is to some degree true. Along with the process of reducing the numbers of "weapons units," however, qualitative changes in arms are taking place. Their significance and scope may be judged by the following statistic—the Pentagon will receive \$3.14 billion in 1992 for its research and development program, scientific research and development of military equipment. It is not a paltry sum. But, as AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY reports, by 1997 the figure will increase further, reaching \$3.31 billion. And additional growth is not ruled out.

The aim of such large expenditures is to maintain U.S. leadership in the sphere of the most important military technology and "not relax the muscles." As proof of this, observers abroad cite the assertion of American military experts: "Success achieved in the war against Iraq confirms that Pentagon expenditures for scientific research and development over the past 20 years have been fully justified."

Developing this concept, the magazine asserts that in May of last year the Defense Industry and Technology Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Armed Forces Committee examined and approved a plan of the most important projects, which determines three main directions in spending: regular evolutionary development and sophistication of military equipment; introduction of the newest technologies into existing armament; and the development of new key technologies in the sphere of nuclear weapons and Stealth technology.

Each of the three overall directions can be specifically defined. The plan for 1992 contains 21 points, behind which are technologies considered "especially important and of top priority for preserving U.S. military superiority." We will not delve into the subject of "over whom," but will cite just a few of these points: highly sophisticated computer systems, artificial intelligence and robotics, image recognition, photon physics, high-sensitivity radar systems, impulse sources of energy, materials capable of withstanding the effects of high-density energy flows, signal and image processing, military biotechnology...

The plan for developing the most important military technologies also includes a schedule for six-year financing of each of the 21 project areas. And although it is expected that the overall Pentagon budget will be reduced in coming years (1992-1997), strategy in the research and development sphere will remain unchanged—"to maintain the dominant position of the United States in the sphere of arms."

It would be interesting to compare overall expenditures of the leading industrially developed countries on research and development and the appropriations allocated to their military departments. According to an assessment by the National Science Foundation of the United States, American spending on scientific research and development last year reached \$150 billion. This is 2.6 times greater than in Japan, and 5.6 times greater than in the FRG. The share of gross national product allocated to research and development in the United States is approximately 2.7 percent. Data for 1988-1989 show that Japan spent one percent of its overall expenditures on military-oriented research and development; the FRG—two percent; Britain—24 percent; France—23 percent; and the United States—28 percent.

The attentive reader may object—mentioned above are figures of \$3.14 and \$150 billion, as well as 28 percent, which sound somewhat strange, the arithmetic not properly adding up.

To clarify things, we will state that, of \$150 billion allocated for scientific research and development, \$21.5 billion (14 percent) goes to conduct basic research; \$33.8 billion (23 percent)—to applied research; and \$94.7 billion—to developmental research. Much of what is related to civilian projects is used by the military departments. Incidentally, at least 15 of the above-mentioned 21 directions in the 1992 program have commercial applications as well or potential benefit for commercial use.

Here the question arises—will not efforts directed toward the qualitative development of American weaponry lead to a new imbalance between the USSR and United States? This question must have an answer.

Problems Facing Former Volksarmee Personnel

*91SV0072A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 Sep 91 First Edition p 2*

[Interview with Retired Admiral Theodor Hoffmann, former GDR minister of national defense, by correspondent Colonel V. Markushin; place and date not given: "Discrimination Is Dispiriting"]

[Text] In Germany a difficult process of unification of its western and eastern parts is under way. Our correspondent talks about the difficulties which in this connection have befallen servicemen of the National People's Army with Retired Admiral Theodor Hoffmann, former minister of national defense of the GDR.

[Markushin] As is known, with Germany's unification part of the personnel of the National People's Army has merged with the Bundeswehr. How do you view this fact?

[Hoffmann] I consider it a normal phenomenon, although, of course, such things do not happen very often. History has made an abrupt turnabout. Germans have come to live in one state and, consequently, must together provide for the functioning of a common state mechanism. The Army is part of this mechanism. So it is all quite logical.

[Markushin] But servicemen are not mechanisms but living people with their own beliefs, their own morals...

[Hoffmann] Of course. It is for this reason that I believe that it will be quite some time before the army of a united Germany is united in spirit. Just as the whole country also will only be spiritually united, if only relatively, after a certain length of time. It is no secret that the actual unity of the citizens of the two parts of Germany is proceeding far from smoothly. This is, naturally, taking its toll on the moral-psychological atmosphere in the Bundeswehr. The negative aspects are being turned primarily against those who served in the National People's Army.

[Markushin] How many such are there in today's Bundeswehr?

[Hoffmann] It has been reported in the press that approximately 9,500 soldiers and approximately 5,500 officers of the former National People's Army are serving in units stationed on the eastern territory. This is approximately one-third of the total strength of the personnel of the forces in East Germany.

[Markushin] What is the fate of the others?

[Hoffmann] Many have found jobs in the civilian sector. They are working well and are coming increasingly to be recognized in their work. The fact that former military personnel of the GDR are conversant with Soviet realities is of value currently. They have kept up their ties to your country and are thus capable of successfully performing a mediating mission. Some officers and men are undergoing retraining in the hope of subsequently obtaining a place in their new profession. Not a great hope, of course, if we consider the growing unemployment.

[Markushin] We hear of discrimination in respect to those who have come from the National People's Army.

[Hoffmann] Much to our regret, such a policy is being pursued directly or indirectly. And without some differentiated approach, what is more. It is having a dispiriting effect. Yet there are no reasons for putting us in so humiliating a position. The GDR military personnel performed their duty and served their people. And did so no worse than the soldiers and officers of other armies. The system in which we lived did not justify the people's hopes. But can the servicemen be blamed for this? After

all, they were subordinate to the laws of a state which was recognized throughout the world and which enjoyed great authority.

[Markushin] The National People's Army had the reputation of being the army of the SED. This fact is obviously also influencing the attitude toward former servicemen.

[Hoffmann] Yes. Because far from everyone wants to acknowledge the obvious fact that the National People's Army was not a force which resisted the changes. It also was expecting changes. The fall of 1989 was a period of reassessment of values for our army. As a result this predetermined the bloodless nature of the revolution. In other words, the National People's Army marched together with the democratic strata. It remained loyal to the democratically elected government and adhered firmly to the constitution.

[Markushin] Do you often think about your past?

[Hoffmann] Thoughts about one's past are the natural condition of a man with 38 years of military service behind him. The path from officer cadet to admiral and defense minister was not easy. But, to be honest, I remember the good things most. I trained in Leningrad at the Naval Academy. I struck up good contacts there with Soviet officers, with Soviet people generally. I consider this time the brightest period of my life.

[Markushin] What worries you most today?

[Hoffmann] I am worried about the futures of people who honestly served the homeland and who are now being forced to suffer insults. I would very much like a display of objectivity and human decency in respect to such people.

FRG Debates New Role for Bundeswehr

91UF1172A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Sep 91
Single edition p 4

[Article by Retired Major-General Ye. Nozhkin and PRAVDA Special Correspondent L. Strzhizhovskiy, Bonn—Moscow: "Where the Bundeswehr is Heading: The Darmstadt Meetings"]

[Text] **Kamo gryadeshi—where are you going? The traditional question of the ancient peasantry is acquiring not only the generally known sense in Europe today. Right now this problem is both moral and political. What will the Bundeswehr be like, which way is NATO heading, and by which paths will we achieve European security under current conditions? There are quite a few questions but all of them are reduced to one: how will a united Europe, which the Soviet Union is becoming an integral part of, peacefully develop?**

When you talk with the residents of Darmstadt, a quite coherent peace program arises from their words. But the problem of NATO concerns them, like everyone else in Germany.

"Naturally, NATO cannot remain like it was before," said Bundestag Deputy, Free Democrat Olaf Feldman. He is involved with disarmament issues and knows Eastern Europe thoroughly. Olaf was born in East Prussia, lived in Poland and the GDR [German Democratic Republic], and now sits in the Bundestag.

"NATO is reducing its military potential but is increasing its political influence. Yes, it has lost its primary enemy but it nevertheless remains a stabilizing factor in Europe. And the Soviet Union should not object if its former allies join NATO. I think that this is the only correct political path. It is closely tied to support of President Gorbachev's policies. I am a Gensherist...."

This new term which we heard for the first time is prevalent in Germany. However, like any political definition, it requires deciphering which is difficult. But, perhaps we have grasped the main thing: it is a question of the approach to the interpretation of European security. It is understood only in combination with support of the perestroika process and is envisioned as the preservation of the Soviet Union as a strong and stable partner.

Another Bundestag Deputy, Social Democrat Hernot Erler finally helped us to understand it. A pleasant surprise: Hernot speaks Russian, more accurately, he specially mastered the language. He is a member of the Bundestag Defense and Foreign Policy Committee, chairman of the SDPG [German Social Democratic Party] working group, and "is observing the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany." You do not often meet such an approach to business. His opinion is all the more interesting:

"I see many problems in disarmament. The diplomats are concluding treaties and we must fill them with content. It is easy to say: let the soldiers go home. They can still find a place. But what do you do with the barracks and military garrisons and with all of this enormous property—both yours and ours. Conversion, military and ecological, is a new problem.

"Yes and the formula itself 'Everyone go home!' is quite difficult. Much depends on the mood with which Soviet soldiers return to the Homeland. What they will leave here, in our country, and how they will build homes. I have close contact with Soviet General Burlakov and I know how difficult it is for you."

We are meeting a German for the first time who is thinking about the "psychological climate" among the Soviet military. The new thinking actually encompasses both the Bundestag deputies and all of the problems that they are examining here taken together. We need to note that the Bundeswehr's role and its future appears to be quite hazy to our interlocutors for the time being.

"We must find an adequately realistic role for the Bundeswehr in the future," said Erler. "Not only in the matter of the defense of the Homeland but also in the framework of the defense of all of Europe. The time has

come to stabilize NATO's European flank. To make the army flexible and mobile and to extract lessons from the Persian Gulf War."

With all of the ambiguity of the future reforms, there are positions on which the politicians and military converge. With the unquestioned preservation of NATO, they admit that the alliance's center of attention is being transferred from maintaining the former world to building the new world. Another architecture of European institutions based on dialogue, trust, and cooperation is needed to do this.

We do not want to build a Europe that confronts the Soviet Union, they told us. We need a peaceful continent and we expect and hope that your country will henceforth continue to progress on the path of reform, seek cooperation, and respect the sovereignty of other peoples....

We obtained a surprising recipe for creating a peaceful Europe from German Brigadier General Winfried Fogel. He occupies the high post of Deputy Chief of the Military Training Directorate in the Bundeswehr and he has 35 years of uninterrupted service behind him. Accurately speaking, Fogel has served in NATO since the day it was founded and covered the entire thorny path of the Cold War. We will once again use the words "for the first time" because we actually heard the brigadier general's thoughts for the first time. The energetic, lively Fogel, in a well-tailored, steel-gray uniform with its Bundeswehr badges and regalia, accepted our invitation to talk with us. In the Dlinnyy Oygen [Long Eugene] (that is what they irreverently call the building in which the Bundestag is located), on the 29th story the waiters turned out to be not particularly competent (just like ours at home) and we talked to our hearts' content with the general.

"A man adjusts to everything and a soldier all the more so. There have been so many such changes in my memory," said Fogel. "The postwar split of Europe overshadowed former stereotypes but I well remember how my father repeated to me: 'Don't you dare forget—our primary enemy—France. You will have to fight her again.' Today we have cordial, friendly relations with the French. It did not take so many years to do this.

"Remember the historical positions that are nearer to us in time—the Brandt-Scheel government's new 'Ost Politik.' Soldiers accepted it far from immediately. But Ost Politik paved the way for the current changes. And I frankly rejoice that there are not only summit meetings but also that you and I have the opportunity to simply sit at the same table.

"Europeans' trust of one another came through NATO," he said. "When I commanded a battalion, our neighbor was a French unit. We exchanged visits of commanders, conducted joint firing practice, and moved into each other's barracks. I was known in French villages and I fell in love with the wonderful southern vineyards. Later when I was at maneuvers as the representative of the

Bundeswehr delegation, we, representatives of the European nations, lived like one big family. The question of which language to speak, whose newspapers to read, or what dishes to prepare never arose. Ties were created at all levels and everything moved by itself. Our defense task became truly international. The NATO Alliance developed into an internally and externally stable alliance. I do not see any reason to disband NATO."

The path to "internationalism" proposed by the general merits attention. A similar experience of "comrades in arms" also existed among the Warsaw Treaty participants. It would be interesting to know, in what forms are its roots preserved now?

The frankness of these conversations permitted us to pose questions which in another situation would have seemed to be tactless. Those questions which are now discussed only among "our own" and responses to which normally hang in the air.

"Will it not turn out that a united Germany will demand the return of Kaliningrad Oblast, that is to say, East Prussia, in two to three years?"

"Today, that does not enter into anyone's mind," answered Deputy Feldman.

"The fear exists that a powerful united Germany and its armed forces with time may present a threat for European countries. Is this so?" we asked General Fogel, as they say, "head on."

"This fear is quite explicable in an historical context," he answered. Especially on the anniversary of June 22. Therefore, steps are being undertaken to dispel them both in politics and in the military sphere. The Bundeswehr is being reduced to 370,000 soldiers, including servicemen of the former GDR [German Democratic Republic] army. The number of military facilities is being reduced. The Bundeswehr remains a part of NATO as before but the politicians and military personnel are now defining its new missions."

Direct questions and just as direct responses. There is no reason to doubt their sincerity and veracity. All the more so since disarmament has already begun on German soil. The first conversion steps convince us of this. The processes are similar in both countries. And being aware of their painfulness in our country, I was particularly interested in the German experience. We became acquainted with it at the Honeywell Concern.

The surprise lay in wait from the first steps. The excellent admissions system. The polite request to surrender our cameras. Through the comment that was dropped that a year ago "Russians would not have been permitted anywhere near here." Why? The enterprise in Frankfurt is one of the affiliates of the American transnational Honeywell Corporation that encompasses the entire world. It specializes in the production of electronic and heat equipment and many other things.

Oh, this German pedantry. We saw detailed diagrams on which were beautifully drawn laser and navigation devices, infrared night vision systems, fire control systems, mine detectors, and many other things. It was specially pointed out that equipment is also being delivered to the Soviet Union. Nearly every one of their "military toys" had a peacetime counterpart. Some of them had been previously planned and others were being developed as promising directions: for example, the peaceful application of ultrasound.... A headquarters has been created at the enterprise to transfer military know-how to peaceful production. The approach is pragmatic—to carry out conversion before others and to be successful in markets before their competitors are.

Naturally, we were not received at Honeywell by chance. The Darmstadt residents had long ties with the enterprise's production council—at one time they jointly

participated in the Easter processions. So the soldiers were acquainted with the workers and they had found common interests.

When the Cold War was in full swing, the well known German Philosopher Karl Jaspers in his sensational book "Kuda dvizhetsya FRG?" [Where Is the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] Heading?] legitimately expressed fear for the peaceful fate of Europe. Today, the European peoples look to the future with confidence. But questions like—what will happen to NATO and where is the Bundeswehr heading?—pose themselves both in the West and in the East. Confrontation between our peoples have always been destructive when cooperation resulted in mutual benefit. When he said goodbye, General Fogel wished the Darmstadt residents that they would "remain without work." We would like to think that it is a question of not only Bundeswehr soldiers and officers from the Darmstadt Garrison.

Conversion Prompts Researcher To Sell Military 'Secrets'

91UF1152B Moscow LUBYANKA, 14 in Russian No 2, Apr 91 p 2

[Article by LUBYANKA, 14 Correspondent A. Mikhaylov: "A Haunting 'Victim of Conversion'"]

[Text] He is well over 50 years old. He has a long life in science, professor's work at VUZ's [higher educational institutions], a doctor's degree, and the rank of professor behind him. He confidently entered the office and sat in the chair offered to him. There was neither a shadow of doubt nor an element of remorse. Is it possible that it only seems so at first glance?

The diplomat waited for him in his car. He had had the foresight to lock the door. Having caught sight of his "client," he opened the window a bit and, after exchanging greetings, let him in the car, having turned the tape recorder on beforehand. An old hand at different machinations, the foreigner met the contact not without some apprehension. The real matter was the initiative offer of services by a Soviet scientist, an expert in the development of PVO [Air Defense] systems! And it is now when war is threatening in the Persian Gulf.... An obsession still grated on the foreigner, some sort of sticky, humbly pleading speech, a lightning-fast readiness to acquire, deliver, make Xerox copies of documents, and to make a description of his invention. His for now! But later....

The professor laid down his sweeping conditions: departure from the USSR with his son and two military antimissile defense experts, total financing of its development, and 40 percent of the profits after its introduction. And in general, as they say, full room and board. Indeed, there had not yet been any conversation with the Ministry of Defense experts so far but he was certain that they would agree (Where did he get the certainty that the officers would betray their oath?).

The professor placed an ideological foundation under his services: to help one of the belligerent parties. That is why he was ready to depart for the other side of the earth's surface right now, in order to realize his invention in material by the sweat of his brow. "No one needed him in the Soviet Union. Intrigues, envy, and indifference to fresh thought...." But not only this could interest him: For many years, he had worked in science that was directly related with the development of the country's air defense system.... So the possibilities were significantly broader than those offered thus far.

The conversation proceeded listlessly. The foreigner was interested in many things but he had already come to a conclusion for himself: Article 65 of the RSFSR UK [Criminal Code] (simply—espionage) is fraught with lengthy periods of confinement, his career would be ruined, and his personal business was quite remote from military secrets: hard currency, precious stones, and other minor matters that provide joy in this life.

The foreigner did not listen to the pesky proposals until the end and he summed up the results. "All of this is interesting but alas.... We still do not have the capabilities to realize your invention. We will leave the ideas you have proposed until peacetime."

The Mercedes did not manage to travel 200 meters when its way was blocked by three black Volgas. "An agent provocateur!", thought the diplomat, hurriedly locking the doors. But they had already put this "agent provocateur" in a parked Zhiguli a little way from there.

The KGB agents were stunned by the results of the operation which they had conducted. They "felled" a hard currency dealer with a foreign passport and the one whom the agents call the "initiator" rushed off into the arranged networks, "having collapsed all of the development." And simply—the man who at his own initiative is attempting to sell what is covered by the Top Secret security classification.

The foreigner tossed the cassette with the recording of the negotiations that had just taken place out the window. The conversation about his hard currency activities was now deprived of any basis. The Mercedes was hidden around the corner.

The apprehended citizen was read his rights in the reception room of the USSR KGB Directorate for Moscow and Moscow Oblast. However, when a specific conversation began with regard to what had been seized, he began to become confused, to stammer, and to equivocate. He explained the presence in his briefcase of a "For Official Use Only" security classification by saying that the flight of creative thought requires its constant presence. "When I'm riding in the metro, a thought comes to me, I open my note pad, and write it down." Since it was impossible to assess on the spot either the work itself or the information with the security classification, they decided to terminate the conversation.

An investigation of the military experts showed that there were no secrets in the work which the professor gave to the foreigner. But the magnetic recording made in the Mercedes assigned everyone to their places. The professor's obvious intention did not leave any doubt. But.... There was no corpus delicti in his actions at that moment. As they say, he wanted to but did not succeed. And it is this that caused the KGB agents to breathe a sigh of relief.

We are sitting with him, an impressive, gray-haired man in the office of the BSSR KGB Directorate for Grodnen Oblast where the unsuccessful "spy" works. There is a video monitor and a compact microphone on the desk—necessary attributes for a basic conversation: as they say, "let us put the cards on the table." The first frames of the video recording reduced the professor's zeal by several orders of magnitude and they shifted the conversation into a constructive channel. He found the strength within himself to not stoop to a lie....

What compelled a man who had worked in defense science his entire life and who could perfectly imagine the consequences of his rash step to seek contacts with the West for the purpose of transferring technical information there? Money, career, world fame? Maybe each person poses the question to himself in his old age: "What have I achieved? What have I managed to do for science and for society?" These are reasons of a subjective nature. Let us leave moral standards in parentheses. Ultimately, each person determines for himself what is moral and what is not.... But there was logic in the professor's words. A logic born of real problems.

Conversion of the defense industry has placed many experts and scientific developments in a dead end situation when engineers' thinking is operating at full speed and the paths for its realization have been reduced to a minimum. They ask a scientist who has worked in defense electronics for his entire life to develop a new type of saucepan....

But does this affect only defense workers? How many promising developments that are capable of providing a powerful impetus to our industry are traveling through the offices of bureaucrats who are indifferent and removed from science and creativity. A purely sloganeering regard for scientific-technical progress. The main thing is to proclaim but few people are concerned with how to give life to new native technologies or how to encourage a scientist in a civilized manner.

Did these causes not give rise to a powerful outflow of scientific cadres from the USSR, is this not prompting people with painful pride on the path to treason, and does this not give rise to pessimism which does not promote progress?

Treason did not occur in the case with the Grodnen scientist. Legally. And therefore there will not be the dock or a court sentence.

And one more thing. The name of the main hero is not in this article not because I am experiencing any special sympathy toward him—any treason is revolting and this kind of "initiative" treason is doubly so. But I am deeply convinced that the professor has to come to the appropriate conclusions. But let it not be on the moral but on the legal level, having admitted that they snatched him from the brink of disaster. To which one inch remained.

Conversion of Nuclear Weapons Fuel Plant

91SV0068A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Sep 91 First edition p 4

[Article by N. Samokhin: "What is Zeolite?"]

[Text] A few years ago this plant, a giant in southeastern Chita Oblast, was closed to the press. And no wonder: The main product of the Priargunsk Mining and Chemical Combine was uranium concentrate, that which goes into the production of nuclear weapons.

The conversion begun in the defense industry not only lifted the veil of secrecy from the combine; it also brought major adjustments in the combine's production life. The volume of orders for the main product is dropping by the year. The multithousand-strong labor collective at the large, modern enterprise found itself in a difficult situation. In order not to go down the tubes, as they say, it would have to convert to other products. To the credit of the workers at the mining and chemical combine, they are seeking and finding a way out of the difficult situation.

"We promptly and efficiently worked out a conversion program and immediately set about implementing it," said combine director Stal Sergeyevich Pokrovskiy. "While output from the conversion accounted for slightly more than 5% in 1985, it has now increased several times over and amounts to around 80 million rubles. It is planned to double the volume again by 1995."

Zeolite has truly become a gold mine for the combine. This mineral, little known until recently, has turned out to possess many beneficial qualities. Adding it to live-stock feed, for example, significantly increases weight gains. Zeolites are used in various branches of industry for inhouse needs. Orders for them are already double the quantity mined and processed by the mining and chemical combine.

Production of molybdenum disulfide is another promising conversion trend. A study has shown that its use as a lubricant makes it possible to reduce friction in mechanisms by at least half and greatly reduces the need for other lubricants. It is expected that the sale of molybdenum sulfide will bring in as much as 15 million rubles a year. And S. Pokrovskiy believes that this is far from the limit. Incidentally, Japanese and South Korean companies have expressed an interest in the new lubricant, so that there might also be profits in the form of foreign currency.

Also important is the fact that the production of zeolites and molybdenum does not mean a great deal of extra work for the collective. Their extraction and processing do not require major retraining for the miners and chemists. In general they continue their usual work with their accustomed technological system.

The combine is also increasing its output of consumer goods and will produce 6 million rubles worth this year. These include various household items made of rubber and plastic, construction materials and dyes. The mining and chemical combine's machine repair plant will soon begin producing equipment for the dairy industry.

Many obstacles stemming from the difficult state of our economy will have to be overcome on the way to converting the enterprise. Despite this, the collective of the Priargunsk Mining and Chemical Combine hope to survive in the difficult situation. The workers believe that the way out is to convert their combine into a mighty, multibranch enterprise delivering diverse and

competitive products to the market, and they are proceeding steadily along that path.

Soviet Defense Industries Set Sights on France

*OW0609160691 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1420 GMT 6 Sep 91*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The USSR Scientific-Industrial Union (SIU) and the Union of Industrialists of France will form a special group to coordinate cooperation in the field of conversion between French firms and Soviet plants of the military-industrial complex. A decision to that effect was made at Friday's meeting of the French Minister of Finance, Economics and the Budget Pierre Beregovoi with the leaders of two dozen leading Soviet defence industries.

The meeting was attended by the deputy leader of the committee for the day-to-day economic management of the economy, SIU President Arkadiy Volskiy. He said that he had received President Gorbachev's consent to plugging Soviet defence industries into cooperation with foreign partners within the framework of the "Eureka" project. Volskiy said that he had already handed over to the French side a list of 31 industrial plants to undergo conversion that could be used by French companies to open their daughter companies or joint ventures.

In general, Soviet defence industries (87 of them are situated in Russia), suggest cooperation in developing a "Burlak" satellite system on the basis of the Tupolev-160 strategic bomber, an advanced computer still unparalleled in Europe, and the manufacture of disposable syringes, washing machines, vacuum cleaners and a wide range of high technology durable commodities. Besides, the Soviet side is interested in processing the stock-piles of chemical weapons being eliminated into mineral fertilizers and raw materials for the electronic industry.

Pierre Beregovoi said he was concerned about the absence of system of guarantees to protect foreign investors or a clear division of powers between Union and republican authorities.

As for the outlook for bilateral cooperation, he believes it would be expedient to develop direct ties between French firms and Soviet industries.

Warship Builders Fear Unemployment Under Ukraine Control

*PM2409152391 Moscow Central Television Vostok
Program and Orbita Networks in Russian 1530 GMT
13 Sep 91*

[From the "Vremya" newscast: Report by I. Petkov, V. Polozhentsev, identified by caption, from Nikolayev]

[Text] [Announcer] More than 80 percent of the Soviet machine-building industry is still working for defense, which in turn swallows up around half of the national

revenue. The transfer of union property to the sovereign republics' jurisdiction is frightening defense industry officials.

[Petkov] While conversion is being discussed in some circles, the latest "Varyag"—a heavy, aircraft-carrying cruiser—is being put together in Nikolayev, the shipbuilder's city. The first ship of this class has recently left here for the high seas and oceans. But then difficulties arose as regards funding, and rallies and a warning strike have been held at the Black Sea Shipbuilding Plant Production Association in support of claims for more money from state coffers and guaranteed supplies of resources—uninterrupted supplies, furthermore, as received in the past from the more than 1,000 plants in various parts of the country supplying components, and not just for the "Varyag," to the shipyard.

A city soviet session has declared that the switch of Union property to Ukrainian jurisdiction has put this in jeopardy, created the threat of disintegration for a large number of unique enterprises in Nikolayev, essentially defense industry enterprises, and raised the specter of unemployment. Misgivings have been officially expressed about a number of provisions of the Declaration of Ukrainian Independence.

Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk, chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet, who visited the shipbuilders' city today, reassured them that they will not lose their jobs. As long as the world is far from peaceful, Nikolayev "Varyag" cruisers will be needed, and not just by the Ukraine alone.

Conversions to Consumer Goods Production Reported

Keramika Cooperative Forced Out

*914A1233A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Sep 91
Union Edition p 4*

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent S. Yeremeyev: "The Director of a Defense Plant Drove a Peace Cooperative Out the Door"]

[Text] Ust-Kamenogorsk—Viktor Sergeyenko, chairman of the Keramika cooperative, called IZVESTIYA's Ust-Kamenogorsk bureau early in the morning. He reported in a crestfallen voice that the equipment is being sealed and that 250 people are now out of work. "Thanks" to Khardikov...

The prehistory is brief. "Free artist" V. Sergeyenko was taken to the plant, literally by the hand, by the director himself, Mikhail Petrovich Khardikov. He offered him an apartment. He took responsibility on himself and assigned a person without education as chief of the section for the output of goods for cultural and domestic purposes. And eight years later, without denying V. Sergeyenko's talent and business grasp, as before M.

Khardikov did everything both possible and impossible to send the flourishing collective packing right out the door.

And what was the closed Keramika plant engaged in until recently behind that defense screen? The output of beryllium ceramics and microchips for military hardware. The need for those products has diminished owing to conversion. A neighboring enterprise putting out analogous items was ready to pick up the small volume that remained. At a much lower cost.

What was the Keramika cooperative, which was created at the plant three years ago based on an unprofitable product line, engaged in? By and large, the output of household and souvenir ceramics. The cooperative had increased its production volume tenfold, from 250,000 rubles a year to two and a half million, in the face of non-slackening demand for rudimentary domestic items. And they were ready to go up to six million. While fulfilling the state order strictly at list prices.

However, even knowing very well that the products of the Keramika cooperative are needed by everyone and ethically supporting the cooperative, Soviet authorities both in the city and in the oblast proved to be powerless before the director of an enterprise of Union subordination. He was and remains a monopolist not only in the sphere of the output of this or that product, but also in the sphere of economic approaches, thinking, and spirit.

The plant director laid bare the essence of the conflict in the first conversation with him in straightforward and somewhat gruff fashion: I, the director of a defense enterprise and former party official, have been sitting here for poor wages my whole life, and now they have launched "that" monster on my premises and are now throwing around "that kind" of money. Without having invested a kopek in the development of the section, they have squeezed everything they could out of every square meter...

Another claim is that they have turned the plant into a parking area for vehicles they bought thanks to their commercial activity. And they put out goods of low quality. Their teapots and mugs enjoy demand because there is nothing in the market.

This last sentence sounded quite strange in the director's office, filled with samples of the products of the Keramika cooperative. The whole country is buying up these "low quality" products like hotcakes. The principal contracting party dealing with the cooperative is the East Kazakhstan Galantereytorg leasing enterprise, which receives a host of scarce products, including imported ones, in exchange for these "knick-knacks that nobody needs."

"I haven't the time, strength or desire to debate with Mikhail Petrovich Khardikov," says Viktor Sergeyenko. "With his muddled position, completely divorced from rudimentary laws of sensible economics. It is not surprising that people at the plant are deprived of any

opportunity to choose between income and losses and are confined to the blind fulfillment of even ridiculous directives. I would like to say something else: We have become the owners. The true masters, not just in name. So we are not done for, having been chucked over the fence. The ispolkom has allotted us a plot for the construction of a cooperative plant—we will build it. But it pains me personally that society is losing out on an enormous quantity of products that have not been produced but are essential right now, just for the sake of ambition. Our millions, after all, were forged in former warehouse accommodations that were not particularly needed by the plant. Now it will be empty again, I think... Who needs that?"

Uraltransmash Looking for Partners

Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian 7 Aug 91 p 2

["Ural-Aktsent" article: "Beating Swords..."]

[Text] Sverdlovsk—Because of conversion the volume of military production of heavy tracked vehicles has decreased by several times at the Uraltransmash Production Association, as reported by Chief Engineer Yuriy Butrin. The plant is converting to the output of petroleum extraction and mining equipment, and is seeking partners to organize production (possibly motor vehicles) in an empty shop.

Yuriy Butrin visited Mr. Tsukazaki, director of the Toyota Tsushio Corporation (Toyota Zucio Corporation) [words in parentheses rendered in English], during the recent visit of a Japanese delegation to Sverdlovsk; it did not, however, conclude with the signing of any agreements.

The address of the Uraltransmash Production Association is 620027 Sverdlovsk, 6. Telephone 57-05-09.

The volume of defense production at the Vysokogorsk Mechanical Plant, as reported by plant director Nikolay Bachevskiy, has been cut back significantly over the last two years as a result of conversion, and it is now about 30 percent of overall production volume. Today the plant specializes in the output of washing machines, children's carriages, and sporting gear. An arrangement to produce automatic thermoplastic devices is being proposed jointly with German firms. A contract has also been signed with Italian firms on the joint production of automatic washing machines.

Problems at Khrunichev Missile Plant

Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 31 Aug 91 p 2

[STUDINFORMO report: "You Won't Get Anywhere With Ski Poles—The USSR Military-Industrial Complex Is Experiencing Tough Times"]

[Text] Some plants are not working at full capacity, and others are standing idle altogether.

The administration of the Missile Building Plant imeni Khrunichev is vainly trying to utilize the plant's capacity. Druzhok bicycles, toboggans, and ski poles are not bringing the profits that used to be raised by military orders.

The production capacity of the Utes Association, with a collective of many thousands, is 92 percent idle. The remaining eight percent is occupied with producing radar installations for airports.

All that is evidently left for the collectives of these enterprises is to hope for armies of the future "independent states" on the territory of the former USSR. And if some of them do not have enough money for expensive hardware, perhaps they will club together to buy?

R80 Million Production at Biysk Plant

Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 11 Sep 91 p 1

[Article by A. Torichko under the rubric "Conversion":
"Peaceable Products"]

[Text] For the collective of the Biysk Chemical Combine the Union Government resolution on conversion has become the point of departure for intensive work to modernize their enterprise and convert it onto the peace track.

The local inhabitants of the city and all of Altay Kray are already feeling this work. Output of consumer goods at the combine has doubled and reached 80 million rubles [R] over the two years since the start of conversion (in prices as of 2 April this year), and this total should increase to R120 million in the current year.

The products being put out by the combine include detergents, glue, spackle, fiberglass items, latex paints, and other household chemical products. The combine is devoting particular attention to building materials. Up to 10,000 running meters of linoleum is shipped off to consumers every day, and production of wallpaper, perfumes, and other scarce consumer goods is being planned.

Role of Military Intelligence During Coup

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Sep 91 Union Edition p 8

[Letter to the editors from Colonel A. Kondrashov, GRU officer: "Once Again About the GRU's Hospitality"]

[Text] A few days ago I read an item in the newspaper: "The GRU [Main Intelligence Directorate] Is Authorized To Clarify: We Were There But Did Not Participate," in which an anonymous officer who had called the editorial offices was energetically defending the military intelligence leadership from attacks. The intelligence officers on the streets of the capital during the putsch, he said, were generally busy distributing food to the hungry. As a GRU officer, I would like to offer some clarifications.

First of all: The tales of "hospitality" produced only a smirk among many officers of the Main Intelligence Directorate, for the very simple reason that nobody had allocated any products for such work. Last year the GRU leadership refused to feed even its own officers engaged in potato harvesting. It is laughable to think that in this case they decided to show such concern for and attention toward strangers.

Now about the participation of GRU staff officers in surveillance of the populace of Moscow. Such undertakings have become routine in the military intelligence agency. For instance, in the spring, at the time of the referendum on the RSFSR presidential elections, GRU employees participated in mass democratic events, filming and photographing anticommunist placards and banners and the people carrying them. They also had the task of finding out whatever possible about the people speaking against the CPSU and socialism. On top of that, rank officers participating in these police functions had been issued personal firearms. There are now special journals in the units, where the surveillance results are entered.

[signed] Colonel A. Kondrashov

From the Editors: Without disputing the author of the letter, we would like to add some strokes to the "portrait" of GRU personnel during the putsch. Our correspondent (who is acquainted with many intelligence officers) personally saw officers of this organization in the White House actively participating in defending democracy. And not in words only. There is only one conclusion, and it is not very complicated: In each "establishment," different people behaved in different ways during those days.

Rumors of Foros Blockade During Coup

91SV0051A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 28 Aug 91 p 4

[Interview with Captain 1st Rank I. Alferev by A. Suvorov: "Was Foros Blockaded"]

[Text] Interview with Captain 1st Rank I. Alferev, commander of the Balaklava Brigade of Border Guard Ships:

[Suvorov] Igor Viktorovich, they say that ships of your brigade blockaded the dacha of the President of the USSR from the sea. Is that true?

[Alferev] On 3 August 1991 a group of four border ships and a subunit of small boats assumed guard of the state border of the USSR in the area of the residence of the President of the USSR. The arrangement to use this quantity of personnel and equipment was made 4 years ago, when the President's residence became located at Foros. From 3 to 23 August we performed our duty in the routine manner.

[Suvorov] In the context of the events which occurred the word "routine" sounds strange at the very least.

[Alferev] For us "routine" means only one thing: reliably guarding the President. Any strangeness began during the evening of 18 August. Sr Lt Andrey Krivorot, the subunit commander, reported that all lines of communication with the residence had been lost. The electric power had been turned off, and the warning equipment had ceased to operate. We therefore took additional steps to guard against sabotage and reinforced our monitoring of the air. Ships and small boats were placed on heightened combat readiness. Frankly, it was a troubled night for us. I felt no easing of the tension until 19 August, when, at 11:30, I received a report from Captain 3rd Rank Mikhail Krikunov, commander of a ship anchored next to shore, that the President had come onto the beach. The alert went out that the beach was in use. By that time we were aware that a coup d'etat had been attempted in the nation. The decision of the brigade's command element and personnel was unequivocal: Protect the President.

[Suvorov] Just what did you do?

[Alferev] On 20 August our agent established contact with one of the President's guards, at which time the message was transmitted to the latter, word for word: "Fellows, don't worry. We are with you." We had to proceed with caution so as not to attract attention. The

member of the guard was given a small parcel and asked to deliver it to an individual, described in detail, at a prearranged site on shore. This was done at 14:30 on 20 August. On 20 and 21 August our boats repeatedly approached the shore.

[Suvorov] Were there any attempts to approach the residence from the sea?

[Alferev] At 09:30 on 21 August I received a report that a group of hydrofoils was moving toward Sevastopol. I immediately alerted the ships at sea. This was done for purposes of monitoring the movement of the boats. Prior to that, on 20 August, the American cruiser Belknap put out to sea from Varna. It never came near us, however.

USSR MVD Staff Reductions To Begin Soon

91SV0098A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 14 Sep 91 p 4

[Report by Aleksandr Nadzharov: "A Minister Without a Ministry?"]

[Text] The new USSR minister of internal affairs, V. Barannikov, will soon begin a de facto liquidation of his agency. According to the Public Relations Center of the all-Union MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], staff reductions will apply to practically the entire administrative-managerial apparatus.

What is left? A few mighty brigades of operational officers, investigators, and criminologists who, on receiving a danger signal, will go to the site of especially grave and mysterious crimes in any area of the country. The ministry's new leadership believes that such help is much more needed by local law enforcement organizations than the tons of directives the center had been dumping for decades on the heads of those who were, by great effort, standing in the way of growing crime.

If the information about the staff cuts in the Ministry of Internal Affairs is confirmed, you and I can only wish that V. Barannikov will have the stamina to see his little revolution through. The resistance of those who had been running the old Ministry of Internal Affairs for years—the majority of whom are not professionals but former Komsomol ((All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League)) and party staffers—will be very strong. On the other hand, what can these militia generals and colonels say after having engaged almost exclusively in gloomy warnings about the rise in organized crime while not being able to control it even within the bounds of an individual farmers market?

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